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Why Don’t Judges Case Manage? 
HON. JENNIFER D. BAILEY* 
The problems of cost and delay experienced by parties 
seeking civil justice have been the subject of complaints for 
nearly one hundred years, going back to the days of Roscoe 
Pound.1 In the past few years, court leadership across the 
country has emphasized judicial case management as a sig-
nificant tool for delivery of cost-effective, fair, and timely 
civil justice. The declining civil caseload has brought new 
urgency to these problems as evidence grows that litigants 
are deserting the civil justice system. Calls for case manage-
ment to contain cost and delay have come from the Chief 
Justice of the United States, the Conference of Chief Jus-
tices, state bar and Supreme Court commissions, and the 
American Bar Association. The continuing demand for case 
management in virtually every lawyer survey, state bar com-
mission, task force, and civil justice report over recent years 
evidences that judicial case management is not occurring on 
a day-to-day basis in today’s civil courtrooms. Notwith-
standing broad calls for judicial case management, most 
judges still don’t case manage—if they did, calls for case 
management would not be persistent and relentless.  
 If court leaders are going to rely on civil case manage-
ment as a critical tool in improving civil justice, it is critical 
to understand how judges in everyday courtrooms view civil 
case management and how to best encourage its utilization. 
                                                                                                         
 *  Administrative Judge, Circuit Civil Division, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, 
Miami, Florida. This Article represents thesis work completed in Duke University 
Law School’s LL.M. in Judicial Studies program. Thanks to Duke for the oppor-
tunity to participate in the program, Dean David F. Levi, Professor Jack Knight, 
and the Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal for their guidance and advice, and to Yanitza 
Madrigal for her excellent research/technical assistance. 
 1  See Jay Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
513, 537–38 (2006) [hereinafter Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century] (discussing Roscoe 
Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 
29 REP. A.B.A. 395 (1906), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273 (1964)). 
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This thesis reports the results of an empirical investigation 
by survey into judicial attitudes among Florida circuit civil 
trial judges regarding utilization of case management in the 
handling of civil disputes in courts of general jurisdiction.2 
The results of surveying Florida circuit judges demonstrate 
that the lack of widespread civil case management is less a 
deliberate choice due to resistance or philosophical objec-
tion than it is a product of the lack of a definition of what 
“civil case management” means and the scope of that task, 
a perceived lack of time and support, and a failure to incen-
tivize its adoption through data sharing and performance 
measures. Through this research, I hope to provide one 
state’s perspective on this challenge to provide guidance to 
my state and others in implementing this cultural shift across 
civil justice.  
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 2  See FLA. STAT. § 34.01(1)(c) (2018) (granting the Florida county courts ju-
risdiction over civil disputes not exceeding a sum of $15,000 in value). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Courts acknowledge the existence of profound challenges of 
cost and delay to civil justice today. There is mounting evidence that 
state civil courts are losing their relevance as a meaningful forum to 
resolve disputes. The civil caseload in state courts have been in a 
steady decline for at least ten years.3 Over the ten-year period be-
tween 2006 and 2015 state civil caseloads declined a total of eleven 
percent (11%).4 Since 2009, when caseloads peaked due to the in-
flux in foreclosure and collection cases resulting from the great re-
cession, civil caseloads have declined by twenty-one percent 
(21%).5 In comparison, the Federal court civil caseload remained 
relatively stagnant over the span of twenty-seven years, increasing 
about nine percent (9%) between 1986 and 2013.6 
Concerns about the increasing costs of discovery and the exploi-
tation of flaws in the civil process as a means to extract strategic 
benefit in litigation are manifest.7 Complaints about cost and delay 
are universal.8 Parties and courts alike decry abusive tactics and lack 
                                                                                                         
 3  See RICHARD Y. SCHAUFFLER ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EX-
AMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN OVERVIEW OF 2015 STATE COURTS 
CASELOADS 1, 4 (2016), http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/ 
CSP/EWSC%202015.ashx [hereinafter EXAMINING THE WORK].  
 4  Id. (defining civil caseloads to include case types such as tort, contract, real 
property, mental health, and small claims).  
 5  Id. (stating that 2009 saw 19.5 million incoming civil cases and that the 
average drop from year-to-year was 3.5%).  
 6  Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Civil Caseload of the Federal District 
Courts, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1177, 1186 (2015). 
 7  See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost 
in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 772 (2010); Lee H. Rosen-
thal, From Rules of Procedure to How Lawyers Litigate: ‘Twixt the Cup and the 
Lip, 87 DENVER U. L. REV. 227, 242 (2009) [hereinafter Rosenthal, Defining the 
Problem]; CORINA GERETY & BRITTANY KAUFFMAN, INST. FOR THE ADV. OF THE 
AM. LEGAL SYS., SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE PRO-
CESS: 2008–2013, at 26 (2014); Jay Tidmarsh, Resolving Cases “On the Mer-
its,” 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 407, 412 (2009) [hereinafter Tidmarsh, Resolving 
Cases]. 
 8  See Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, supra note 1, at 552; Judith Resnik, The 
Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793,1813 (2014) [hereinafter Resnik, 
Privatization of Process]; Richard D. Freer, Exodus from and Transformation of 
American Civil Litigation, 65 EMORY L.J. 1491, 1501 (2016). 
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of management that distorts the value of a case, usually either by 
consequence of cost (mostly discovery) to the defendant or delay to 
the plaintiff.9 The cost of the litigation process, as opposed to the 
merits of the case, has come to define the value of cases.10 As one 
commentator has vividly stated, “[n]ourishing the fiction that justice 
is a pearl beyond price has its own price.”11 
The perception that courts cannot cost-effectively deliver timely 
results has also caused people with modest cases to simply surrender 
their rights or disputes because of the burden going to court repre-
sents.12 The perception is that it is simply not worth it.13 The 2015 
                                                                                                         
 9  See Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, Four Years After Duke: Where 
Do We Stand on Calibrating the Pretrial Process?, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
643, 646 (2014) [hereinafter Gensler & Rosenthal, Four Years After Duke]; GER-
ETY & KAUFFMAN, supra note 7, at 26 (“Attorneys . . . have expressed that in 
some circumstances targeted and tailored discovery can lead to a more efficient 
(i.e., less costly) resolution than little or no discovery, and cost-conscious lawyers 
are aware when the cost of obtaining marginal information will exceed the bene-
fit.”). 
 10  See Richard A. Nagareda, 1938 All Over Again? Pretrial As Trial in Com-
plex Litigation, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 647, 655–56 (2011) (stating that the “settle-
ment value” of a case “depends largely upon” the costs associated with the dis-
covery process). 
 11  E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 
U. CHI. L. REV. 306, 321 (1986). 
 12  John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 
122 YALE L.J. 522, 551 (2012) (“Discovery is costly, so costly that the prospect 
of having to bear those costscan dissuade a potential litigant from advancing a 
meritorious claim or defense.”). Cf. REBECCA L. SANDEFUR, ACCESSING JUSTICE 
IN THE CONTEMPORARY USA: FINDINGS FROM THE COMMUNITY NEEDS AND SER-
VICES STUDY 15 (2014), http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/
documents/sandefur_accessing_justice_in_the_contemporary_usa._aug._ 
2014.pdf (“58% of those surveyed agreed with the statement that ‘lawyers are not 
affordable for people on low incomes.’”); Freer, supra note 8, at 1501 (“[D]issat-
isfaction with the delay and expense of litigation led many to extoll the virtue of 
less formalized process.”).  
 13  Langbein, supra note 12, at 551–52; Memorandum from GBA Strategies 
to Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Analysis of National Survey of Registered Voters 1 
(Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Public%20 
Trust%20and%20Confidence/SoSC_2015_Survey%20Analysis.ashx [hereinaf-
ter Memorandum from GBA Strategies] (“[P]ersistant concerns about customer 
service, inefficiency, and bias are undermining the public’s confidence in the 
courts and leading them to look for alternative means of resolving disputes or 
addressing problems that would have previously led them into the court system.”); 
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State of the State Courts survey conducted for the National Center 
for State Courts found that fifty-four percent (54%) of those inter-
viewed believed that the court system is “inefficient, intimidating, 
and expensive.”14 The public perceives that “attorneys are getting 
rich by running the meter” as opposed to resolving disputes swiftly 
and cost-effectively.15  
Many parties have turned to alternatives such as arbitration, pri-
vate judges, or mediation.16 The 2015 State of the Court Survey also 
found that fifty-four percent (54%) of the surveyed public believe 
that “[a]lternative ways to resolve disputes, like mediation, are 
faster, cheaper, and more responsive to the needs of the people they 
serve than the court system.”17 Globalization and alternative meth-
ods of dispute resolution are marginalizing the American litigation 
system.18 The United States Supreme Court has elected to treat pri-
vate arbitration and public adjudication as mechanisms of “equal 
dignity.”19 Courts now face competition as a forum for dispute res-
olution and are losing out.20 As far back as 1995, the Federal Judicial 
Conference Long Range Plan warned of the possible results:  
Those civil litigants who can afford it will opt out of 
the court system entirely for private dispute resolu-
tion providers. . . . [J]udges are able to spend fewer 
of their working hours in civil trials than ever before, 
and the future may make the civil jury trial—and per-
haps the civil bench trial as well—a creature of the 
past. . . . [C]ourts, rather than being forums where 
                                                                                                         
Cf. GERETY & KAUFFMAN, supra note 7, at 26 (“[C]ost-concious lawyers are 
aware when the cost of obtaining marginal information will exceed the benefit.”). 
 14  Memorandum from GBA Strategies, supra note 13, at 2. 
 15  Freer, supra note 8, at 1514. 
 16  Nagareda, supra note 10, at 692; Memorandum from GBA Strategies, su-
pra note 13, at 2–3. 
 17  Memorandum from GBA Strategies, supra note 13, at 3. 
 18  Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, supra note 1, at 540. 
 19  Freer, supra note 8, at 1492 (“In approving this expansion [of the Federal 
Arbitration Act], the [Supreme] Court increasingly makes clear that it sees noth-
ing special about court litigation—that it an arbitration are mechanisms of equal 
dignity.”); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1631, 1636–39 (2005). 
 20  Memorandum from GBA Strategies, supra note 13, at 2–3; Freer, supra 
note 8, at 1501. 
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the weak and the few have recognized rights that the 
strong and the many must regard, could become an 
arena for second-class justice.21  
As noted by United States District Court Judge Lee Rosenthal in an 
article penned with Professor Steven Gensler,  
 
[T]here seems to be a growing sense of shared con-
viction that without effective judicial case manage-
ment, the age-old problems of cost and delay will so 
frustrate lawyers and litigants that they will continue 
to leave the judicial system with fewer and fewer 
cases tried, or they will simply avoid the system al-
together.22  
At a time when technology and transparency is changing every 
aspect of life, the courts seem creaky, flawed, and vaguely irrelevant 
in the immediacy of information available in modern life. A 2014 
National Center for State Courts survey conducted by Accenture 
found that, of those citizens surveyed, seventy-four percent (74%) 
believed that the “[j]ustice system needs to improve . . . [s]peed and 
efficiency” and fifty-two percent believed that the “[j]ustice system 
needs to improve . . . [c]ost.” 23As a solution to these problems, 
sixty-three percent (63%) believed digital technology could “speed 
up outcomes,” sixty-two percent (62%) believed digital technology 
could “reduce public costs,” and fifty-four percent (54%) believed 
digital technology could “reduce personal cost to individuals in-
volved.”24 The idea that courts deliver services and that litigants are 
“valued customers” is a new concept to many working in the court 
system, “but it captures the basic idea that people entering the court-
                                                                                                         
 21  JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL 
COURTS 19–20 (1995), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/federalcourt-
slongrangeplan_0.pdf.  
 22  Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, The Reappearing Judge, 61 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 849, 855 (2013) [hereinafter Gensler & Rosenthal, The Reappearing 
Judge]. 
 23  Citizen Support for Digital Justice to Reduce Cost and Speed Up Out-
comes, ACCENTURE (2015) https://www.accenture.com/nz-en/insight-2014-ac-
centure-citizen-survey-digital-justice-infographic. 
 24  Id. 
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house react to both the services delivered and the manner of deliv-
ery.”25 The idea that those customers can take their dispute resolu-
tion business elsewhere is even more startling to some.26 “[S]tate 
courts find themselves in an unfamiliar position of facing competi-
tion for customers,”27 while, at the same time, continuing to do busi-
ness as usual as complaints of judicial disengagement “persist and 
abound.”28  
The decline in the civil court caseload has ramifications for de-
mocracy. As far back as 1997, sociologist Tom Tyler warned of a 
“public ‘crisis of confidence’ in the legal system.”29 As summarized 
by the National Center for State Courts:  
[I]t is through courts that those seeking justice can 
obtain it, regardless of wealth or power. Courts exist 
to assure that asymmetries of power do not dictate 
the outcome of disputes. . . . [I]n our common-law 
system, a public record of court decisions is essential 
for establishing and updating our legal system. When 
disputes are resolved in private venues, information 
is denied to the public and to those seeking to ensure 
appropriate regulation of social and economic 
life. . . . [T]he judiciary plays a key role in ensuring 
checks and balances on the power and actions of the 
executive and legislative branches.30 
The critical role of reliable court systems as a component of stable 
democracies is reflected in world economic reports, which include 
                                                                                                         
 25  Brian Ostrom et al., Creating a New Generation of Courts, 47 CT. REV. 80, 
80–81 (2011). 
 26  NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS. AND ST. JUST. INST., CIVIL JUSTICE INITIATIVE: 
THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIG. IN ST. CTS., at iii (2013), 
http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Research/CivilJusticeReport-2015.ashx 
[hereinafter LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION]. 
 27  Memorandum from GBA Strategies, supra note 13, at 2. 
 28  Rosenthal, Defining the Problem, supra note 7, at 238. 
 29  Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science 
Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871, 872 (1997). 
 30  Richard Y. Schauffler, The Rise and Fall of State Court Caseloads, in 
TRENDS: UP CLOSE, at 2 (Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Trends in the State Courts 
April 2017), https://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/ctadmin/id/2184/. 
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the evaluations of the adequacy and availability of civil court reso-
lutions in comparing national economies.31  
The chief justices of state supreme courts recognized that re-es-
tablishing and maintaining the reputation of state courts as a legiti-
mate forum, providing timely and affordable opportunities to re-
solve disputes, is essential. In 2013, the nation-wide Conference of 
Chief Justices created a committee to evaluate data, make recom-
mendations, and develop guidelines “for the purpose of improving 
the civil justice system in state courts.”32 After two years of analyz-
ing existing pilot projects, surveys, research, and empirical data, the 
Civil Justice Improvements Committee made thirteen comprehen-
sive recommendations to the Conference of Chief Justices, which 
are memorialized in their Call to Action report (“CJI Report”),33 and 
framed the problem in the following way:  
Americans deserve a civil legal process that can 
fairly and promptly resolve disputes for everyone—
rich or poor, individuals or businesses, in matters 
large or small. Yet our civil justice system often fails 
to meet this standard. Runaway costs, delays, and 
complexity are undermining public confidence and 
denying people the justice they seek. This has to 
change.34  
The CJI Report’s proposals lead off with the following recom-
mendation (“Recommendation One”): “Courts must take responsi-
bility for managing civil cases from time of filing to disposition.”35 
The American Bar Association’s House of Delegates adopted the 
                                                                                                         
 31  See, e.g., ECON. DEP’T, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., POLICY 
NOTE NO. 18, WHAT MAKES CIVIL JUSTICE EFFECTIVE? 2 (2013), 
https://www.oecd.org/eco/growth/Civil%20Justice%20Policy%20Note.pdf 
[hereinafter WHAT MAKES CIVIL JUSTICE EFFECTIVE?] (“Well-functioning judici-
aries guarantee security of property rights and enforcement of con-
tracts. . . . [which] strengthens incentives to save and invest[.]”). 
 32  CIVIL JUSTICE IMPROVEMENTS COMM., CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, 
CALL TO ACTION: ACHIEVING CIVIL JUSTICE FOR ALL 4–5 (2016), 
https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/Civil-Justice/NCSC-CJI-Report-
Web.ashx [hereinafter CJI REPORT]. 
 33  Id.  
 34  Id. at 2. 
 35  Id. at 16. 
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recommendations in the CJI Report in 2017, “urg[ing] all state 
courts to consider the Recommendations of [the CJI Report] as ap-
propriate guidance in their endeavors to achive demonstrable civil 
justice improvements with respect to the expenditure of time and 
costs to resolve civil cases,” which signals a strong endorsement of 
judicial case management.36 The CJI Report’s Commentary on Rec-
ommendation One succinctly summarizes the problem:  
Our civil justice system has historically expected lit-
igants to drive the pace of civil litigation by request-
ing court involvement as issues arise. This often re-
sults in delay as litigants wait in line for attention 
from a passive court—be it for rulings on motions, a 
requested hearing, or even setting a trial date. The 
wait-for-a-problem paradigm effectively shields 
courts from responsibility for the pace of litiga-
tion. . . . The party-take-the-lead culture can encour-
age delay strategies by attorneys, whose own inter-
ests and the interests of their clients may favor delay 
rather than efficiency. In short, adversarial strategiz-
ing can undermine the achievement of fair, econom-
ical, and timely outcomes.37  
This initiative by state supreme court chief justices followed the 
2010 Conference on Civil Litigation held by the Federal Civil Rules 
Advisory Committee at Duke University Law School (the “Duke 
Conference” or the “Duke Conference Report”).38 Similar to the CJI 
Report, the Duke Conference Report also demanded strong case 
management: “There was nearly unanimous agreement that the dis-
position of civil actions could be improved, reducing cost and delay, 
by advancing cooperation among the parties, proportionality in the 
                                                                                                         
 36  A.B.A. HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 102, at 1 (Feb. 6, 2017).  
 37  CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 16.  
 38  JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES AND THE 
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE 2010 CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION 1 (2010), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/report_to_the_chief_justice.pdf 
[hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMM.]; DUKE CONFERENCE SUB-
COMM., ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, REPORT OF THE DUKE CONFERENCE 
SUBCOMMITTEE 79 (2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_im-
port/CV2014-04.pdf [hereinafter DUKE CONFERENCE REPORT].  
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use of available procedures, and early and active judicial case man-
agement.”39 The Duke Conference Report referenced surveys and 
reports from the Federal Judicial Center (“FJC”), the American Col-
lege of Trial Lawyers and the Institute for the Advancement of the 
American Legal System, the American Bar Association section on 
litigation and the National Employment Lawyers association 
(“NELA”), along with perspectives from the Lawyers for Civil Jus-
tice, the Civil Justice Reform Group, and the U.S. Chamber Institute 
for Legal Reform.40 As described by attendees, “Many users of the 
current scheme—whether speaking from the perspective of plain-
tiffs or defendants, business or public interest, government or pri-
vate litigants—complained that a wide variety of cases took too long 
and cost too much to resolve.”41 The report identified that 
judges must be considerably more involved in man-
aging each case from the outset, to tailor the motions 
practice and shape the discovery to the reasonable 
needs of that case. The challenge is to achieve this on 
a consistent, institutional basis without interfering 
with the independence and creativity of each judge 
and district responding to the specific mix of cases 
and docket conditions, and without interfering with 
the effective handling of many cases under existing 
rules and practices.42  
Rather than intiating a complete overhaul of the current case man-
agement system, many users believe that the simplest solution 
would be to increase judicial engagement and intervention.43 This 
reflects the common and strong belief that judicial management is 
the key stone to the reasonable needs of a case. The Duke conference 
remedy reflected a strong, shared belief that judicial management is 
essential to tailoring the pretrial process to the reasonable needs of 
the case.44  
                                                                                                         
 39  DUKE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 38, at 79.  
 40  Id. at 79, 82–83, 115. 
 41  Gensler & Rosenthal, Four Years After Duke, supra note 9, at 645. 
 42  JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMM., supra note 38, at 4. 
 43  Gensler & Rosenthal, Four Years After Duke, supra note 9, at 645. 
 44  Id. 
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The consensus on the need for court case management extends 
to every level of court. In his 2015 report on the State of the Judici-
ary, United States Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts ex-
tolled the virtues of civil case management in just, speedy, and in-
expensive delivery of civil justice:  
Judges must be willing to take on a stewardship role, 
managing their cases from the outset rather than al-
lowing parties alone to dictate the scope of discovery 
and the pace of litigation. Faced with crushing dock-
ets, judges can be tempted to postpone engagement 
in pretrial activities. Experience has shown, how-
ever, that judges who are knowledgeable, actively 
engaged, and accessible early in the process are far 
more effective in resolving cases fairly and effi-
ciently, because they can identify the critical issues, 
determine the appropriate breadth of discovery, and 
curtail dilatory tactics, gamesmanship, and proce-
dural posturing.45  
Chief Justice Roberts continued that emphasis in his 2016 report:  
As I explained in my 2015 Year-End Report, the Ju-
dicial Conference—the policy making body of the 
federal courts—has revised the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure to emphasize the judge’s role in 
early and effective case management. Those proce-
dural reforms encourage district judges to meet 
promptly with the lawyers after the complaint is 
filed, confer about the needs of the case, develop a 
case management plan, and expedite resolution of 
pretrial discovery disputes. The reforms are begin-
ning to have a positive effect because already ex-
tremely busy judges are willing to undertake more 
active engagement in managing their dockets, which 
                                                                                                         
 45  C. J. JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FED. JUDICI-
ARY 10–11 (2015), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year 
-endreport.pdf [hereinafter 2015 YEAR-END REPORT]. 
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will pay dividends down the road. A lumberjack 
saves time when he takes the time to sharpen his ax.46 
Since 2010, multiple state civil justice commissions and pilot 
projects across the country have called for active court case man-
agement as key to delivering better value in civil justice by reducing 
cost and delay.47 These calls echo the calls of prior decades. The 
                                                                                                         
 46  C.J. JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2016 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FED. JUDICI-
ARY 6–7 (2016), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2016year-
endreport.pdf [hereinafter 2016 YEAR-END REPORT]. 
 47  See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON THE ESCALATING COSTS OF CIVIL LITIG., WASH. 
STATE BAR ASS’N, FINAL REPORT TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS 3 (2015), 
https://www.wsba.org/docs/default-source/legal-community/committees/eccl-
task-force/reports/eccl-final-report-06152015.pdf?sfvrsn=3a993cf1_2; INST. FOR 
THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., UNIV. OF DENVER, CIVIL CASE PRO-
CESSING IN THE OREGON COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF MULTNOMAH COUNTY 1–3 
(2010), https://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/civil_case_ 
processing_oregon_courts2010.pdf; COMM. ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, ARIZ. SU-
PREME COURT, A CALL TO REFORM 1–3, 7–9 (2016), http://www.azcourts.gov/ 
Portals/74/CJRC/Master%20CJRC%20Final%20Report%20and%20Recom-
mendations.pdf [hereinafter ARIZ. CALL TO REFORM]; News Release, N.J. Courts, 
Supreme Court Committee on Expedited Civil Actions Releases Report (Apr. 15, 
2014), https://www.njcourts.gov/pressrel/2014/pr140415b.pdf; IOWA CIVIL JUS-
TICE REFORM TASK FORCE, REFORMING THE IOWA CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM, at v–
viii (2012), https://www.iowacourts.gov/media/cms/FINAL03_22_12_0E9941A 
E5D491.pdf; CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, 
CIVIL RE-ENGINEERING CONCEPT PAPER 2–4 (2014), https://ccj.ncsc.org/~/media 
/Microsites/Files/CCJ/Web%20Documents/Civil%20Justice%20Initiative/ Con-
necticut%20Concept%20Paper%20Civil%20Re-engineering.ashx; CIVIL JUS-
TICE INITIATIVE, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, NEW HAMPSHIRE: IMPACT OF 
THE PROPORTIONAL DISCOVERY/AUTOMATIC DISCLOSURE (PAD) PILOT RULES 1, 
19–22 (2013), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/%E2%80%8CPDF /Top-
ics/Civil%20Procedure/12022013-Civil-Justice-Initiative-New%E2%80% 8C-
Hampshire.ashx [hereinafter NEW HAMPSHIRE: PAD PILOT RULES]; Nat’l Ctr. for 
State Courts, Complex Litigation: Key Findings from the California Pilot Pro-
gram, CIVIL ACTION, Winter 2004, at 1–2 [hereinafter Complex Litigation: Key 
Findings]; JUDICIAL BRANCH STATE OF IDAHO, ADVANCING JUSTICE: PROMOT-
ING FAIR AND TIMELY CASE RESOLUTION (2013), http://idahodocs.con-
tentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p16293coll3/id/251137; INST. FOR THE AD-
VANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., UNIV. OF DENVER, STATEWIDE CASEFLOW 
MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE IDAHO DISTRICT COURTS 1 (2014), 
http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/idaho_state 
wide_caseflow_management_plan.pdf; Andrew A. Powell, It’s Nothing Per-
sonal, It’s Just Business: A Commentary on the South Carolina Business Court 
Pilot Program, 61 S.C. L. REV. 823, 839–42 (2010); MINN. SUPREME COURT 
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judicial branch is confronting the truth that the “interests, values, 
and rights of all participants in the legal process are court responsi-
bilities. . . . Fairness is desired by everyone, with court customers 
wanting this result through a process that is predictable, timely, and 
cost-effective.”48 
I. PRIOR SURVEYS AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
There have been multiple surveys over the past decade establish-
ing strong support for civil court case management as a solution to 
the challenges plaguing the civil justice system.49 In 2007, the 
American College of Trial Lawyers (the “ACTL”) and the Institute 
for the Advancement of the American Legal System (the “IAALS”) 
began a joint project “to examine the role of discovery in perceived 
problems in the United States civil justice system and to make rec-
ommendations for reform” in which they surveyed ACTL members 
                                                                                                         
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE TASK 
FORCE 4–5 (2011), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2012/other/ 120214.pdf; JU-
DICIAL IMPROVEMENTS COMM. OF THE S. DIST. OF N.Y., REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL 
IMPROVEMENTS COMMITTEE: PILOT PROJECT REGARDING CASE MANAGEMENT 
TECHNIQUES FOR COMPLEX CIVIL CASES, at ii (2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
sites/default/files/tab_vi_appendix_f_sdny_pilot_project_for_complex_litiga-
tion_0.pdf; Howard Berchtold et al., Bureau of Justice Assistance Criminal Courts 
Tech. Assistance Project, Differentiated Cases Management Concept and Appli-
cation to Civil Case Management, NACM ANNUAL CONFERENCE (July 23, 2010), 
https://nacmnet.org/sites/default/files/conferences/PastConferences/PastConfer-
ences/2010Annual/Civil%20DCM.pdf; INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE 
AM. LEGAL SYS., UNIV. OF DENVER, SURVEY OF THE ARIZONA BENCH & BAR: ON 
THE ARIZONA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1 (2010), http://iaals.du.edu/sites/de-
fault/files/documents/publications/survey_arizona_bench_bar2010.pdf [hereinaf-
ter SURVEY OF THE ARIZONA BENCH]; INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. 
LEGAL SYS., UNIV. OF DENVER, SURVEY OF THE OREGON BENCH & BAR: ON THE 
OREGON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1–2 (2010), http://iaals.du.edu/sites/de-
fault/files/documents/publications/survey_oregon_bench_bar2010.pdf; LEE SUS-
KIN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, A CASE STUDY: REENGINEERING UTAH’S 
COURTS THROUGH THE LENS OF THE PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, 
at i–ii (2012), http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/ documents/publications/sur-
vey_oregon_bench_bar2010.pdf. 
 48  Ostrom et al., supra note 25, at 80.  
 49  See generally EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, ATTORNEY SAT-
ISFACTION WITH THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: REPORT TO THE JU-
DICIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2010), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/ 
default/files/2012/CostCiv2.pdf.  
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beginning in 2008.50 The results of this survey identified the need 
for serious repair of the civil justice system, and called for judges to 
have a more proactive role in the direction, timing, and cost-contain-
ment of a case beginning at the outset of the case, from filing to trial, 
including designing the scope of discovery.51 The survey also iden-
tified rule enforcement as an issue.52  
In response to the problems the survey identified, the 
ACTL/IAALS survey recommended that judges hold prompt initial 
conferences after service of a complaint to effectively manage all of 
their cases.53 The survey noted that “[e]arly judicial involvement is 
important because not all cases are the same and because different 
types of cases require different case management.” 54 Seventy-four 
percent (74%) of the respondents reported that early intervention by 
the judge helped narrow the issues in the case.55 The survey called 
for courts to set realistic timetables for discovery and to establish 
trial dates at the first pretrial conference.56 The report specifically 
discussed how continuing trial dates, or the failure to establish firm 
trial dates, increases the cost and delay of cases and, to fix this issue, 
called for courts to enforce firm trial dates.57 The ABA Section on 
Litigation surveyed its members in Fall 2009.58 The respondents to 
the ABA survey agreed that litigation was too expensive, costs 
would be reduced by expediated disposition, and judges help with 
                                                                                                         
 50  AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE 
AM. LEGAL SYS., FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COL-
LEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR 
THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 1–2 (2009), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/final_report_on_the_joint_project_of 
_the_actl_task_force_on_discovery_and_the_iaals_1.pdf. 
 51  Id. at 2. 
 52  Id.  
 53  Id. at 13. 
 54  Id. at 19.  
 55  Id. 
 56  Id.  
 57  See id. at 20. 
 58  SPECIAL COMM. ON THE FUTURE OF CIVIL LITIG., AM. BAR ASS’N, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE IN THE 21ST CENTURY: SOME PROPOSALS (2010), http://www.us 
courts.gov/sites/default/files/aba_litigation_section_civil_procedure_in_the_21st 
_century_0.pdf [hereinafter CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE 21ST CENTURY]. 
2019] WHY DON’T JUDGES CASE MANAGE? 1085 
narrowing issues and limiting discovery.59 The ABA Section on Lit-
igation also endorsed case management as a critical tool in reducing 
cost and delay.60 
In 2010, IAALS conducted another survey, this time to collect 
data from federal and state trial judges about the civil justice sys-
tem.61 The majority of the participating judges acknowledged that 
civil justice takes too long.62 Seventy-five percent (75%) of state 
trial judges and eighty-eight percent (88%) of federal judges be-
lieved that early intervention by a judge helps to narrow issues.63 
Federal respondents felt that early Rule 16 pretrial conferences lead 
to faster case resolution and improved time management.64 Seventy 
percent (70%) of responding state and federal judges believed that a 
case management order setting deadlines should be entered early in 
the case and control the litigation going forward. The respondent 
judges, both state and federal, overwhelmingly indicated that both 
the time required for discovery and requests for extensions and con-
tinuances by attorneys were significant causes for delay.65 Interest-
ingly, the state and federal judges were more reserved when asked 
to self-examine their own role in delay, with a much lower rate of 
                                                                                                         
 59  Id. at 5.  
 60  See id. at 4. 
 61  Corina Gerety, Trial Bench Views: IAALS Report on Findings from a Na-
tional Survey on Civil Procedure, 32 PACE L. REV. 301, 301 (2012). 
 62  Id. at 303. 
 63  Id.at 314. 
 64  Id. at 302.  
 65  Id. at 329 (displaying that eighty-two percent (82%) of state trial judges 
and eighty-four percent (84%) of federal trial judges indicated that the “time re-
quired to complete discovery” was a significant cause of delay, while eighty-three 
percent (83%) of state trial judges and eighty-five percent (85%) of federal trial 
judges indicated that “attorney requests for extensions and continuances” were a 
significant cause of delay).  
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judges indicating their belief that delayed rulings and court contin-
uances were causes of significant delay.66 At the same time, a ma-
jority of responding judges grant pleading extensions ninety percent 
(90%) of the time.67  
In 2009, the FJC conducted a survey of attorneys focused on the 
costs of litigation and discovery as well as the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, amongst other topics.68 The survey placed the attorneys 
into three groups: (1) those who primarily represented plaintiffs; (2) 
those who primarily represented defendants; and (3) those who rep-
resented both plaintiffs and defendants equally.69 The survey asked 
two complementary questions: (1) should the Rules be amended to 
encourage judicial case management and (2) should the Rules be 
amended to discourage judicial case management?70 To the first 
question, approximately forty-three percent (43%) of the respond-
ents who represented both plaintiffs and defendants equally agreed 
or strongly agreed, thirty percent (30%) felt neutral, and only 
twenty-six percent (26%) disagreed or strongly disagreed.71 How-
ever, to the second question, only eleven percent (11%) of the re-
spondents who represented both plaintiffs and defendants equally 
agreed or strongly agreed, thirty-two percent (32%) felt neutral, and, 
                                                                                                         
 66  Id. (displaying that only sixty-five percent (65%) of state trial judges and 
seventy-five percent (75%) of federal trial judges indicated that “[d]elayed rulings 
on pending motions” were a significant cause of delay, while only sixty-seven 
percent (67%) of state trial judges and sixty-five percent (65%) of federal trial 
judges indicated that “[c]ourt continuances of scheduled events” were a signifi-
cant cause of delay).  
 67  Id. at 330. 
 68  EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CENTER NATIONAL, CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY 
REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 
1 (2009), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/materials/08/CivilRulesSurvey 
2009.pdf. 
 69  Id. at 2. 
 70  Id.at 66–67. 
 71  Id. Of the respondents who represented primarily plaintiffs, approximately 
thirty-three percent (33%) agreed or strongly agreed, twenty-nine percent (29%) 
felt neutral, and thirty-five percent (35%) disagreed or strongly disagreed. Id. Of 
the respondents who represented primarily defendants, approximately thirty-four 
percent (34%) agreed or strongly agreed, thirty-four percent (34%) felt neutral, 
and thiry percent (30%) disagreed or strongly disagreed. Id.  
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most interestingly, fifty-three percent (53%) disagreed or strongly 
disagreed.72 
Notwithstanding the broad enthusiasm for judicial case manage-
ment and the resulting rule changes to encourage it, there remains a 
dearth of data on case management’s effectiveness.73 Important top-
ics, such as whether case management delivers better value in terms 
of cost and timely resolution of issues, and what tools and resources 
judges need to case manage effectively have not been the subjects 
of objective measurement.74 Most of the measurement data that does 
exist comes from state pilot projects, small in scale, which have been 
summarized in excellent reports from the Civil Justice Initiative75 
and IAALS.76 Previous efforts at federal measurement were con-
ducted in the 1990s with the passage of the Civil Justice Reform Act 
(“CJRA”);77 however, the CJRA pilot program has largely failed to 
provide definitive empirical results on whether case management 
projects are actually effective and efficient.78  
A 1996 study conducted by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice 
is arguably the most significant study of federal civil justice reforms 
that has, as of now, been conducted.79 The study “summarizes three 
                                                                                                         
 72  Id. at 67–68. Of the respondents who represented primarily plaintiffs, ap-
proximately sixteen percent (16%) agreed or strongly agreed, thirty-three percent 
(33%) felt neutral, and forty-six percent (46%) disagreed or strongly disagreed. 
Id. Of the respondents who represented primarily defendants, approximately 
eleven percent (11%) agreed or strongly agreed, thirty-seven percent (37%) felt 
neutral, and forty-nine percent (49%) disagreed or strongly disagreed. Id.  
 73  Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the Crossfire, 60 
DUKE L.J. 669, 672 (2010) [hereinafter Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire] (“But 
even though we are nearly thirty years into the case management era, many prac-
tical questions about the real-world effectiveness of judicial case management re-
main at least partly unanswered.”); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. 
L. REV 374, 380 (1982) [hereinafter Resnik, Managerial Judges]. 
 74  Id.  
 75  See generally, e.g., CJI REPORT, supra note 32.  
 76  See generally, e.g., GERETY & KAUFFMAN, supra note 7. 
 77  Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA), Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. I, 104 
Stat. 5089 (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–482 (2016)). 
 78  Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, supra note 73, at 716 (explaining that 
insufficient participation and individualized case management, as well as incon-
sistent tracking, were reasons for the CJRA’s failure to provide meaningful em-
pirical data). 
 79  JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, JUST, SPEEDY, 
AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER 
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technical reports that document RAND’s evaluation of the 
[CJRA].”80 The study found that “what judges do to manage cases 
matters” in several different respects.81 The RAND study found that 
early judicial case management, including setting a trial schedule 
early, firm and shortened discovery cutoffs, and appropriate settle-
ment conferences, significantly reduced time to disposition.82 While 
the study found that costs were significantly increased by early case 
management, the study also found that this increase could be offset 
by the decrease in discovery costs associated with firm and short-
ened discovery cutoffs.83 This combination of early case manange-
ment and firm discovery cutoffs, RAND concluded, resulted in “no 
cost penalty for a reduced time to disposition of approximately four 
to five months.”84  
With regard to the relationship between time and cost, RAND 
explained its conclusions in the following way:  
Early judicial case management has significant 
effects on both time and cost. We estimate a 1.5 to 2 
month reduction in median time to disposition for 
cases that last at least nine months, and an approxi-
mately 20-hour increase in lawyer work 
hours. . . . [However] costs to litigants are also 
higher in dollar terms and in litigant hours spent 
when cases are managed early. These results debunk 
the myth that reducing time to disposition will nec-
essarily reduce litigation cost.85  
                                                                                                         
THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/ 
pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR800.pdf.  
 80  Id. at v. The three reports summarized in the RAND study are the follow-
ing: (1) Implementation of the Civil Justice Reform Act in Pilot and Comparison 
Districts; (2) An Evaluation of Judicial Case Management Under the Civil Justice 
Reform Act; and (3) An Evaluation of Mediation and Early Neutral Evaluation 
Under the Civil Justice Reform Act. Id.  
 81  Id. at 1–2.  
 82  Id. 
 83  Id. at 2. 
 84  Id.  
 85  Id. at 14. 
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The RAND study also found that early judicial case manage-
ment shifted work earlier in the case, but found that active manage-
ment of discovery reduced costs during the discovery phase. Specif-
ically, early judicial case management involves a tradeoff between 
shortened time to disposition and increased lawyer work hours.86 
Despite this tradeoff, the study found that, “[s]horter time from set-
ting a discovery schedule to discovery cutoff is associated with both 
significantly reduced time to disposition and significantly reduced 
lawyer work hours.”87 Of all the different factors investigated in the 
study, judicial management of discovery is the only technique that 
produced the effect of reducing lawyer work hours, and, in turn, lit-
igation costs.88  
The RAND study also found that, “in terms of predicting re-
duced time to disposition, setting a schedule for trial early was the 
most important component of early management.”89 This provides 
solid evidence of most lawyers’ continued obsession with a trial 
date.90 Although most cases are disposed of by means other than 
trial,91 the continued obsession with trial dates results in manage-
ment by way of an extremely rare event;92 in other words, trial dates 
are a cultural loadstar that guides lawyers and judges to earlier dis-
positions and thus, reduced litigation costs.93 Interestingly, eighty-
five (85%) of the judges surveyed in pilot districts with regard to 
case management before and after the CJRA responded that the 
CJRA made “no difference” in the way they managed cases.94 
                                                                                                         
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. at 16. 
 88  Id. at 26. 
 89  Id. at 14. 
 90  See generally, e.g., CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 
58, at 7. 
 91  Langbein, supra note 12, at 524–25. 
 92  See id. at 26 (stating that lawyer work hours are driven predominantly by 
factors other than case management and that “[w]hen time to disposition is cut, 
lawyers seem to do much the same work, but do it in less time”). 
 93  Id. at 14; David C. Steelman, What Have We Learned About Court Delay, 
“Local Legal Culture,” and Caseflow Management Since the Late 1970s?, 19 
JUST. SYS. J. 145, 159–60 (1997).  
 94  KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 79, at 24. Furthermore, ninety-two percent 
(92%) of the judges in comparison districts also believed the CJRA made “no 
difference” in the way they managed cases. Id.  
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The RAND Study is twenty-three years old;95 however, other 
studies are even older. Steven Flanders conducted a study in 1975 
“of civil cases that were terminated in six large courts.”96 This study 
found that judges who used strong case management controls settled 
cases within 366 days while judges who used limited or no case 
management controls resolved cases within 682 days.97 The study 
also found that judges who used strong case management controls 
tried cases within 472 days while judges who used limited or no case 
management controls tried cases within 945 days.98 
One of the other empirical challenges in evaluating civil case 
management as a tool to reduce cost and delay is answering the in-
herently subjective questions of how much is too much and how 
long is too long. Some indicia can be evaluated: for example, a sur-
vey conducted by the American Institute of Certified Professional 
Accountants estimated that continuances increase hours of expert 
witness preparation.99 Forty-four percent (44%) of the survey’s re-
spondents estimated an increase between eleven to twenty-five per-
cent (11–25%), another thirty-two percent (32%) estimated an in-
crease of more than twenty-five percent (25%).100 Ninety-six per-
cent (96%) of respondents said their preparation time, and therefore 
costs, increased due to continuances.101 The AICPA survey provides 
tangible evidence of costs due to continuance.102 
Research on litigants’ perspectives of trial suggests that satisfac-
tion with the court is more likely to be influenced by considerations 
of procedural fairness than it is by absolute cost or time.103 Delay 
                                                                                                         
 95  Id. at 5. 
 96  Steven Flanders, Commentary, Blind Umpires—A Response to Professor 
Resnik, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 505, 516–18 (1984). 
 97  Id. at 519. 
 98  Id. 
 99  AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, ANOTHER VOICE: FINAN-
CIAL EXPERTS ON REDUCING CLIENT COSTS IN CIVIL LITIGATION 4 (2012), 
http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/financial_ex-
perts_on_reducing_client_costs_in_civil_litigation.pdf. 
 100  Id. 
 101  Id. 
 102  Id. 
 103  E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, THE PERCEPTION 
OF JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS’ VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARIBITRATION, 
AND JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES 77 (1989) [hereinafter LIND ET AL., 
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was a similarly elastic concept.104 Specifically, while “[c]ase delay 
did affect the litigant’s attitudes, . . . what mattered was not the ab-
solute delay but rather the litigants’ personal evaluations of whether 
the delay was reasonable.”105 Furthermore, evaluations of case delay 
showed no consistent relationship to how litigants’ actually perceive 
fairness.106 Accordingly, research shows that “delay-reducing ef-
forts should be targeted at those aspects of delay that are most likely 
to be seen as unreasonable.”107  
Another challenge to measuring the success of case 
management derives from a lack of consistent defi-
nition of the appropriate parameters of case manage-
ment and the wide degree of individualization em-
ployed in judicial approaches.108 As a result, frustra-
tion with the progress on civil justice innovation may 
be driving leaders to demand case management on 
faith.109 Without specific evidence of efficacy, how-
ever, skeptics properly note that case management 
                                                                                                         
THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE] (“The litigants’ judgments of fairness and their sat-
isfaction with the court showed remarkably little relation to the cost of the case or 
how long it took to resolve. . . . Economic concerns of all sorts seemed to play at 
most a minor role in determining litigants’ attitudes. . . . Case delay did affect the 
litigants’ attitudes, but what mattered was not the absolute delay but rather the 
litigants’ personal evaluations of whether the delay was reasonable.”); E. Allan 
Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litgants’ Evaluations of Their Expe-
riences in the Civil Justice System, 24 L. & SOC’Y REV. 953, 980, 984 (1990) 
[hereinafter Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder]; Tyler, supra note 29, at 882 
(“[S]tudies of people’s reactions to their experiences in court and mediation sug-
gest that there is little relationship between objective indicators of cost and delay 
and litigant’s subjective evaluations of their experience with the legal system.”). 
 104  See PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE, supra note 103, at 78. 
 105  Id. at 77. 
 106  Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder, supra note 103, at 971. 
 107  PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE, supra note 103, at 77. 
 108  See Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure The-
ory, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 319, 321 (2008); see also, e.g., Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, 
supra note 1, at 575–76; Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Leg-
islation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 41, 43, 90–91 (2008); Flanders, supra note 96, at 
507; Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, supra note 73, at 722–23; Gensler & 
Rosenthal, Four Years After Duke, supra note 9, at 647–48. 
 109  Memorandum from Hon. Mark R. Kravitz, Chair, Advisory Comm. on 
Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure to Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Standing Comm. 
on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 19, 2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/
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may be “either an effective tonic for undue cost and 
delay or a snake-oil solution that is doomed to leave 
the patient sick.”110  
The challenge of conducting good empirical study is understand-
able, given the myriad of species of individualized judicial case 
management. For example, the RAND study took five years to com-
plete.111 Debate about the ability of case management to reduce cost 
and delay is nothing new, nor is it unique to the United States. But 
it remains critically important. One of the focuses of the latest wave 
of empirical studies is to determine whether case management has 
fulfilled its promise. If case management does not help at all, or, as 
Professor Tidmarsh recently suggested, it turns out to be counter-
productive, then we need to quickly start taking steps to turn around 
the battleship.112 Accordingly, the need for additional study is im-
portant.  
Despite the lack of empirical data, the proliferation of special-
ized courts that serve high-profile constituencies and have a high 
degree of court case management provide practical evidence of the 
need for judicial case management. For example, the expansion of 
Multidistrict Litigation courts,113 the success of Delaware’s Court of 
Chancery as a forum of choice,114 and the spread of business courts 
in many jurisdictions115 all demonstrate that case management is 
beneficial to the success of the courts and support the existence of a 
                                                                                                         
rules-policies/archives/committee-reports/advisory-committee-rules-civil-proce-
dure-may-2010 (discussing the 2010 Duke Conference proposals on how to man-
age cost and delay in litigation and stating that “[p]leas for universalized case 
management achieved virtual, perhaps absolute, unanimity”); Steven Baicker-
McKee, Reconceptualizing Managerial Judges, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 353, 353, 365–
68 (2015) (“Survey data suggest an uncommon agreement between plaintiffs and 
defendants that more judicial involvement leads to quicker, less expensive and 
more satisfying results.”).  
 110  Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, supra note 73, at 727. 
 111  KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 79. 
 112  Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, supra note 73, at 729. 
 113  John G. Heyburn II, A View from the Panel: Part of the Solution, 82 TUL. 
L. REV. 2225, 2229–31 (2008). 
 114  Randy J. Holland, Delaware’s Business Courts: Litigation Leadership, 34 
J. CORP. L. 771, 773–74 (2009). 
 115  John F. Coyle, Business Courts and Interstate Competition, 53 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1915, 1918, 1922–23 (2012). 
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market demand for judicial case management in complex matters.116 
However, the breadth of continued calls for judicial case manage-
ment reform117 demonstrates that, notwithstanding years of debate 
and rule changes promoting case management, it is simply not oc-
curring or being enforced in day to day dockets.118  
In sum, for decades civil case management has been repeatedly 
identified as one of the most effective tools to move cases fairly, 
justly, effectively, and efficiently through the civil courts. Case 
management as a means by which courts can differentiate and tailor 
management of each case according to its need has been the subject 
of justice research and advocacy efforts since the late 1970s.119 De-
spite the cheerleading, the pleas from bar leadership, the mandates 
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the proof from different 
pilot projects across the states,120 civil case management is still not 
generally employed.121 The proof of its absence as part of standard 
                                                                                                         
 116  See, e.g., Complex Litigation: Key Findings, supra note 47, at 6. 
 117  CORINA GERETY, INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., 
EXCESS & ACCESS: CONSENSUS ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL JUSTICE LANDSCAPE 7–
8 (2011) [hereinafter GERETY, EXCESS & ACCESS]. 
 118  See, e.g., CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 58, at 13; 
SURVEY OF THE ARIZONA BENCH, supra note 47, at 3, 51–52. 
 119  NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE TRIAL JUDGES COURT DELAY REDUCTION 
COMM., AM. BAR. ASS’N, LITIGATION CONTROL: THE TRIAL JUDGE’S KEY TO 
AVOIDING DELAY 7 (1996) (discussing THOMAS CHURCH JR. ET AL., NAT’L CTR. 
FOR STATE COURTS, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN 
TRIAL COURTS (1978)); NANCY E. GIST, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUS-
TICE ASSISTANCE FACT SHEET: DIFFERENTIATED CASE MANAGEMENT 1 (1995), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/txtfiles/dcm.txt.  
 120  See KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 79, at 2–3, 26–30; Gensler & Rosenthal, 
The Reappearing Judge, supra note 22, at 854; Baicker-McKee, supra note 109, 
at 365–68; Gensler & Rosenthal, Four Years After Duke, supra note 9, 647–50; 
CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 2–4, 15–38. 
 121  Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, supra note 73, at 735–37; Baicker-
McKee, supra note 109, at 358, 368–71; Gensler & Rosenthal, Four Years After 
Duke, supra note 9, at 650; CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 4; GERETY, EXCESS & 
ACCESS, supra note 117, at 14–15, 18; Freer, supra note 8, at 1520–21. Cf. Gens-
ler & Rosenthal, The Reappearing Judge, supra note 22, at 854 (stating that, even 
though the research on and use of case management has increased in recent years, 
lawyers and judges did not implement the 1983 changes to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure until recently due to various worries).  
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court operations is evident by the repeated continuing clarion calls 
for its adoption as the best option for improving civil justice.122  
II. FRAMING THE ISSUE 
This historical background leads to the key questions that the 
following research seeks to address: given the broad call for judicial 
case management, what are the attitudes of rank and file judges? 
Why do judges make the decisions they do about whether or not to 
case manage? Is this a conscious decision or a product of the work-
load? Do judges have a handle on their overall caseload in terms of 
types of cases? What might incentivize judges to engage in civil case 
management? When advocates recommend civil case management, 
what do they mean, and what does their audience understand them 
to mean? These questions are particularly timely for state courts 
given the new technological opportunities now available due to the 
recent shift to digital files in state courts,123 which was over twenty-
five years behind the federal shift to the electronic PACER sys-
tem,124 and endorsed by the policy recommendations reflected in the 
CJI Report.125 For example, Florida, the chosen research location, 
only began the shift towards digital court files in the civil circuit 
courts in 2009.126 
As a matter of practice, there are three approaches to civil case 
management:  
                                                                                                         
 122  CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 2–3, 16; Baicker-McKee, supra note 109, at 
358.  
 123  See Jenni Bergal, Courts Plunge into the Digital Age, PEW (Dec. 8, 2014), 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2014/12/8/ 
courts-plunge-into-the-digital-age (“We’ve got 50 states and everybody is doing 
some kind of e-filing project. That was not true even at the beginning of this year. 
It’s really exciting[.]” (quoting Jim McMillan, a technology consultant for the 
National Center for State Courts)). 
 124  25 Years Later, PACER, Electronic Filing Continue to Change Courts, 
U.S. CTS., (Dec. 9, 2013), www.uscourts.gov/news/2013/12/09/25-years-later-
pacer-electronic-filing-continue-change-courts. 
 125  CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 15–38 (listing recommendations on judicial 
case management).  
 126  In Re: Statewide Standards for Electronic Access to the Courts, AOS09-30 
(Fla. July 1, 2009) (adopting and incorporating the Florida Supreme Court 
Statewide Standards for Electronic Access to the Courts); see also FLA. R. JUD. 
ADMIN. 2.520, 2.525. 
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• Traditional deferential case management, with near 
complete reliance on litigants to progress the case to 
resolution requiring only the obligation to provide a 
hearing date or trial upon request, and in the absence 
of such a request, allows continued inactivity. 
• Reactive court case management, in which the court 
routinely gets involved upon a request for enforce-
ment or ruling by a party, and additionally recognizes 
an obligation to act when there is period of inactivity 
in the case or the case is aged beyond the judge’s tol-
erance level;127 and  
• Proactive court case management which recognizes 
an obligation to provide consistent momentum 
through a court-supervised case management plan 
designed from the outset to ensure effective progress 
through case stages, with a defined anticipated reso-
lution deadline, whether by trial or settlement, with-
out unnecessary delay between events.128 
Under the traditional deferential approach, case management is 
perceived as a responsibility of the lawyers and parties, rather than 
the courts, because the litigants themselves know their case the best 
and know what it needs and when it needs it.129 In this approach, 
courts are theoretically available to assist upon request; parties can 
call on the court when they need it.130 As illustrated by the continu-
ing demands for stronger course case management previously de-
tailed, this approach is widespread among judges.131 The effective-
ness of this approach is measured by the timeliness of access and the 
                                                                                                         
 127  KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 79, at 1; Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, su-
pra note 73, at 734; Nagareda, supra note 10, at 672–73; Resnik, Managerial 
Judges, supra note 73, at 384. 
 128  Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, supra note 73, at 671–72; Gensler & 
Rosenthal, The Reappearing Judge, supra note 22, at 871–74; WHAT MAKES 
CIVIL JUSTICE EFFECTIVE?, supra note 31, at 6.  
 129  Molot, supra note 108, at 29, 32, 39; Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, supra 
note 1, at 562–63; Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73, at 384–86. 
 130  Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73, at 384. 
 131  See, e.g., GERETY, EXCESS & ACCESS, supra note 117, at 14; CJI REPORT, 
supra note 32, at 4.  
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discipline and effectiveness of enforcement.132 Furthermore, be-
cause this approach requires cases to compete for judicial attention 
on an on-demand, first-come-first-served basis depending on the 
availability of resources, the urgency of the issues in any given case 
does not always guarantee access.133 In other words, access depends 
on which cases are earlier in the judge’s queue and how much time 
and attention those cases require.134 Additionally, many lawyers 
complain existing rules are not effectively invoked or timely en-
forced.135 Therefore, most court leaders—Chief Justices, Chief 
Judges, and innovative individual judges–reject this party-based 
deferential approach,136 particularly as they are regularly asked to 
account for case statistics to legislatures and the public. Its lack of 
success may be reflected in the declining reputation of and dimin-
ishing caseloads in state courts.137  
While the reactive approach to court case management recog-
nizes the responsibility of courts to manage cases to a timely and 
efficient resolution, court involvement under this approach is ad hoc 
and irregular, triggered only by a request of the parties or inactivity 
in the case.138 The length of inactivity sufficient to capture judicial 
attention is individually defined,139 except where specific procedural 
                                                                                                         
 132  Molot, supra note 108, at 29. 
 133  Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73, at 414–15; Molot, supra note 
108, at 39–40.  
 134  Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73, at 414–15. 
 135  Molot, supra note 108, at 90; Gensler & Rosenthal, Four Years After Duke, 
supra note 9, at 645. For example, a survey conducted in 2010 in connection with 
judicial enforcement of Arizona’s mandatory disclosure rules found that only 
twenty-one percent (21%) of judges enforced the rules almost always or often, 
nineteen percent (19%) enforced the rules half the time, and fifty-five percent 
(55%) enforced the mandatory disclosure rules almost never or occasionally. 
Therefore, Rule changes designed to promote improvement are ineffective if not 
enforced. SURVEY OF THE ARIZONA BENCH, supra note 47, at 26. 
 136  See Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73, at 417; GERETY, EXCESS 
& ACCESS, supra note 117, at 7–8. 
 137  CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 11; EXAMINING THE WORK, supra note 3, at 
1–2.  
 138  Molot, supra note 108, at 39–40; KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 79, at 1; 
Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, supra note 73, at 734; Nagareda, supra note 10, 
at 672–73; Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73, at 384. 
 139  Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73, at 384; CJI REPORT, supra note 
32, at 12. 
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rules are utilized such as for lack of prosecution.140 Progress occurs 
from court event to court event, with limited intermediate deadlines 
and no effort to reduce unnecessary delay between events.141 There 
is no defined overall plan for the case and no end date in the hori-
zon.142 Rather, ultimate deadlines are created when a party notices 
the case for trial, which generates a trial order with deadlines 
counted backwards from a putative trial date.143 However, even the 
efficacy of those trial preparation deadlines is based on compliance, 
access, enforcement, and the judge’s continuance policy.144  
The proactive court case management approach has been em-
bedded in the federal rules since the 1983 amendments, which made 
Rule 16(b) conferences available and civil case management orders 
increasingly common among federal judges.145 Furthermore, proac-
tive court case management has been emphasized with great enthu-
siasm in federal courts since the Duke Conference.146 The proactive 
approach requires the judge to establish a case management plan at 
the inception of a case, which includes setting reasonable intervals 
for intermediate deadlines, with the goal that at each deadline the 
case is ready to move to the next phase and towards resolution.147 
Under these plans, for example, a case would not be continued for 
                                                                                                         
 140  See, e.g., FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.420(e) (permitting action by the court, including 
dismissal for failure to prosecute, if nothing has occurred in the case for a period 
of 10 months).  
 141  CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 12, 21. 
 142  See id. at 21–22; Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, supra note 73, at 670–
71. 
 143  Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73, at 384; see, e.g., FLA. R. CIV. 
P. 2.085(e)(1) (providing specific timing from filing to resolution). 
 144  See AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, supra note 99, at 4–5; 
KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 79, at 1; GERETY, EXCESS & ACCESS, supra note 117, 
at 12–13. 
 145  Baicker-McKee, supra note 109, at 358; Rosenthal, Defining the Problem, 
supra note 7, at 238–41; Langbein, supra note 12, at 555; Joanna C. Schwartz, 
Gateways and Pathways in Civil Procedure, UCLA L. REV. 1652, 1655, 1678 
(2013).  
 146  DUKE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 38, at 79; Gensler & Rosenthal, 
Four Years After Duke, supra note 9, at 647–50. See generally, e.g., THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. AND CASE MGMT., CIVIL 
LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL 5–8 (2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter CIVIL LITI-
GATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL]. 
 147  See, e.g., CIVIL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL, supra note 146, at 6–
7. 
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failure to complete discovery because the completion of discovery 
would have been assured by a prior deadline before the trial date.148 
The success of proactive court case management depends on the is-
suance of a reasonable plan, preferably issued in collaboration with 
the parties, the monitoring and enforcement of the intermediate 
deadlines, and the degree to which the parties and the court engage 
in managing the case through the process.149  
However, one of the continuing challenges for court case man-
agement is the degree of highly variable individualized practice 
among judges and the lack of common standards and definitions.150 
Urging courts to undertake systemic case management without de-
fining the task may be weakening advocacy efforts.151 What do 
judges, staff, and lawyers envision? The following research is de-
signed in part to determine how these questions of definition and 
scope affect adoption of court case management.  
III. STATE VS. FEDERAL: THE STATE COURT CASELOAD 
The research and debate on case management in academia has 
focused on federal courts, and in doing so, has omitted the majority 
of American civil litigation.152 As of December 2018, there were 
677 authorized United States District Court judgeships.153 Accord-
ing to 2016–2017 data compiled by the National Center for State 
                                                                                                         
 148  Id. at 31–37. 
 149  Gensler & Rosenthal, Four Years After Duke, supra note 9, at 652–53; JU-
DICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 111, at 5–8; CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 12, 
16, 18.  
 150  See Bone, supra note 108, at 321; Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, supra note 
1, at 575–76; Molot, supra note 108, at 41, 43, 90–91; Gensler, Caught in the 
Crossfire, supra note 73, 722–23. 
 151  Molot, supra note 108, at 42; Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73, 
at 419–20. 
 152  COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, http://www.courtstatistics.org/ (last visited 
Dec. 17, 2018) (“More than 95% of U.S. Cases are filed in state courts.”); Marc 
Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 460 (2004). 
 153  Vacancy Summary for December 2018, U.S. CTS., https://www.us 
courts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2018 
/12/summary (last updated Dec. 1, 2018).  
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Courts, responding states reported 10,199 trial judges in general ju-
risdiction state courts across the country.154 Florida alone has 599 
circuit court trial judges.155 United States District Courts are “courts 
of limited jurisdiction,”156 while “state courts are courts of general 
jurisdiction” and are open to all non-federal disputes.157 Unsurpris-
ingly, the breadth of the state court docket poses management chal-
lenges. “The development of tracking systems in state courts pre-
sents a much different situation because of differences in the cases 
that populate the state court docket.”158 In 2016, 291,851 civil cases 
were filed in federal district courts.159 In 2015, there were over 
7,000,000160 civil cases filed in state court general jurisdiction or 
single tier courts.161 Florida had 176,740 new case filings in civil 
circuit court during the 2015–2016 fiscal year.162 
While all courts are loosely coupled organizations in which a 
judge has the responsibility for his or her own docket without a tra-
ditional boss, state courts face particular organizational challenges. 
First, because judges in state courts frequently change over the life 
of a case, either due to rotation, election, or elevation,163 these 
                                                                                                         
 154  NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT ORG., at tbl. 3.2a (S. Strick-
land et al. eds., 2017), www.ncsc.org/sco. 
 155  FLA. STAT. § 26.031 (2018); NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 
154, at tbl. 3.2a. 
 156  Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 376 (2012). 
 157  State Courts vs. Federal Courts, JUDICIAL LEARNING CTR., http://judicial-
learningcenter.org/state-courts-vs-federal-courts/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2018). 
 158  Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, supra note 73, at 708 n.174. 
 159  U.S. District Courts – Judicial Business 2016, U.S. CTS., http://www.us 
courts.gov/statistics-reports/us-district-courts-judicial-business-2016 (last visited 
Dec. 19, 2018). 
 160  EXAMINING THE WORK, supra note 3, at 3.  
 161  Forty-two states divide their caseload between general jurisdiction courts 
and limited jurisdiction courts, which hear a defined caseload, usually below a set 
dollar amount in controversy or covering specific areas like landlord/tenant. EX-
AMINING THE WORK, supra note 3, at 3–5.  
 162  FLA. OFFICE OF THE STATE COURTS ADMN’R, FLORIDA’S TRIAL COURTS 
STATISTICAL REFERENCE GUIDE FY 2015–16, at 4-2 to 4-5 (2016), 
https://www.flcourts.org/content/download/218355/1976076/Chapter-4_Circuit-
Civil-FY15-16.pdf.  
 163  E.g., ARIZ. CALL TO REFORM, supra note 47, at 21 (“We note that a strict 
practice of rotating judges . . . can inject additional delays and inefficiencies into 
civil cases, when judges who have become familiar with the parties and the issues 
in an ongoing case are suddenly replaced by a new judge with no background in 
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changes introduce uncertainty to the risk calculation for parties pur-
suing litigation and can generate cost and delay, which is often due 
to each judge’s differing approach to case management.164 This is 
distinct from the federal system, in which a single judge holds a life-
time appointment within a geographic area and enjoys the support 
of a magistrate judge, law clerks, and other staff.165  
Additionally, as one judge emphasized in his interview, state 
court is much more informal than federal court.166 As opposed to the 
typical Federal court practice of submission of written motions and 
briefing followed by a written ruling without a hearing,167 state court 
relies much more significantly on oral argument at a hearing event, 
which results in a verbal ruling subsequently reduced to writing.168 
As hearings are typically requested and set by attorneys as opposed 
to the court, the progress of the case is dictated by the diligence of 
counsel in setting hearings and calendar time availability.169 In Flor-
ida, outside of specialty courts, it is rare for courts to issue rulings 
without a hearing first.170 As opposed to written rulings, state court 
justice is typically delivered in person face-to-face.171 “Many of 
                                                                                                         
the case, and sometimes no background in civil law. Abrupt judicial rotation re-
quires a new learning curve for the new judge.”).  
 164  CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 12. 
 165  ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM IN THE 
UNITED STATES: AN INTRODUCTION FOR JUDGES AND JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATORS 
IN OTHER COUNTRIES 15–16, 19 (4th ed. 2016).  
 166  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Judge 4 (transcript on file with the 
University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Telephone Interview 4].  
 167  Gensler & Rosenthal, The Reappearing Judge, supra note 22, at 864–65. 
 168  Id. at 849–50; HENRY P. TRAWICK, JR. & DEBRA M. SALISBURY, 
TRAWICK’S FLORIDA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 15:3–§15:5 (2018 ed. 2017) 
[hereinafter TRAWICK’S FLORIDA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE].  
 169  TRAWICK’S FLORIDA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 168, § 15:4 
at 261–63; see infra Section IV.C. 
 170  See TRAWICK’S FLORIDA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 168, § 
15:4, at 261–63. 
 171  Time spent in court face to face with litigants and their lawyers is fre-
quently referred to as “bench presence.” Judith Resnik, Revising Our “Common 
Intellectual Heritage”: Federal and State Courts in Our Federal System, 91 
NORTE DAME L. REV. 1831, 1915 (2016) [hereinafter Resnik, Revising Our Com-
mon Intellectual Heritage]. State court judges have a much larger bench presence 
than do federal court judges. Compare TRAWICK’S FLORIDA PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE, supra note 168, § 15:4, at 261–62 (“When a motion is served, the court 
usually conducts a hearing to determine what order is proper unless the motion 
can be heard ex parte beause it is granted as a matter of course or because no 
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these interactions are decidedly trial-like in substance and outcome, 
though they may not be recorded as formal trials.”172 Further, 
[w]hile trials are on the decline in state courts just as 
they are in federal courts, state court litigation differs 
in important ways. In person interactions between 
judges and parties are still the primary means of con-
ducting business ins tate courts. Judges and parties 
routinely interact in open court to process and dis-
pose of litigation; few cases are resolved based on 
written peladings and motions.173 
The potentially significant impact that successful innovations to 
improve costs and reduce delays would have is obvious, as such in-
novations would benefit almost all cases in state courts.174 Further, 
such innovations could also have a potentially commensurate bene-
fit to public trust and confidence in the court system, since state 
courts are are the ‘community courthouses’ from which most people 
seek resolutions to their disputes.175 However, to further understand 
judicial attitudes about case management, it is important to under-
stand the civil caseload.176 As discussed, the state caseload is far 
more diverse than a typical federal docket.177 Understanding what is 
being managed is a first step in understanding how to manage it.178  
The National Center for State Courts surveyed 152 civil courts 
in ten urban counties across the United States to examine caseloads 
                                                                                                         
substantive rights of a party are affected.”), with Resnik, Revising Our Common 
Intellectual System, supra, at 1915 (stating that “[f]ederal judges spent less than 
two hours a day on average in the courtroom” (citing Jordan M. Singer & Hon. 
William G. Young, Bench Presence 2014: An Updated Look at Federal District 
Court Productivity, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 565, 565–66 (2014))). 
 172  Anna E. Carpenter et al., Studying the New Civil Judges, 2018 WIS. L. 
REV. 249, 277 (2018). 
 173  Id. at 255.  
 174  See CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 4. 
 175  See id. at 3. 
 176  See id. at 8. 
 177  See Markus B. Zimmer, Overview of Specialized Courts, 2 INT’L J. CT. 
ADMIN. 56–57 (2009), http://doi.org/10.18352/ijca.111. 
 178  CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 8. You cannot manage what you do not 
measure. In fact, inventorying the caseload is part of the first recommendation 
from the Conference of Chief Justices. Id. at 16.  
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between July 1, 2012 and June 30, 2013.179 The resulting study, en-
titled The Landscape of Civil Litigation in State Courts, included 
925,344 cases, which is approximately five percent (5%) of the state 
civil caseload across the country.180 The resulting study established 
that nearly sixty-four (64%) of the caseload was contract cases, most 
of which were debt collection and landlord/tenant disputes.181 Only 
seven percent (7%) of the caseload consisted of tort cases.182 Of that 
amount, product liability and malpractice made up five percent 
(5%), which was less than one percent (1%) of the total caseload.183 
Even among contract cases, the average judgment was $9,428, indi-
cating that the number of complex commercial cases was a small 
percentage of the overall contract docket.184  
In another study, the National Center for State Courts Court Sta-
tistics Project found that, in 2015, contract cases represented fifty-
one percent (51%) of the entire civil caseload, while torts case rep-
resented only four percent (4%) of the entire civil caseload.185 Fur-
thermore, the study found that tort case filings declined twenty-one 
percent (21%) between 2000 and 2015.186 
Another significant characteristic of the civil caseload in state 
courts is the prevalence of self-represented litigants. In 1992, the 
Civil Justice Survey of State Courts found that both plaintiffs and 
defendants were represented by counsel in ninety-five percent 
(95%) of state court cases.187 By 2013, the Landscape study found 
                                                                                                         
 179  LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 26, at iii. The NCSC sur-
veyed the following ten counties: (1) Maricopa County, Arizona (Phoenix); (2) 
Santa Clara County, California (San Francisco); (3) Miami-Dade, Florida; (4) 
Oahu, Hawaii; (5) Cook County, Illinois (Chicago); (6) Marion County, Indiana 
(Indianapolis); (7) Bergen County, New Jersey; (8) Cuyahoga County, Ohio 
(Cleveland); (9) Allegheny County, Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh); and (10) Harris 
County, Texas (Houston). Id. at 15. 
 180  Id. at iii. 
 181  Id. 
 182  Id. at iv. 
 183  Id. at 19. 
 184  LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 26, at 24. 
 185  EXAMINING THE WORK, supra note 3, at 26. Based on this national data, I 
included in my survey to Florida judges a question about the prominence of con-
tract cases in their overall caseload. See infra Figure 33. 
 186  EXAMINING THE WORK, supra note 3, at 8. See also CJI REPORT, supra 
note 32, at 9 (“Tort cases . . . have largely evaporated.”). 
 187  LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 26, at 31 (discussing the 
1992 Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, which was part of a large-scale national 
2019] WHY DON’T JUDGES CASE MANAGE? 1103 
that, while plaintiffs were still represented by counsel in ninety-two 
(92%) of the cases, defendants were represented in only twenty-six 
(26%) of cases and both sides had representation in only twenty-four 
percent (24%) of cases.188 The growing number of self-represented 
litigants compromises the traditional assumption that the competing 
interests of the parties will promote case momentum and that the 
court can rely on parties to enforce the rules.189 Due to the simple 
lack of knowledge on the part of pro se litigants and inattention from 
plaintiffs, these cases can languish.190  
Our modern civil justice system was not de-
signed—outside of the small claims context—for lay 
people. It was designed by and for lawyers, with a 
baseline assumption of party control over litiga-
tion. . . . At the outset, lay people may lose a case 
simply because they do not understand the need to 
show up. If they do make it to the courthouse, they 
struggle with basic procedures and paperwork and 
may never make it to the hearing room. They lose 
meritorious cases due to procedural challenges or be-
cause they misunderstand substantive law.191  
                                                                                                         
study of civil caseloads conducted by the US Department of Justice Bureau of 
Justice Statistics in 1992, 1996, 2001, and 2005).  
 188  Id. at 31. Florida has not conducted a similar study, however, Florida Su-
preme Court Chief Justice Jorge Labarga appointed a statewide commission on 
Access to Civil Justice that identified similar challenges involving self-repre-
sented litigants in Florida. FLA. COMM’N ON ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE, FINAL RE-
PORT 1, 3–4 (2016), http://www.flaccesstojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/ 
06/ATJ-Final-Report-Court-06302016-ADA.pdf; About Us, FLA. COMM’N ON 
ACCESS TO CIV. JUST., http://www.flaccesstojustice.org/ (last visited Dec. 19, 
2018). 
 189  LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 26, at 35; CJI REPORT, supra 
note 32, at 34. On the traditional model of litigation with counsel, see generally 
David Marcus, From “Cases” to “Litigation” to “Contract”: A Comment on Sta-
bility in Civil Procedure, 56 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 1231, 1237 (2012); Molot, supra 
note 108, at 39. 
 190  CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 34. For a discussion on how technology can 
help to cure the inequality faced by self-represented litigants, see James E. Cabral 
et al., Using Technology to Enhance Access to Justice, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
241, 259 (2012).  
 191  Carpenter et al., supra note 172, at 260–61. 
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While much of the debate about civil case management focuses on 
complex cases, relatively simple cases may be even more likely to 
benefit from civil case management because, among other things, 
the disproportionate presence of self-represented litigants in simple 
cases require increased judicial supervision to keep pro se cases 
moving.192  
An examination of the academic research on case management 
also evidences the significant challenges in evaluating the manage-
ment issues confronting the courts and my fellow judges: we do not 
know our caseload.193 The docket in our heads does not match the 
docket in our files. There is a disconnect between the most prevalent 
case types on the docket and judge’s perception of where case man-
agement benefits most likely lie. This suggests that judges tend to 
overestimate the complexity of their caseloads.194 Certainly, most of 
the discussion around case management centers on complex 
cases.195 However, as Judge Rosenthal and Professor Gensler point 
out, “[i]n many ways, it is the smaller cases that benefit the most 
from judicial management because they can least bear the costs of 
needless (and avoidable) discovery and motions practice.”196  
IV. FLORIDA AND ITS COURTS: EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CASE  
MANAGEMENT IN FLORIDA’S CIRCUIT CIVIL COURTS 
I chose Florida as the location for this research not only because 
of my close personal proximity, but also because it is one of the 
largest and most diverse states. Florida is the third largest state by 
population, with 21,299,325 residents in July 2018.197 The state’s 
                                                                                                         
 192  Gensler & Rosenthal, The Reappearing Judge, supra note 22, at 859; CJI 
REPORT, supra note 32, at 33–34; Gensler & Rosenthal, Four Years After Duke, 
supra note 9, at 645. 
 193  See, e.g., CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 12, 31–32.  
 194  See id. at 8. 
 195  Id. 
 196  Gensler & Rosenthal, The Reappearing Judge, supra note 22, at 859. 
 197  National Population Totals and Components of Change: 2010-2018, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest 
/2010s-national-total.html#par_textimage_2011805803 (follow “Annual Esti-
mates of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States, and 
Puerto Rico: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2018 (NST-EST2018-01)” hyperlink under 
“Population Estimates, Population Change, and Components of Change) (last up-
dated July 1, 2018).  
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economy relies on international trade, tourism, agriculture, con-
struction, space, health, and tech services.198 The state mirrors the 
country’s political division with the majority of voters almost evenly 
split between the two most prominent political parties—4.4 million 
registered Republicans and 4.6 million registered Democrats—
while 3 million registered Independents represent the majority of re-
cently registered voters.199 Florida’s twenty-nine electoral votes 
went to Republican Donald Trump in 2016, while they went to Dem-
ocrat Barack Obama in 2012 and 2008.200 The state’s pivotal razor-
close vote count in the 2000 election between George W. Bush and 
Al Gore is notorious.201 Florida’s range from rural conservative to 
urban liberal makes it an ideal location for this research as responses 
will almost certainly be varied among differing viewpoints across 
the state.202  
Florida’s twenty circuit courts further reflect the diversity of the 
state.203 There are twenty circuits throughout the state, which repre-
sent a wide cross-section of population characteristics: from large 
urban circuits such as Miami, to small multi-county, largely rural 
circuits.204 They range in size from Monroe County, home of the 
Florida Keys, with a population of 73,873 in 2011 and four circuit 
court judges, to Miami-Dade County, with a population of 
                                                                                                         
 198  Florida Quick Facts, STATEOFFLORIDA.COM, www.stateofflorida.com/ 
facts.aspx (last visited Dec. 19, 2018). 
 199  Martin Savidge, Florida: The Swingiest Swing State, CNN (Aug. 9, 2016), 
https://www.cnn.com/2016/08/09/politics/election-2016-donald-trump-hillary-
clinton-florida/index.html.  
 200  Florida, 270TOWIN, https://www.270towin.com/states/Florida (last visited 
Dec. 19, 2018). 
 201  See generally Frank Cerabino, Ten Years Later, Infamous 2000 Election 
Ballot Recount Still Defines Palm Beach County to Many, PALM BEACH POST 
(Mar. 31, 2012), http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/ten-years-later-infamous-
2000-election-ballot-recount-still-defines-palm-beach-county-many/uscC5ni 
N1BtOOs 7d33V8GL/. 
 202  Steve Schale, Everything You Wanted to Know About Florida 2016 But 
Were Afraid to Ask, OBSERVER (Aug. 15, 2016, 2:44 PM).  
 203  THE FLA. LEGISLATURE OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY, REP. NO. 15-13, A REVIEW OF FLORIDA CIRCUIT COURTS 1 
(2015), http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/MonitorDocs/Reports/pdf/1513rpt.pdf 
[hereinafter OPPAGA REPORT]. 
 204  Id. at 2; Schale, supra note 202.  
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2,554,766 in 2011 and eighty circuit court judges.205 For statistical 
analysis, the Florida Office of the State Court Administrator catego-
rizes the circuits as small, medium, large, and very large.206 Flor-
ida’s circuit civil caseload is generally assigned on a one judge-one 
case basis. Master calendars are not favored in Florida, and the re-
search conducted with the state’s trial court administrators reflected 
that there are no master calendar systems in use in the circuit civil 
caseload across the state.207 Florida’s circuit dockets are generally 
divided up into subject divisions: felony criminal; juvenile depend-
ency/delinquency; family divorce/paternity/child support; pro-
bate/trusts/guardianship; and general civil cases.208 In most large 
and mid-size circuits, judges are assigned to a single division, for 
example civil, family or felony.209 In some circuits—particularly in 
multi-county or small circuits—judges are assigned to multiple di-
vision types and hear a mixed docket, such as civil and probate or 
civil and family.210 Florida’s circuit court judges have general juris-
diction over all civil disputes in excess of $15,000.211 
In addition, the Florida judicial branch faces challenges in accu-
mulating data on its caseload. In Florida, the Clerks of Court are 
separate constitutional officers and are not under the direct supervi-
sion of the judicial branch.212 It is the responsibility of the Clerks of 
each circuit to manage and assemble all caseload data; however, 
there is no uniform system used across all of the circuits.213 Cur-
rently, there is almost no statewide data on pending civil cases by 
action type; rather, the only caseload data provided by the local 
Clerks of Court to the Office of the State Court Administrator is in-
formation on filings and dispositions.214 Therefore, Florida is lack-
ing any definitive information regarding its pending civil case count 
                                                                                                         
 205  OPPAGA REPORT, supra note 203, at 16; Florida Quick Facts, supra note 
146. 
 206  FLA. OFFICE OF THE STATE COURTS ADMN’R, supra note 162, at 4-6.  
 207  Email Survey of 20 Trial Court Administrators (Nov. 2017 to Jan. 2018) 
(on file with author).  
 208  OPPAGA REPORT, supra note 203, at 1–2. 
 209  See id., at 3–4.  
 210  See id.  
 211  Id. at 1. 
 212  Id. at 3. 
 213  Id. at 4–6. 
 214  See generally, e.g., id.; FLA. OFFICE OF THE STATE COURTS ADMN’R, supra 
note 162. According to the Florida Office of the State Court Administrator, in 
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by action type. As a result, it is difficult to acquire caseload data for 
case management.  
While Florida’s judicial branch leadership has publicly endorsed 
case management as a key to the future of the branch in its Long 
Range Plan 2016–2021,215 there has been no separate initiative re-
garding civil justice or emphasis on broad-based civil case manage-
ment with trial judges and, as illustrated by the following research, 
the emphasis has not translated to engagement at the trial-judge 
level. Although many state bar associations or supreme courts have 
formed blue-ribbon commissions or committees to address the civil 
justice system innovation, Florida has not yet established such a 
commission.216 Therefore, Florida judges have not yet been exposed 
to the publicity about civil case management that typically follows 
such a branch effort.217  
In sum, Florida state circuit court judges serve as good study 
subjects for the survey on trial court attitudes about civil case man-
agement, as they represent the courts of general jurisdiction in the 
state and have experience managing various cases.218 I benefitted as 
                                                                                                         
2015, real property/foreclosure cases represented 44.4% of the state civil circuit 
court filings, contract cases represented 21.9% of filings, auto and other negli-
gence cases represented 18.3%, and product liability and malpractice cases con-
stituted 1.8% of the state filings. Id. at 4-16. The percentages may be significantly 
higher if the caseloads of the limited jurisdiction county courts had been included. 
See EXAMINING THE WORK, supra note 3, at 7 (finding that Florida had a thirty-
four percent (34%) contract case filing rate in 2015).  
 215  See generally FLA. SUPREME COURT, JUSTICE: FAIR AND ACCESSIBLE TO 
ALL—THE LONG-RANGE STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE FLORIDA JUDICIAL BRANCH 
2016-2021, http://www.flcourts.org/core/fileparse.php/581/urlt/2016-2021-Long 
-Range-Strategic-Plan-Floridaweb.pdf [hereinafter THE LONG RANGE PLAN]. 
This plan contains specific goals designed to improve case management, includ-
ing the following: (1) “1.2 Ensure the fair and timely resolution of all cases 
through effective case management;” (2) “1.3 Utilize caseload and other workload 
information to manage resources and promote accountability;” and (3) “4.3 Create 
a compatible technology infrastructure to improve case management and meet the 
needs of the judicial branch and court users.” Id. at 3–4. 
 216  As discussed, Florida’s efforts to date have focused on access to justice in 
the civil system as opposed to broader civil justice innovation. See generally, e.g., 
FLA. COMM’N ON ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 188. 
 217  Id. 
 218  Florida’s Circuit Judges have previously served as guinea pigs for judicial 
research, such as during the Circuit Judge’s Conference in 2006. See Chris Guth-
rie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 
1, 13 (2007).  
1108 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1071 
a circuit court judge, the administrative judge for the Eleventh Judi-
cial Circuit, and a member of this group, as it enabled me to secure 
the necessary access to distribute the surveys.219 In addition, alt-
hough case management received significant attention during the 
foreclosure crisis in Florida’s state courts between 2008 and 2015, 
that case management effort was directed solely at the tsunami of 
foreclosure cases.220 Accordingly, among the other benefits dis-
cussed, Florida represented a relatively neutral territory in which to 
identify judicial attitudes about case management.  
A. Research Methods 
To get the most accurate and complete picture of the environ-
ment of the Florida civil circuit courts, I gathered two different sets 
of information: (1) information from current circuit court judges 
across the state as to the character and management of the pending 
civil caseload in circuit courts; and (2) information from circuit trial 
court administrators (“TCAs”) for each of Florida’s twenty circuits 
about the level of civil case management occurring in their cir-
cuits.221 All twenty circuits provided the requested information.  
The inquiries related to civil case management asked about the 
existence of any systemic case management programs in place, in-
stitutional support for case management, specialty divisions, stand-
ardized procedures, the degree of individualization among the cir-
cuit’s civil judges, data measurement and distribution, and the “local 
court culture” of each circuit.222 The purpose of gathering this infor-
mation from both judges and court administrators was to identify 
whether the information gathered from the judges matched the in-
formation gathered from the trial court adminstrators in the same 
circuit, or whether there were disconnects and disagreements be-
tween the two sets of information. The caseload information was 
gathered to gauge the judges’ knowledge of the constellation of 
                                                                                                         
 219  See CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 6; infra Section IV.A.  
 220  In Re: Final Report and Recommendations of the Foreclosure Initiative 
Workgroup, AOSC13-28, 1 (Fla. June 21, 2013) [hereinafter Foreclosure Initia-
tive Workgroup].  
 221  Time constraints prohibited also surveying attorneys about their case man-
agement experiences as a means to corroborate or refute judge and trial court ad-
ministrator perceptions. This additional step invites further study.  
 222  The surveys and questionnaires used in this research are on file with the 
Author and the University of Miami Law Review. They are available upon request.  
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cases on their dockets and to compare the cases types between cir-
cuits. However, comparing the various circuits’ civil case types 
proved to be an unanticipated patchwork task.  
Research within the judiciary was approached through two ve-
hicles: (1) a quantitative written survey for judges; and (2) qualita-
tive telephone interviews I conducted with judges. The first vehicle, 
the quantitative written surveys, was conducted between late July 
and December 2017 and contained a series of statements targeted 
towards factors that the prior pilot projects, academic research, stud-
ies, and surveys discussed above have identified as influencing case 
management decision-making.223 Specifically, the written survey 
targeted the following factors:  
• Lack of awareness of case management; 
• Misunderstanding or lack of definition of case management;  
• Philosophy of judicial independence and perception of case 
management as an administrative versus judicial function; 
• Cross-incentives such as elections, bar polls, attorney fees 
and ambition; 
• Institutional inertia or “local court culture;” and 
• Lack of time or support to case manage.  
 The written survey asked judges to indicate their level of agree-
ment or disagreement with each particular statement, including an 
option for “no opinion.” The survey responses were anonymous as 
to the judge’s own identity, but requested information about the cir-
cuit in which each judge sits as well as each judge’s years of service. 
This permitted analysis of the responses based on both experience 
level and geographic diversity. The title, “Civil Case Management 
Survey on Judicial Views,” appears in large bold letters at the top of 
the survey, and the instructions provided a deliberately broad and 
generic definition of case management: “In considering these ques-
tions, please use the following definition for Case Management: 
Case management is the entire set of actions that a court takes to 
                                                                                                         
 223  Any mention of standard judicial survey questions and TCA interview 
questions can be found in the surveys and questionnaires on file with the Author 
and the University of Miami Law Review.  
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monitor and progress cases, from filing to disposition to post-dispo-
sition, to assure that each case is resolved fairly, justly, cost-effec-
tively and without undue delay.”  
I conducted the survey research in two phases. Initially, the sur-
vey was handed out to a live audience on July 23, 2017 in Orlando 
at the annual Florida Circuit Court Judge’s Conference, the educa-
tional opportunity for judges to secure their required continuing ju-
dicial education requirements.224 In addition to currently sitting cir-
cuit court judges, “senior judges,” who are retired judges who sit 
upon request to assist circuits when needed, also attend this confer-
ence.225 The instructions with the survey informed judges that they 
should participate only if they had judicial experience in the civil 
division, relying upon judges to self-police in terms of their re-
sponse. Of the 457 judges at the conference,226 123 responded to the 
survey at the conference, representing a twenty-seven percent (27%) 
response rate. It is important to note, however, that the attendance 
records did not break down the number of judges who had been or 
were currently assigned to a civil docket. It also did not break down 
the number of sitting judges versus the number of retired senior 
judges at the conference. Therefore, it is impossible to determine the 
exact number of potentially qualified responders who were in at-
tendance at the conference but declined to respond.227 
As a result, because I wanted to ensure that the attitudes of cur-
rently sitting judges were adequately represented in the results, I 
also mailed the survey to all circuit court judges in Florida. The in-
structions included with the mailed survey made very clear that if 
the judge had taken the survey in person at the conference, he or she 
should not take the survey again. The survey was mailed to all sitting 
circuit court judges, and an additional 177 responses were returned. 
Again, it is impossible to determine how many judges were eligible 
to complete the survey as there is no effective way to track whether 
                                                                                                         
 224  Judges must attend one conference every three years to satisfy their educa-
tional requirements. FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.320. 
 225  Senior Judges, FLA. SUPREME CT., http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/ 
employment/senior-judges.shtm (last visited on Nov. 3, 2018). 
 226  Email from Charles Hydovitz, Conference Manager, to Jennifer Bailey, 
Circuit Court Judge, Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court of Florida (Aug. 24, 2017) 
(on file with University of Miami Law Review).  
 227  Judges were instructed that they should execute the survey only if they had 
civil judicial experience and not all judges have been assigned to a civil docket.  
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a given judge had ever been assigned to circuit civil dockets, even if 
they were now sitting elsewhere due to judicial rotation.228 This ef-
fort relied on judges accurately following the directions and only 
executing the survey if they actually had civil experience, for which 
there is no good control. In addition, although the survey instruc-
tions were very clear, it was handed out live and then again by mail, 
and the possibility exists that some judges may have filled out the 
survey twice.229  
As a result of the two-phased effort, a total of 303 surveys were 
received. The results of the survey are reflected in the analysis that 
follows, which includes graphs that depict the responses to each 
statement. Each graph includes the statement being surveyed listed 
at the top, followed by a number indicating its respective position in 
the survey sequence. Each survey included an invitation to volunteer 
for a follow-up interview. Responses to that invitation were fairly 
robust, in that forty-seven judges volunteered to be interviewed. 
These volunteers were the subject of the next phase of research.  
The second vehicle I conducted was qualitative, journalistic-
style interviews with the volunteer circuit court judges. Each inter-
view included a set of open-ended questions directed at judicial 
background and experience, why and how the individual judge case 
managed, and the perception of what motivated judicial colleagues. 
The interviews took, on average, between forty-five and seventy-
five minutes. Because the group volunteered for interviews, it is fair 
to conclude that the volunteers were actively interested in case man-
agement, which was further revealed in the interviews themselves. I 
conducted twenty-one230 qualitative interviews with judges from 
most circuits across the state, most of which were done via telephone 
                                                                                                         
 228  Rotation is the process by which circuit judges change assignments to dif-
ferent divisions of the court. Circuits can have differing rotation procedures and 
schedules and, generally, they are divided into criminal, civil, family, juvenile, 
and probate sections. See generally FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.215. 
 229  A number of conscientious judges contacted me to make sure that I had 
received their first survey at the conference and to ask whether they could ignore 
the mail-out version, which offered some comfort in terms of attention to the di-
rections. An additional set returned the mail survey to me in blank with a note that 
they had already executed it.  
 230  Time limitations due to thesis deadlines prevented interviewing all volun-
teers. I selected interviewees based on geography, circuit size, and those who re-
sponded when I asked for interview dates and times. 
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but a few from my own circuit were done in person. In terms of 
experience, judges ranged from two-and-a-half to twenty-seven 
years on the bench. These interviews provided additional insights 
into the data gathered through the surveys. Notwithstanding the 
built-in bias from the volunteer process, a diverse set of perspectives 
emerged.  
The qualitative interview began by securing basic information 
about the judges: total years on the bench, years of civil judicial ex-
perience, and available staff support. The questions then turned to 
individual definitions of case management and how that judge case 
managed. The next questions directly addressed factors related to 
why judges may or may not elect to case manage. As in the first 
phase of research, the factors were derived from pilot projects, prior 
surveys, and other academic research. These factors are the same 
factors that the written survey was designed to test:  
• Lack of awareness of case management;  
• Misunderstanding or lack of definition of case management;  
• Philosophy of judicial independence and perception of case 
management as an administrative versus judicial function; 
• Cross-incentives such as elections, bar polls, attorney fees 
and ambition; 
• Institutional inertia or “local court culture;” and 
• Lack of time or support to case manage.  
I asked for each judge’s reactions and comments with regard to the 
individual factors. Virtually all respondents answered enthusiasti-
cally and thoughtfully. I took detailed written notes for each inter-
view. I used a standard interview sheet with the questions listed, so 
that each judge would be asked each question with similar language, 
without missing or skipping questions. In order to assure complete 
and candid responses, I guaranteed that the identity of each judge I 
interviewed would remain anonymous. 
The results of the qualitative interviews, as discussed further be-
low, reflected that there is no real uniform understanding amongst 
judges regarding what the standard definition and scope of “civil 
case management” is. While each judge was asked what “case man-
agement” meant to them, each judge had his or her own individual 
definition, which then framed and animated their subsequent re-
sponses. Therefore, the qualitative interviews further revealed the 
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inherent variation in approaches to case management amongst the 
judges, which provides challenges to the broad-based adoption of 
civil case management that is currently proposed.  
The Trial Court Adminstrator surveys were drafted with a series 
of open-ended questions about administrative support among the 
circuits for civil case management, utilization of differentiated case 
management in the civil division of the subject circuit, use of stand-
ardized procedures or forms for civil case management, use of single 
judge assignment to cases versus master calendar, data distriubiton 
and performance report distribution, and TCA perception of how 
judges manage civil cases in their circuit. These questions were de-
livered to the Trial Court Adminstrators for every circuit by email, 
and the responses were delivered by email and executed by the ad-
minstrators or their designees. Every circuit responded. Responses 
were received between October 2017 and January 2018. The pur-
pose of these surveys was to gauge the judicial awareness of availa-
ble resources, use of data available to them, and whether the admin-
istrator’s reports correlated to the judges’ perceptions.  
It would be fair and reasonable to question the ability that a sam-
ple of a single state’s judges has to extract broader conclusions about 
court case management and identify the barriers to its universal 
adoption. While Florida seems like a fertile soil from which to glean 
such attitudes, it is still only a single state, and many states may 
rightfully assert they have little in common with the third most pop-
ulous state in the nation.231 However, while Idaho, for example, may 
have little in common with Miami, it is likely to have much in com-
mon with small or mid-size rural communities in Florida, and those 
attitudes are likely to be reflected herein. There are more than twenty 
million people currently living in Florida, who span across an array 
of different communities and, for those who participate in litigation 
at some point in their lives, file a wide variety of civil cases. In short, 
the most logical response to such criticism is that we have to start 
somewhere if we are to determine how the national efforts towards 
implementation of uniform civil case management can succeed.  
Finally, it would also be fair to criticize the qualitative effort, 
specifically, due to the potential self-selection bias of the judges 
who volunteered for the qualitative interviews. While it is true that 
                                                                                                         
 231  National Population Totals and Components of Change: 2010-2018, supra 
note 197.  
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no judge who volunteered for the interviews professed animosity to 
case management as a tool or concept, the survey data—both my 
own and in the past—suggests that such animosity exists, albeit in a 
minority.232 These are the judges who will be the most difficult to 
convince of the benefits that case management will have on them-
selves, the court, and most importantlhn]y, the litigants we serve. 
Other than capturing their observations in the anonymous written 
survey responses, engaging with these judges presented an insur-
mountable problem in this setting.  
B. Trial Court Administrator Survey Results 
All of the TCA’s reported that their circuits use a one judge/one 
case system, in which a single judge is assigned to handle all the 
cases—from filing to disposition—in their assigned civil docket, as 
opposed to a master calendar system, in which cases move from 
judge to judge based on the procedural status of the case.233 In prac-
tice, judges in Florida rotate among substantive assignments period-
ically, which may result in multiple judges being assigned to a case 
if it is not resolved within a single rotation timespan.234  
When asked whether the circuit had a formally structured civil 
case management system, only four circuits answered that they 
did.235 The Eighteenth Circuit, located mid-way up the east coast of 
Florida, sets a case management conference when a case has been 
inactive for a specified period of time and, if appropriate, sets up a 
schedule of dates culminating in a trial date.236 A scheduling confer-
ence is held when cases are noticed for trial.237 In the Sixteenth Cir-
cuit in the Florida Keys, case management orders are issued for the 
general civil caseload at the judge’s discretion at commencement of 
                                                                                                         
 232  See infra Figure 7. See, e.g., Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, supra note 
73, at 689–92; Gensler & Rosenthal, Four Years After Duke, supra note 9, at 650. 
 233  FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.215. 
 234  Id.  
 235  There is no data available comparing case closure rates between these cir-
cuits and other circuits, which might be a source of further study. Interestingly, 
there was no reference to these systems in any of the interviews.  
 236  E-mail from Mark Van Bever, Trial Court Adm’r, Eighteenth Judicial Cir-
cuit of Fla., to Jennifer D. Bailey, Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Ju-
dicial Circuit of Fla. (Oct. 05, 2017, 12:17 EST) (on file with the University of 
Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Eighteenth Circuit TCA Response]. 
 237  Id. 
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the case.238 In the Tenth Circuit, mid-state, a case management con-
ference is set when there has been a lack of activity in the case,239 
and in the Twentieth Circuit, a case management order is sent out at 
the inception of the case.240  
None of the TCAs reported any kind of routine differentiated 
case management based on case types across the divisions of their 
general civil circuit dockets.241 Differentiated case management is 
only utilized in establishing specialty courts within civil circuits. 
Four large circuits (Eleventh–Miami, Thirteenth–Tampa, Fifteenth– 
Palm Beach, and Seventeenth–Fort Lauderdale) use specialty divi-
sions to segregate and handle different case types—such as family 
                                                                                                         
 238  E-mail from Paunece Scull, Dir. Case Mgmt., Sixteenth Judicial Circuit of 
Fla., to Jennifer D. Bailey, Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Judicial 
Circuit of Fla. (Oct. 17, 2017, 09:14 EST) (on file with the University of Miami 
Law Review).  
 239  E-mail from Nick Sudzina, Trial Court Adm’r, Tenth Judicial Circuit of 
Fla., to Jennifer D. Bailey, Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Judicial 
Circuit of Fla. (Oct. 16, 2017, 13:14 EST) (on file with the University of Miami 
Law Review) [hereinafter Tenth Circuit TCA Response]. 
 240  E-mail from Sheila Jerome, Civil/Family Div. Dir., Twentieth Judicial Cir-
cuit of Fla., to Jennifer D. Bailey, Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Ju-
dicial Circuit of Fla. (Oct. 10, 2017, 11:19 EST) (on file with the University of 
Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Twentieth Circuit TCA Response].  
 241  During the foreclosure crisis in Florida, many circuits had separate fore-
closure divisions to handle caseload backlogs, which also included specially des-
ignated funding for senior judges and case manager positions. See generally Fore-
closure Initiative Workgroup, supra note 220. However, most funding for those 
divisions terminated in 2015 and most of these divisions have been closed as the 
case backlog has been nearly resolved. See Paul Owners, South Florida Foreclo-
sures ‘Tantalizingly Close to Normal,’ SUN SENTINEL (Jan. 12, 2017, 9:26 AM); 
Kimberly Miller, Expiring Foreclosure Court Money May Help and Hurt Home-
owners, PALM BEACH POST (May 11, 2015, 12:01 AM), https://www.palm-
beachpost.com/news/business/real-estate/expiring-foreclosure-court-money-may 
-help-and-hurt/nmDkG/. 
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law, complex business litigation, complex tort, asbestos, and to-
bacco cases.242 One smaller circuit, the Eighth Circuit, has a special-
ized division to which extraordinary writs are assigned.243  
In terms of case management staff positions, most circuits have 
a limited number of positions dedicated to reviewing cases for inac-
tivity, lack of prosecution, and lack of service.244 Each case manager 
works on a ratio of one case manager to between two and twelve 
judges, with the exception of the Twentieth Circuit which has case 
managers on a 1:1 or 1:2 ratio for their case management system.245 
Five circuits have no civil case managers assisting judges.246  
While standard form orders such as trial orders and pretrial com-
pliance orders are widely used, there was no evidence that any 
broader standardized approach to case management is used across 
                                                                                                         
 242  E-mail from Maria Harrris, Circuit Civil Operations Div. Dir., Eleventh 
Judicial Circuit of Fla., to Jennifer D. Bailey, Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., 
Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. (Nov. 13, 2017, 15:48 EST) (on file with the 
University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Eleventh Circuit TCA Response]; 
E-mail from Robyn Gable, Trial Court Adm’r, Fourteenth Judicial Circuit of Fla., 
to Jennifer D. Bailey, Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Judicial Circuit 
of Fla. (Oct. 16, 2017, 16:59 EST) (on file with the University of Miami Law 
Review) [hereinafter Fourteenth Circuit TCA Response]; Eighteenth Circuit TCA 
Response, supra note 236. 
 243  E-mail from Bridget Baker, Dir. of Court Operations, Alachua Cty. Family 
and Civil Justice Ctr., Eighth Judicial Circuit of Fla., to Jennifer D. Bailey, Ad-
min. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. (Oct. 23, 2017, 
10:03 EST) (on file with the University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter 
Eighth Circuit TCA Response]. 
 244  OPAGGA REPORT, supra note 151, at 11–18. There are five circuits in 
which TCAs report using case managers to assist with unresolved and aged fore-
closure cases from the foreclosure crisis. As these are not part of the regular 
docket but are rather still directed at special backlog reduction efforts, I dis-
counted those positions as they do not benefit the general caseload.  
 245  Twentieth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 240.  
 246  E-mail from Susan Wilson, Dir. of Research and Data, Second Judicial 
Circuit of Fla., to Jennifer D. Bailey, Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh 
Judicial Circuit of Fla. (Oct. 23, 2017, 10:03 EST) (on file with the University of 
Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Second Circuit TCA Response]; E-mail from 
Walt Smith, Court Adm’r, Twelfth Judicial Circuit of Fla., to Jennifer D. Bailey, 
Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. (Oct. 05, 2017, 
12:17 EST) (on file with the University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter 
Twelfth Circuit TCA Response]; Fourteenth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 
242. 
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judges’ dockets. Even within the systems referenced above, it ap-
pears, based on the responses, that individual judges decide whether 
and how to use those case management systems within their case-
load. 
The TCA responses also indicate that, across the board in Flor-
ida, every judge sets his or her own case management procedures 
with the exception of minor standardization in part of the Twentieth 
Circuit.247 However, even in the Twentieth Circuit, there is some 
individual “tweaking” of case management procedures set forth in 
those counties that use the system.248 Otherwise, the degree of con-
sistency between judges in a geographic location depends on per-
sonal relationships between the judges.  
In terms of data or reports that enable judges to identify case 
management issues, seven circuits do not distribute any routine data 
or reports to their judges.249 Of the remaining thirteen circuits, the 
data or reports distributed are geared towards case age, inactivity, 
                                                                                                         
 247  Twentieth TCA Response, supra note 240. 
 248  Id. 
 249  Second Circuit TCA Response, supra note 246; E-mail from Virginia B. 
Norton, Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Fourth Judicial Circuit of Fla., to Jennifer D. 
Bailey, Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. (Oct. 
23, 2017, 10:03 EST) (on file with the University of Miami Law Review) [here-
inafter Fourth Circuit TCA Response]; Eighth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 
243; E-mail from Matthew Benefiel, Trial Court Adm’r, Ninth Judicial Circuit of 
Fla., to Jennifer D. Bailey, Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Judicial 
Circuit of Fla. (Jan. 22, 2017, 16:21 EST) (on file with the University of Miami 
Law Review); Fourteenth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 242; E-mail from 
Thomas Genung, Trial Court Adm’r, Nineteenth Judicial Circuit of Fla., to Jen-
nifer D. Bailey, Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. 
(Oct. 23, 2017, 10:03 EST) (on file with the University of Miami Law Review) 
[hereinafter Nineteenth Circuit TCA Response]. 
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and clearance rates.250 Two circuits provide reports on jury trials.251 
No circuits routinely generate and distribute reports on time stand-
ard compliance or reports that track disposition of intermediate court 
events such as pending motions, requests for hearings or matters un-
der judicial advisement. 
All TCAs reported that the majority of court events are set upon 
request by attorneys, either by contacting the judicial office or by 
online scheduling. Cases are typically only set by the court where 
the judge has identified an issue due to the age of the case, inactivity, 
or some other attention-grabbing issue which prompts a reaction by 
the court, or where a trial order is initiated, usually in response to a 
notice for trial from a party.252 
                                                                                                         
 250  E-mail from Sondra M. Lanier, Court Adm’r, Third Judicial Circuit of Fla., 
to Jennifer D. Bailey, Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Judicial Circuit 
of Fla. (Oct. 16, 2017, 10:37 EST) (on file with the University of Miami Law 
Review) [hereinafter Third Circuit TCA Response]; E-mail from Jonathan Lin, 
Trial Court Adm’r, Fifth Judicial Circuit of Fla., to Jennifer D. Bailey, Admin. 
Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. (Oct. 17, 2017, 11:21 
EST) (on file with the University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Fifth Circuit 
TCA Response]; E-mail from Gay Inskeep, Trial Court Adm’r, Sixth Judicial Cir-
cuit of Fla., to Jennifer D. Bailey, Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Ju-
dicial Circuit of Fla. (Oct. 09, 2017, 11:15 EST) (on file with the University of 
Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Sixth Circuit TCA Response]; E-mail from 
Mark Weinberg, Court Adm’r, Seventh Judicial Circuit of Fla., to Jennifer D. Bai-
ley, Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. (Oct. 9, 
2017, 16:13 EST) (on file with the University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter 
Seventh Circuit TCA Response]; Tenth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 239; 
Eleventh Circuit TCA Response, supra note 242; Twelfth Circuit TCA Response, 
supra note 246. The term “clearance rate” measures how a court is keeping up 
with its caseload and whether judges are closing as many cases as are being filed. 
In Florida, it is described as:  
The clearance rate is a useful measure of the responsiveness of a court to 
the demand for services, and is nationally recognized as a measure of 
court performance. The rate is determined by dividing the total number 
of cases disposed by the total number of cases filed during a specific time 
period.  
FLA. OFFICE OF THE STATE COURTS ADMN’R, supra note 162, at 10-3.  
 251  Eleventh Circuit TCA Response, supra note 242; E-mail from Kathleen 
Pugh, Trial Court Administrator, Seventeenth Judicial Circuit of Fla., to Jennifer 
D. Bailey, Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. (Oct. 
6, 2017, 3:37 PM EST) (on file with the University of Miami Law Review). 
 252  See TRAWICK’S FLORIDA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 168, § 
15:5, at 261–63. 
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In the large majority of civil cases, TCAs reported that there are 
no case management or scheduling orders issued at the commence-
ment of the case as a standard procedure.253 Case management is 
usually triggered by inactivity, and scheduling usually occurs 
through deadlines set forth in a pretrial or a trial order once a case is 
noticed for trial.254 The exception is, again, the Twentieth Circuit, 
which sets a standard case management conference at 150 days in 
three of five counties in the circuit.255  
When asked about local court culture and case management, 
court administrators acknowledged that their circuit’s procedures 
are largely based on the discretion of each individual judge.256 Most 
TCAs reported that attorneys drove case progress as opposed to the 
court taking responsibility.257 At the same time, every circuit 
acknowledged the court’s responsibility to control the pace of liti-
gation. Many reported that judges tend to grant attorneys leeway un-
til delay in the case becomes an issue, and that every judge has dif-
ferent standards.258 However, most judges still move cases from 
court event to court event based on what the parties set down before 
them. When asked specifically whether judges or attorneys set the 
pace, every TCA reported that, while it differs widely by judge, pro-
gress and pace is largely attorney-driven.259  
The TCAs’ responses included their thoughts on why judges do 
not engage in civil case management.260 There were two common 
                                                                                                         
 253  See, e.g., Fourth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 249; Seventh Circuit 
TCA Response, supra note 250; Nineteenth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 
249. 
 254  Tenth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 239; Eleventh Circuit TCA Re-
sponse, supra note 242; Fourteenth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 242. 
 255  Twentieth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 240. 
 256  See, e.g., Eighth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 243. 
 257  See, e.g., Second Circuit TCA Response, supra note 246; Third Circuit 
TCA Response, supra note 250; Fifth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 250; 
Tenth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 239. 
 258  Tenth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 239; Eleventh Circuit TCA Re-
sponse, supra note 242; Fourteenth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 242. 
 259  See, e.g., Second Circuit TCA Response, supra note 246; Third Circuit 
TCA Response, supra note 250; Fifth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 250; 
Tenth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 239. 
 260  See, e.g., Second Circuit TCA Response, supra note 246; Third Circuit 
TCA Response, supra note 250; Fourth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 249; 
Seventh Circuit TCA Response, supra note 250; Nineteenth Circuit TCA Re-
sponse, supra note 249. 
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refrains: a lack of resources and lack of case management support 
personnel. Trial court administrators across the board indicated that 
case management in their circuits suffered due to the lack of support, 
technology as well as staff. The lack of consensus among the judges 
within each circuit was also evident in the responses: differences in 
the degree to which judges rely on attorneys to drive cases, the ap-
propriate time to intervene when a case is inactive, and how to pri-
oritize the judge’s time and attention between cases make any sys-
temic initiative on the part of court administration difficult. At the 
same time, all the TCAs expressed confidence in and admiration of 
the judges’ dedication to timely resolution of the matters before 
them.  
C. Judicial Survey and Interview Results:  
The discussion that follows grouped survey questions aimed at 
specific factors with the interview responses that expanded on that 
factor. The grouping includes questions that occurred at different 
points in the survey in an effort to test responses for consistency, 
and each graph includes a number denominating the numeric order 
of the question in the survey. In many instances, the total responses 
reflected in the survey do not total 100% because respondent judges 
skipped or missed a question. The incidence of these omissions was 
typically one to two percent (1–2%) of respondents, the highest total 
skip rate was four percent (4%).  
As referenced earlier, the research was designed to address the 
following factors, which have emerged as potential influences af-
fecting the success and use of judicial case management: 
• Lack of awareness of case management;  
• Misunderstanding or lack of definition of case management;  
• Philosophy of judicial independence and perception of case 
management as an administrative versus judicial function; 
• Institutional inertia or “local court culture”;  
• Cross-incentives such as elections, bar polls, attorney fees 
and ambition; and 
• Lack of time or support to case manage.  
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The first three factors—awareness, misunderstanding, and philoso-
phy—are individual considerations for a judge. The last three fac-
tors—local culture, cross-incentives, and support—are institutional 
considerations which consider the effect of outside influences on the 
case management choice. The next Sections discuss each factor, in-
cluding both the related survey results and insights gained from the 
qualitative interviews. The results will also be discussed in further 
detail based on data subsets, which take a closer look at the results 
based on the size of the circuits—large, medium, and small—and 
experience level of the judges—zero to three years (new), three to 
six years, six to nine years, nine to twelve years, twelve to eighteen 
years, and over eighteen years261 with regard to those results in 
which some distinct difference appeared between subset responses.  
1. AWARENESS 
When identifying causal factors in judicial decision-making 
about case management, the first question is whether judges are 
even aware of case management as a tool in the civil judge’s 
toolbox. The traditional deferential approach of judges sitting back 
and resolving only the matters put to them by the parties is still the 
dominant mode of operation in civil courts,262 but does that mean 
that judges are not aware that case management is part of the job? 
Case management is implicit in both the Florida Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure and the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration. Florida 
Rule of Civil Procedure 1.010 provides that, “[t]hese rules shall be 
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination 
of every action.”263 As noted in the comment to the rule, “whether 
an action is to be determined in the manner contemplated will de-
pend, in great measure, upon the attitudes of judges and lawyers in 
approaching legal controversies and in employing and applying the 
rules.”264 Civil case management is taught as a routine topic at judi-
cial education conferences and was extensively utilized during the 
                                                                                                         
 261  While I do not also include graphs that depict these results of the data sub-
sets, such graphs are available and on file with myself and the University of Miami 
Law Review. 
 262  See, e.g., GERETY, EXCESS & ACCESS, supra note 117, at 14; CJI REPORT, 
supra note 32, at 4. 
 263  FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.010. 
 264  FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.010 comment to 1967 amendment.  
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foreclosure crisis.265 While case management is emphasized as a 
means to improve judicial performance in the Florida Judicial 
Branch’s Long Range Strategic Plan,266 the means to implement 
those goals is undefined. 
As one interviewed judge put it, “[a]re you asking me if judges 
are oblivious?”267 Anonymous survey responses to a set of questions 
testing basic awareness of case management indicate that while 
some judges are, in fact, oblivious, most are not.  
While eighty-eight percent (88%) of total respondents agreed or 
strongly agreed with the statement “judges have a responsibility to 
assume early and continuous control over the pace of litigation,” 
eight percent (8%) of total respondents disagreed or strongly disa-
greed and four percent (4%) had no opinion.268 Florida Rule of Ju-
dicial Administration 2.545, entitled “Case Management,” states 
that, while “parties and counsel shall be afforded a reasonable time 
to prepare and present their case,”  
The trial judge shall take charge of all cases at an 
early stage in the litigation and shall control the pro-
gress of the case thereafter until the case is deter-
mined. The trial judge shall take specific steps to 
                                                                                                         
 265  See generally THE LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 215; Foreclosure Initia-
tive Workgroup, supra note 220. 
 266  See generally, THE LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 215. 
 267  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Judge 13 (transcript on file with the 
University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Telephone Interview 13].  
 268  Figure 1. 
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monitor and control the pace of litigation, including 
the following: (1) assuming early and continuous 
control of the court calendar.269  
A further breakdown of the data reveals that a significant seventeen 
percent (17%) of newer judges—those who have only zero to three 
years’ experience—disagreed with the statement. Most support was 
found from respondents in larger circuits, who strongly agreed at 
sixty-nine percent (69%), nearly twenty points higher than the 
small- to medium-sized circuits.  
Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.545 also provides that 
“[j]udges and lawyers have a professional obligation to conclude lit-
igation as soon as it is reasonably and justly possible to do so.”270 
Accordingly, this statement resulted in only three percent (3%) re-
porting no opinion and five percent (5%) reporting strong disagree-
ment.271 Interestingly, eleven percent (11%) of newer judges disa-
greed. The consistent agreement in responses to these questions in-
dicates that judges are aware of the court’s responsibility to manage 
and progress litigation.  
                                                                                                         
 269  FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.545(a)–(b).  
 270  FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.545(a).  
 271  Figure 2. 
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As discussed, Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.545 im-
poses the obligation “to concluded litigation as soon as it is reason-
ably and justly possible to do so” on both judges and lawyers.272 
However, few judges expressed confidence in litigants’ ability to do 
so, with only seventeen percent (17%) strongly agreeing/agreeing 
and five percent (5%) expressing no opinion.273 In contrast, seventy-
seven percent (77%) stronglydisagreed/disagreed.274 This frames 
the challenge for courts: if courts do not think the parties and the 
lawyers can execute this task, how are courts to supervise and ensure 
the promise of reasonable, swift justice? This result highlights dis-
connects between broad conceptual knowledge of the obligation to 
case manage and the actual execution of case management on a day-
to-day basis. All of the interviewed judges repeatedly raised issues 
of strategic delay, overburdened lawyers, financial incentives, and 
inattention as compromising litigant dependability in providing for 
case momentum. At the same time, interviewed judges emphasized 
the need to collaborate with lawyers to assure that reasonableness 
pervades any case management effort. Ideally, each case should get 
what it needs at the time it needs it as much as organizationally pos-
sible.  
 
                                                                                                         
 272  FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.545(a).  
 273  Figure 3. 
 274  Id. 
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A similar response was reflected here with sixty-four percent 
(64%) expressing disagreement, but a much higher eighteen percent 
(18%) having no opinion.275 This is a large “no opinion” set for such 
a basic question about handling a docket; it represents a 250% in-
crease in “no opinion” responses from the earlier-referenced ques-
tion about litigant reliability and reflects a somewhat startling am-
bivalence about attorney roles.276 A total of eighty-one percent 
(82%) disagreed, strongly disagreed, or had no opinion, which again 
suggests judges do not rely on lawyers to move cases.277 Only eight-
een percent (18%) agreed that lawyers reasonably progress cases on 
their own.278 Again, many judges professed no opinion, in ranges 
from ten to twenty-seven percent (10%–27%) across the data sub-
sets based on size of circuit and experience. This speaks to a poten-
tial absence of case management by lawyers and judges. 
                                                                                                         
 275  Figure 4. 
 276  Compare Figure 4, with Figure 3. 
 277  Figure 4. 
 278  Id. 
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Overall, eighty-four percent (84%) of the judges interviewed 
agreed with this oft-quoted principle279: “justice delayed is justice 
denied.”280 In practice, this adage means that the result must be de-
livered while the outcome is still meaningful.281 For case-manage-
ment purposes, this question recognizes the importance of timely 
access. The six percent (6%) who disagreed or strongly disagreed 
indicate that, while they are the clear minority, there is a group of 
judges in the dissent. In terms of data subsets, responders from large 
circuits strongly agreed nearly twenty-three percent (23%) more of-
ten than those from smaller circuits.  
Interviewed judges defined this issue in terms of providing ac-
cess.282 Every judge agreed that timely access resolves issues and 
                                                                                                         
 279  Figure 5. 
 280  See generally, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Justice Delayed is Justice Denied, 
2 NEXUS 21 (1997); Alexander B. Aikman, An Essay on Restoring Case Flow 
Management to “The Heart of Court Management, CT. MANAGER, Spring 2013, 
at 6, 16 (2015). 
 281  See Chemerinsky, supra note 280, at 39. 
 282  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Judge 1 (transcripts on file with the 
University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Telephone Interview 1]; Tele-
phone Interview with Anonymous Judge 2 (transcripts on file with the University 
of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Telephone Interview 2]; Telephone Interview 
4, supra note 166; Telephone Interview with Anonymous Judge 10 (transcripts on 
file with the University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Telephone Interview 
10]; Telephone Interview with Anonymous Judge 11 (transcripts on file with the 
University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Telephone Interview 11]; Tele-
phone Interview with Anonymous Judge 14 (transcripts on file with the Univer-
sity of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Telephone Interview 14]; Telephone In-
terview with Anonymous Judge 17 (transcripts on file with the University of Mi-
ami Law Review) [hereinafter Telephone Interview 17]; Telephone Interview 
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moves cases.283 Several judges had interesting observations about 
how their colleagues evaluated their own ability to deliver justice.284 
They observed that judges who do not case manage viewed justice 
delivery at the level of the individual case, without really evaluating 
how that case affected other pending matters,285 while judges who 
do case manage viewed justice delivery across their entire docket, 
to ensure that each case received justice.286 The related questions to 
this two-tiered view of case management were designed to investi-
gate how the judges surveyed viewed the scope of their obligation 
to deliver timely justice. The following questions were interspersed 
through the survey to test those concepts. 
The rate of agreement in this statement is similar to the above 
question at eighty-eight percent (88%),287 which reinforces the view 
that the timeliness of resolutions is a significant aspect of judicial 
effectiveness. Again, judges in large circuits strongly agreed at a rate 
twenty points higher than judges from smaller circuits. The results 
of this statement suggest that judges understand that timely access 
is essential.288 At the same time, the most common traditional def-
erential and reactive approaches to case management suggest that 
                                                                                                         
with Anonymous Judge 21 (transcript on file with the University of Miami Law 
Review) [hereinafter Telephone Interview 21]. 
 283  See supra note 282. 
 284  Id. 
 285  Id. 
 286  Id. 
 287  Figure 6. 
 288  See, e.g., Telephone Interview 1, supra note 282 Telephone Interview 2, 
supra note 282; Telephone Interview with Anonymous Judge 9 (transcript on file 
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court involvement is sought only after an issue has erupted, which 
requires waiting in line to be heard.289 Proactive case management 
contemplates pre-established access points designed to prevent de-
lay and problems from accruing.290 These results inidicate that all 
three approaches can work, depending on the degree of timeliness 
of access and how a judge prioritizes their workload, as the re-
sponses indicates a fundamental understanding that delay compro-
mises the Court’s mission and implicates the public’s confidence in 
the courts to resolve their issues.  
However, the disarray in addressing this problem was captured 
in the following set of questions.  
The responses to this statement evidenced the opposition and the 
work that advocates for case management must face. While only 
twenty-seven percent (27%) of total responding judges agreed or 
strongly agreed, twenty-one percent (21%) had no opinion.291 In 
other words, roughly fifty percent (50%) of responding judges either 
do not think about case management or had no opinion. Fifty one 
percent (51%) rejected the statement. Interestingly, newer judges 
                                                                                                         
with the University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Telephone Interview 9]; 
Telephone Interview with Anonymous Judge 19 (transcript on file with the Uni-
versity of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Telephone Interview 19]. 
 289  Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73, at 384, 414–15.  
 290  Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, supra note 73, at 671–72; Gensler & 
Rosenthal, The Reappearing Judge, supra note 22, at 871–74; WHAT MAKES 
CIVIL JUSTICE EFFECTIVE?, supra note 31, at 6. 
 291  Figure 7. It is important to note that one percent (1%) of the judges sur-
veyed provided no response to this statement. 
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had strong opinions: They strongly disagreed at a significantly 
higher rate of seventeen percent (17%).  
Additionally, the responses frame a larger question: If attorneys 
and parties cannot be trusted to reliably progress cases and delay 
threatens justice, how does timely justice get delivered if judges are 
not thinking about case management? This series of responses 
seems to acknowledge problems but avoids confronting court re-
sponsibility for solutions.  
This statement appeared halfway through the survey and was de-
signed to test the consistency of the responses and identify potential 
definitional issues. Total responding judges agreed or strongly 
agreed at ninety-four percent (94%), while only two percent (2%) 
strongly disagreed, and three percent (3%) either had no opinion or 
did not respond to this statement.292 There were high levels of agree-
ment across all the data sets, with little disagreement. However, it is 
difficult to reconcile the broad agreement on this statement if 
roughly fifty percent (50%) of judges are not thinking about case 
management daily, as reflected in the previous results.293 This draws 
the larger question into crisper focus: how can case management be 
part of the judge’s job if half of the bench has no opinion or does not 
think of case management as part of their daily work? These results 
imply that judges know that case management is their responsibility 
but lack the specifics to implement it on a daily basis. 
Most of the interviewed judges either strongly objected to, or 
indicated disagreement with, any assertion about the civil bench’s 
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lack of awareness as a contributing factor to a lack of civil case man-
agement.294 Judges generally felt that the frequency of reference to 
case management suggested that only deliberate ignorance could 
produce a lack of awareness. All interviewed judges felt that nearly 
every judge is aware of case management, but whether they chose 
to employ it or not is a different issue. If judges say they are not 
aware, interviewees believe it to be an excuse or a result of willful 
ignorance.295 A few judges expect that there is a small number of 
judges—the very old and the very new—who might not be as aware 
as they should be.296 The interviewed judges generally felt that case 
management was the subject of education and awareness, but that 
simply raising it as an issue is insufficient without incentivizing 
judges to engage—“lip service.” “We need to get past just raising 
this at New Judges’ College,” said one judge.297  
While these comments point to a generalized awareness, they 
also point to a lack of more specific understanding of the responsi-
bility, a failure to define the scope of what civil case management 
entails, a lack of information about its direct benefits for the judge 
both personally and to the parties and the branch, and the lack of any 
real accountability. The deference given to individual choices by in-
dividual judges managing their docket their own way prevents sys-
temic case management in the interviewed judges’ views, due to the 
consequential lack of uniformity on procedures. Many complained 
that there is no strong leadership consensus that case management is 
important or has value in individual cases or systematically. These 
judges all case managed as a result of their own initiative, because 
                                                                                                         
 294  See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Anonymous Judge 3 (transcript on file 
with the University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Telephone Interview 3]; 
Telephone Interview 4, supra note 166; Telephone Interview 9, supra note 288; 
Telephone Interview 11, supra note 282; Telephone Interview with Anonymous 
Judge 12 (transcript on file with the University of Miami Law Review) [hereinaf-
ter Telephone Interview 12]; Telephone Interview 13, supra note 267; Telephone 
Interview with Anonymous Judge 15 (transcript on file with the University of 
Miami Law Review); Telephone Interview 17, supra note 282; Telephone Inter-
view 19, supra note 288; Telephone Interview with Anonymous Judge 20 (tran-
script on file with the University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Telephone 
Interview 20]. 
 295  See, e.g., Telephone Interview 12, supra note 294. 
 296  E.g., Telephone Interview 17, supra note 282. 
 297  Id.  
2019] WHY DON’T JUDGES CASE MANAGE? 1131 
they see it as essential to being a good judge, as opposed to any in-
stitutionalized incentive. Many commented that there were no con-
sequences for judges whose dockets reflected undue delay, disarray, 
lack of access, or for judges who lacked work ethic. Judges repeat-
edly commented that case management must be established as a high 
priority and that judges must be told that if “you don’t engage in 
civil case management, you are letting the system down and people 
are not going to get justice.”298  
One of the most significant insights about case management 
awareness from the interviews was in regard to judges comparing 
civil case management with criminal case management, particularly 
since most Florida judges rotate through a criminal assignment.299 
Multiple judges pointed out that criminal court has an extremely 
structured case management process.300 Every criminal case has a 
series of deadlines—from arrest, to a constitutionally guaranteed 
bond hearing, to arraignment to trial.301 A criminal case always has 
a future date and deadline.302 This structure is intentionally designed 
and imposed without question, systemically, by the judges assigned 
to criminal dockets.303 In other words, criminal case management is 
not viewed as optional or a matter of judicial choice.304 The inter-
viewed judges compared the criminal system with the apathy to-
wards civil case management simply because, as the civil system 
currently exists, it is individually judge-dependent in choice, design, 
and execution.305 
                                                                                                         
 298  Telephone Interview 11, supra note 282. 
 299  See, e.g., Telephone Interview 1, supra note 282; Telephone Interview 10, 
supra note 282; Telephone Interview 11, supra note 282; Telephone Interview 13, 
supra note 267; Telephone Interview with Anonymous Judge 16 (transcript on 
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In sum, the responses to the statements targeting awareness es-
tablished that a strong majority of judges understand that the respon-
sibility to case manage exists. If judges are aware of civil case man-
agement and that they cannot rely on lawyers to move cases forward, 
but are simply not exercising case management, then execution may 
be an issue, which implicates the next targeted factor: a misunder-
standing or lack of definition of case management;  
2. DEFINITION: WHAT IS THE MEANING AND SCOPE OF  
CIVIL CASE MANAGEMENT? 
One issue echoed both in the academic debate and in the inter-
views I conducted was the wide variation in how judges defined the 
scope and execution of civil case management.306 As Professor El-
liott noted, the “specific techniques advocated by self-styled mana-
gerial judges vary so widely that it is not clear what, if anything, 
they have in common.”307 Objections and resistance to civil case 
management are extremely dependent on how the scope of the job 
is defined.308 As noted, there are three general approaches to civil 
case management: deferential, reactive, and proactive.309  
In the traditional party-dependent deferential approach, the 
judge employs wide judicial discretion to make management deci-
sions on a case-by-case and an event-by-event basis upon request of 
an initiating party.310 Historically, this entailed deference to the par-
ties regarding case progress: “Unless and until one of the parties re-
quested some sort of judicial action . . . judges did not intervene” in 
the pretrial process.311 Additionally, “[t]he parties might undertake 
discovery, negotiate settlement, or let the case lie dormant for years 
                                                                                                         
 306  See Elliott, supra note 11, at 309, 316–317. Elliott’s article illustrates how 
this issue has existed for decades by describing a 1985 workshop in which federal 
judges were asked to manage the same hypothetical case. The results revealed 
“dramatic differences” in the ways each judge would have managed the case. Id.  
 307  Id. at 309. 
 308  See Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, supra note 1, at 515–16, 559–60, 568. 
 309  See supra Part II. 
 310  KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 79, at 27; Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra 
note 73, at 384. 
 311  Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73, at 384. Accord Molot, supra 
note 108, at 29, 39–40. 
2019] WHY DON’T JUDGES CASE MANAGE? 1133 
— all without judicial scrutiny.”312 This is the methodology used in 
the decades following the initial adoption of the 1938 Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure and follow-on efforts by the states. After initial 
adoption of the 1983 amendments initiating federal case manage-
ment rules, the first debates began about the discretionary character 
of case management and the scope of judicial action.313 What is en-
compassed by civil court case management? What are the appropri-
ate parameters of judicial action?  
Traditionalists, led eloquently by Professor Judith Resnik, de-
plored judicial case management as the abandonment of the neutral 
adjudicatory role. Resnik decried “managerial judging” in an influ-
ential 1982 article in the Yale Law Journal.314 She worried that 
“[j]udicial management has its own techniques, goals, and values, 
which appear to elevate speed over deliberation, impartiality, and 
fairness.”315 Traditionalists like Resnik expressed alarm about unre-
viewable and potentially biased decision-making focused not on jus-
tice, but rather on a judge’s case disposition statistics, with parties 
strong-armed into settlements and alternative dispute resolutions 
(“ADR”) promoted as a means to reduce cost and delay.316 Resnik 
expressed concern that the movement of cases from open court to 
ADR compromises the public’s opportunities to have firsthand 
knowledge about the claims brought, the disputants, and the deci-
sions made.317 Other commentators expressed concern that the em-
phasis on case management had fundamentally changed the role of 
the judge from a reactive and neutral umpire to an active manager 
obsessed with efficiency, front-loading, and adjudication without 
trial.318 They raised concern about judges injecting themselves into 
a case of which they have little knowledge, expressing the long-held 
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deferential belief that the lawyers know their case best.319 They ar-
gued that the lawyers should control the case, and that momentum 
is a choice that the parties can make themselves.320  
Given the changes in federal pleading and summary judgment 
law that created opportunities to dispose of cases at early stages,321 
traditionalists are particularly concerned about pretrial adjudication. 
While these concerns are less pronounced in state courts, in which 
dismissals on pleadings and summary judgments occur much less 
frequently than in federal court,322 these debates contributed to un-
certainty about the definition and scope of the case management task 
and continue to reinforce any tendency to defer to the attorneys.323 
One commentator has proposed a useful methodology for distin-
guishing between practices in case management.324 UCLA Profes-
sor Joanna Schwartz distinguished between those “gateway” mana-
gerial processes that move a case in or out of court, such as definitive 
pleading rulings, summary judgment rulings, forced ADR, and judi-
cial involvement in settlements, versus those “pathway” processes 
that move a case from event to event to consistently progress to the 
resolution of the parties’ choice, whether settlement or trial.325 Tra-
ditionalists express much more alarm over judicial activism in gate-
way case management and pay less attention to pathway manage-
ment, but they blur the distinction by referring to all actions as “case 
management.”326 For example, as expressed by Professor Jay Tid-
marsh, 
Case management has taken on a life of its own, and 
dismissals for failure to abide by court-imposed 
scheduling deadlines, issue-narrowing requirements, 
and final pretrial orders fill the reporters. Many cases 
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are determined on the criteria of efficiency and obe-
dience to judicial will rather than on their merits.327  
For purposes of considering the path forward for civil case manage-
ment, these accusations regarding decisions which dispose of cases 
on technicalities may be more fairly treated as concerns regarding 
the underlying federal rules and substantive law affecting gateway 
decisions, as opposed to an animating feature of case manage-
ment.328 These are concerns for which there is little parallel in cur-
rent state systems, particularly in the absence of uniform state con-
formity with reformation of federal pleading standards.329 
A large portion of the attorney surveys regarding civil case man-
agemet conducted within the last decade reflect a demand for more 
management and reflect less evidence of the overreaching antici-
pated by Resnik over the last thirty-five years. A 2012 survey by the 
Federal Judicial Center investigated practice with regard to the early 
case management conference prescribed by Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 16(b).330 Rule 16(b) conferences were not held in fifty 
percent (50%) of the respondents’ cases, either due to settlement, a 
local exemption, or “other.”331 Of those held, only thirty-one percent 
(31%) reported live conferences; the other nineteen percent (19%) 
reported telephonic conferences.332 Additionally, twelve percent 
(12%) of respondents who originally indicated they did not have a 
Rule 16(b) conference reported that they conferred via “correspond-
ence.”333 Fifty-seven percent (57%) of respondents reported that the 
conference lasted between ten and thirty minutes.334 Twenty-three 
percent (23%) reported that the conference lasted less than ten 
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minutes, which means eighty percent (80%) of cases had a 16b con-
ference that lasted less than thirty minutes.335 Ninety-four percent 
(94%) respondents reporting said the 16b conferences almost always 
resulted in a scheduling order.336 During the course of the case, the 
scheduling order was modified fifty percent (50%) of the time.337 
However, only fifteen percent (15%) of respondents reported that 
deadlines were enforced.338 The respondents were asked to rate the 
involvement of the presiding judge in the management of the case 
on a scale of one to five, five being very involved.339 The average 
response was 2.6 for all cases.340 Where a 16b conference occurred, 
judicial involvement was rated at 2.9, and at 3.1 where there were 
substantive discussions about the case.341 These survey results refute 
early concerns about dictatorial managerial judging occurring 
through proactive case management in the federal courts.342  
Advocates for court case management see the traditionalist ob-
jections as untethered to reality. In a 1983 response written to Pro-
fessor Resnik’s Managerial Judges, Professor Steven Flanders 
charged that traditionalists like Resnik confuse genuinely question-
able approaches with all accepted and essential case management 
approaches.343 He agreed, as do most case management advocates, 
that judges should never strong arm settlements or set abusive dead-
lines.344 Judicial case management advocates, led enthusiastically 
by United States District Court Judge Lee Rosenthal and Professor 
Steven Gensler, point out that “[c]alibrating [application of] the 
rules to individual cases is one good way to describe case manage-
ment.”345 They argue that if existing rules are not used, and those 
rules are adequate and well-designed, as the surveys generally sug-
gest they are, then the critical elements in bridging the gap between 
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the rules and their enforcement are access, judicial engagement, and 
involvement in cases that need it.346 Instead of shaping the litigation 
process in response to a request by a party to rule one specific issue 
at a time, advocates recommend that processes should be calibrated 
and designed for the case at outset, creating a plan for the path for-
ward.347  
Furthermore, the engaged court case management process is one 
of more visibility, not less, from the judge.348 Advocates describe a 
case management platform for dialog between the judge, the law-
yers, and the parties in order to get information, clarify issues, set 
timelines and priorities with reasonable deadlines.349 The case man-
agement conference becomes the opportunity to give the judge the 
salient information about the case that the judge needs to under-
stand.350 It is not and should not be a process of pushing reluctant 
parties to settle. Rather, it should be a process of tailoring pretrial 
work to get the necessary information in a cost-effective manner and 
to value the case, which may result in settlement or trial depending 
on the parties.351 The goal is not to push settlement, but given that 
settlement is the resolution for the vast majority of cases, to permit 
settlement earlier as opposed to later with less work, less cost, and 
consequently, less waste.352 So long as adjudication remains a viable 
option, the choice to settle is voluntary.353 Advocates speculate that 
greater judicial case management may result in more trials by reduc-
ing the distortive exploitation of pretrial process, which leaves the 
parties with resources to try their case within a timeline in which 
resolution is still meaningful.354 Judges who are trusted to deliver 
fair trials under a traditional construct should be equally trustworthy 
to manage pretrial processes fairly.355 Further, the ideal of engage-
ment that Professor Resnik espouses has not been evident in courts 
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for decades: lawyers and clients in routine adversarial litigation have 
little contact, and clients report little control over their lawsuits.356  
In the meantime, advocates point out, crowded dockets and 
overzealous litigants compete for the attention of the most expensive 
resource in the courthouse: the judge’s time. Without case manage-
ment, there is no organization or prioritization of those demands.357 
As a result, justice process flaws are exploited to distort the value of 
anemic claims and minimize the value of meritorious claims.358 As 
Professor Tidmarsh pointed out, “[t]he judicial discretion that the 
‘on the merits’ principle dictates also increases direct litigation 
costs, because discretion allows judges to reinvent the procedural 
wheel for each case and gives parties an incentive to argue over the 
shape of the wheel.”359 The concerns enunciated by the traditional-
ists focus on the risk of case management in an individual case, but 
fail to acknowledge the risks to other cases that failure to manage or 
inconsistent management could impose.360 Professor Jonathan 
Molot recognized that “[i]n an overcrowded court system, partisan-
ship’s tendency to string out the litigation process meant fewer court 
resource for other pending cases,”361 noting that there is a real risk 
overzealous litigants might not just inflict harm on their immediate 
adversaries, but also clog dockets and deprive future litigants of 
their day in court.362 Even Professor Resnik acknowledges the prob-
lem and seems to call for management at some level to solve it:  
Court services, particularly judges’ time, have be-
come scarce commodities. A continually expanding 
                                                                                                         
 356  Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, supra note 1, at 585 n.292. 
 357  Aikman, supra note 280, at 16; BRIAN J. OSTROM & ROGER A. HAN-
SON, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., ACHIEVING HIGH PERFORMANCE: A FRAME-
WORK FOR COURTS 34 (2010) (“If backlogs and bottlenecks exist, each individu-
als’ case suffers from excessive waiting time and likely inconsistent treatment 
which it comes to the amount of attention they receive from the court. No court 
where processes and events occur without rational control can persuasively assert 
that cases receive the amount of individual attention warranted.”). 
 358  See Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73, at 423; Molot, supra note 
108, at 41–43; Nagareda, supra note 10, at 672-74; Langbein, supra note 12, at 
552–53.  
 359  Tidmarsh, Resolving Cases, supra note 7, at 420. 
 360  Molot, supra note 108, at 91–92. 
 361  Id. at 39. 
 362  Id. 
2019] WHY DON’T JUDGES CASE MANAGE? 1139 
number of consumers are seeking access to the 
courts, but are forced to wait. One (apparent) cause 
for the wait is the queue—the line created by claim-
ants already waiting for judicial services. A second 
cause comes from some claimants, already in the 
courthouse, who appear to abuse their places at the 
head of the line by monopolizing court time. Attor-
neys, motivated by their own interests or those of 
their clients, seem to be the critical actors in the ap-
parent misuse of court resources. According to pro-
ponents of judicial management, judges . . . should 
take charge of the system and allocate their time in a 
prudent, coherent, and fair manner.363  
Such a process necessarily contemplates case management. 
During the qualitative interviews, I asked each judge to provide 
their definition of case management. One judge described case man-
agement as a “nebulous concept”;364 another used the word “amor-
phous.”365 All agreed that there is wide individual variation in how 
judges define case management. One judge stated that “[a] lot of us 
have different philosophies or thoughts about what works best for 
us depending on individual judges’ personalities; different methods 
work for different judges:”366 others said it’s a widely held belief 
that case management is part of the job, but different judges define 
it in different ways.367 A judge in a leadership position referenced 
the “different concepts that we all have,” and that there are different 
skills for managing a civil case and managing a civil docket.368 All 
agreed that defining the scope of case management is a challenge to 
universal engagement.  
These observations were consistent with the varying approaches 
to court case management. Interviewed judges each described their 
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approach to case management. One group focused on ensuring that 
the lawyers and the parties were complying with court rules, dead-
lines, and orders—primarily referencing keeping the case moving 
towards resolution by reactively policing inactivity and following 
up on problems as opposed to preventing delay in the first instance. 
The second group focused on the proactive approach of creating a 
defined schedule at inception, with anticipated court interaction, cre-
ating expectations over the life of the case as opposed to event from 
event—all with the goal of consistent progress to resolution whether 
by trial or settlement at the parties’ choice by a relatively certain 
date.  
All this debate about the role of the judge, the lawyers, the jus-
tice principles, and competing interests involved may have produced 
a corresponding ambivalence on the bench about case management. 
“There is no broad normative consensus to unite reformers. Alt-
hough there is a widespread feeling that the system needs repair, 
there is no clear sense of how serious the problems really are, what 
to do about them, or even whether they can be solved at all,” 369 
observed Professor Robert Bone. Tidmarsh observed:  
[W]e tossed upon the ocean, buffeted in the 1980s by 
concerns for inefficiency and by disaffection with the 
sharp practices of a lawyer-driven, costly, and dila-
tory litigation system. Political pressures to reform 
procedure to achieve short-term policy objectives 
blew in during the 1990s. Transnational pressures 
and the concern for the ‘vanishing trial’ brought wa-
ter into the boat in the 2000s. ….[W]e are still afloat 
on Pound’s ocean. We cannot—or at least have not—
imagined a fresher and better approach to proce-
dure.370  
Many state judges, particularly without the strong rule-based di-
rectives and autonomy of the federal system, may have mixed reac-
tions to directives to case manage because of a lack of clear scope. 
The surveys indicate that most lawyers and judges find the rules 
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themselves adequate, but lacking enforcement.371 The survey refer-
enced above conducted by IAALS and the ACTL, the FJC, the 
ABA, and the Duke Conference conveners indicate strong support 
for case management, but a reality in which case management rarely 
occurs in a meaningful way.372 As noted by Gensler and Rosenthal, 
“[t]he current Civil Rules are built upon the expectation that judges 
will manage their cases. But the rules themselves provide little guid-
ance on the critical questions of calibration and scale necessary to 
guide judges on how to manage.”373 The need for a definition is ev-
ident:  
For every excess that managerial judging’s critics 
identify, its defenders identify other cases in which 
judicial case management has facilitated efficient 
resolutions and saved valuable court resources. 
Without a conceptual framework to weigh these 
costs and benefits, scholars have been unable to 
agree on a course of reform. . . . [W]e must move 
beyond simply weighing the tradeoffs that surround 
new judicial practices and develop a framework to 
help us decide which costs are worth bearing and 
which are not.374 
There is a further distinction between state and federal courts 
that is important. In many cases in state court, a formal case man-
agement conference may be unnecessary given the broad diversity 
of the character of the cases.375 There are many noncomplex cases 
in state court that could still benefit from a case management struc-
ture in the form of a schedule without the necessity of a formal con-
ference, particularly uncontested or minimally contested matters 
that still need deadlines to progress.376 The significant number of 
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self-represented litigants is particularly impacted by a lack of pre-
dictable and consistent structure for cases moving through the court 
system, as the lack of consistency in practices among judges creates 
confusion, consumes staff resources, and enhances perceptions of a 
deck that is stacked against those who cannot afford a lawyer.377 In-
ability to understand the process of how a case will move through 
the court system, because of a lack of systemic consistency, contrib-
utes to pro se frustration and consumes valuable staff resources in 
providing guidance one case at a time.378 Ad hoc management con-
tributes to issues of public trust.379  
Given these realities, which have been repeatedly established by 
empirical data cited above, the need for an operative definition has 
emerged as a factor to be explored in this research. What is included 
in case management? Who is supposed to be doing what? Both state-
ments on the survey and the qualitative interviews conducted at-
tempted to explore the role of definitional issues in case manage-
ment adoption. What should and should not be done? What is the 
extent of court responsibility? 
                                                                                                         
LEGAL ETHICS 1485, 1488 (2009). Issues regarding foreclosure case processing 
contributed to a landmark Justice Department settlement addressing abusive liti-
gation and servicing practices. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Fed. Gov’t and 
State Att’ys General Reach $25 Billion Agreement with Five Largest Mortg. Ser-
vicers to Address Mortg. Loan Servicing and Foreclosure Abuses (Feb. 9, 2012), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-government-and-state-attorneys-general-
reach-25-billion-agreement-five-largest. 
 377  Gensler & Rosenthal, The Reappearing Judge, supra note 22, at 859; CJI 
REPORT, supra note 32, at 33–34; Gensler & Rosenthal, Four Years After Duke, 
supra note 9, at 645; LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 26, at 35. 
 378  LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 26, at 35. 
 379  CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 3; Molot, supra note 108, at 39–40; KAKA-
LIK ET AL., supra note 79, at 1; Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, supra note 73, at 
734; Nagareda, supra note 10, at 672–73; Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 
73, at 384. 
2019] WHY DON’T JUDGES CASE MANAGE? 1143 
The next series of questions was designed to identify attitudes 
and beliefs that shape the potential scope of court case management.  
This question was designed to test the tendency of judges to rely 
upon the parties: the traditional deferential approach. Ninety-one 
percent (91%) of judges put the responsibility for rule compliance, 
deadlines, and order enforcement on the litigants.380 At the same 
time, the responses here conflict with the reality established in the 
results discussed previously: two-thirds of judges do not believe that 
litigants will reasonably progress a case or conclude litigation as 
soon as reasonably or justly possible.381 Accordingly, this response 
appears to indicate, consistent with decades of broader survey re-
sults, that while courts believe that the responsibility should lie with 
the litigants, courts know that litigants will not, cannot, or are unable 
to exercise this responsibility.  
This is also an interesting metric from the standpoint of the state 
and national trend of growing self-representation, which generally 
suggests that self-represented litigants are ill-equipped to police lit-
igation effectively, especially if the other side is represented.382 The 
statement, as phrased, suggests responsibility, but does not specify 
a hierarchy of responsibility, so it is unclear whether the respondents 
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envision this statement as responsibility in tandem with the court, or 
whether litigants bear the lion’s share of responsibility for policing 
compliance. Again, very large circuits were eighteen points higher 
than small or mid-size circuits in their rate of strong agreement.  
The results also ignore the uncontested, one-sided case where 
there is no conflict to produce momentum. Most of the court-gener-
ated case management described across the judicial interviews oc-
curred as a result of a one-sided failure to comply with the rules 
deadlines over an extended period of time: failure to serve within 
120 days, failure to prosecute the case in any way over ten months. 
These results seem to establish that Florida judges, even those who 
are strong case management advocates, manage reactively, rather 
than proactively.  
The high level of agreement to this statement speaks to this con-
flict between the shared responsibility of lawyers and judges when 
examined in relationship to the views expressed about the enforce-
ment obligations of the litigants.383 The broad agreement also speaks 
to the initial observations of the interviewed judges. This is an easy 
statement to agree with, but there is an absence of definition as to 
what this entails and how and when it should occur. How are judges 
to know when enforcement is needed? Traditionalists rely upon par-
ties.384 Court case management advocates want to supplement with 
diligent attention from the court.385 Reactive case managers look to 
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act upon requests and cases in limbo,386 and proactive case managers 
look to ensure compliance by monitoring and preventing failure to 
comply by setting clear deadlines, consequences, and prophylactic 
future dates.387 All three approaches are dependent on the court 
providing prompt access for enforcement issues, instead of incen-
tivizing bad behavior by delaying access to enforcement.388 This 
challenge was captured in the next series of questions.  
While agreement to this statement was unanimous,389 very large 
counties strongly agreed nearly twenty points higher than other cir-
cuits. This statement is designed to highlight the question of how 
judges view case management on an individual case level fitting into 
the larger challenges of case management across an entire docket. 
These results show that judges universally acknowledge the need to 
provide a timely hearing at an individual case level without regard 
to other demands.  
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This unanimity was also evident among the interviewed judges. 
Each strongly emphasized the importance of prompt access to hear-
ings as an absolutely essential component to state court case man-
agement.  
Following the question as to policing compliance, ninety-five 
percent (95%) of respondents agreed that effective enforcement 
must be timely.390 This question also recognizes that delayed en-
forcement is less effective. Parties for whom delayed access results 
in rulings of declining value would agree, which is again driven by 
access.391 Where cases are one-sided, or involve a self-represented 
party, a substantial lag in enforcement can occur unnecessarily, 
causing delay in a case.392 This question implicates the broader 
scope issue previously referenced: how can courts promptly respond 
to a rule or order violation requiring enforcement when there is no 
corresponding compliance monitoring in the first instance? In other 
words, relying upon the diligence of the parties—previously estab-
lished as the subject of significant skepticism by all judges393—
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seems like a poor management choice, as reflected in the current 
state of affairs. Delays reward and incentivize bad behavior.394 
This statement targeted how judges view their responsibilities to 
a single case versus the demands across a docket.395 In Florida, most 
hearings that are not short five-minute matters set on a multi-case 
calendars are set by specific request, or “special set hearings.”396 
Those hearings are typically scheduled in the chronological order in 
which the request is received.397 If many cases are requesting hear-
ing time, then the time available may be pushed to a more remote 
future date, which will delay the case.398 In some instances, a delay 
in getting a hearing may extend beyond the useful date of securing 
the resolution.399  
For example, getting a hearing on a motion to compel discovery 
is of little use if it is set after the trial date is scheduled. As a practical 
matter, the number of cases which need hearings always affects the 
available time. The responses here suggest that fifty-three percent 
(53%) of judges believe that a hearing should be made available 
based on the needs of the requesting case, and thirty-three percent 
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(33%) acknowledge that the number of cases waiting for hearings 
will affect the timeliness of dates offered. At fourteen percent 
(14%), this is one of the higher no opinion findings, which, com-
bined with the agreement categories, totals forty-seven (47%), very 
nearly equaling the disagreements. This suggests an overall lack of 
clarity of thought as to this problem and is consistent with prior an-
swers about the failure to think about case management.400  
This statement is the converse of the statement above.401 The 
eighty-two percent (82%) of judges who agree or strongly agree 
seem to indicate that the needs of the individual case are the appro-
priate measure—only nine percent (9%) of judges disagree or 
strongly disagree.402 The need to deliver a timely resolution may 
drive a more aspirational response to this question as opposed to the 
above question, which reflects the difficulties of juggling busy dock-
ets. Smaller circuits agreed or strongly agreed at a rate of ninety-five 
percent (95%).  
A significant number of the interviewed judges expressly differ-
entiated between case management at the case level and at the 
docket level. They expressed the view that managing at the individ-
ual case level was insufficient if other cases’ needs were not being 
met.403 Parties who are evaluating their court experience do not have 
any appreciation for the demands of a docket.404 They will evaluate 
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the competency of the court and the efficacy of the court system on 
being able to get their hearing in their case heard within a reasonable 
time.405 Interviewed judges strongly emphasized the need for con-
sistent awareness of how long parties are waiting for hearing dates, 
as well as the need to adjust schedules and prioritize on a continual 
basis through use of case management in order to deliver prompt 
access at the case level across the docket. In other words, providing 
access is the judge’s job.406 
Given the lack of data being distributed to Florida judges on any 
routine basis, judges have to search out the vantage point for case-
load overviews. They will not know how long parties are waiting for 
hearings unless they monitor their settings or they ask. Judges have 
to actively engage with their staff to determine when hearings and 
trials are being routinely set, clearance rates, and continuance num-
bers. These are not organic systemic operations in most circuits, and 
as result, depend heavily on the engagement of the individual judge, 
based on interview comments. At the same time, many of the judges 
expressed that this docket view is essential to public trust and con-
fidence in the courts, the reputation of the judicial branch overall, 
and ties into the importance of timeliness in justice delivery. 
Judges are very clear about their obligation to deliver rulings 
quickly after a hearing.407 However, some of the data from national 
surveys suggest that the reality does not always comport with this 
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vision of justice.408 These results establish that once enforcement is 
sought, courts must be prompt in ruling on enforcement.  
This statement was designed to identify how judges believe case 
progress can be impacted. Ninety percent (90%) of judges agreed 
that setting deadlines is an important tool, with only five perfect 
(5%) disagreeing and three percent (3%) expressing no opinion.409 
This view is ratified in the interviews. Judge after judge emphasized 
the importance of consistently enforcing deadlines and a firm trial 
date to ensure a case progresses forward.410 Equally, judge after 
judge emphasized that access to hearing time is key.411 When a hear-
ing looms, parties frequently resolved the contested matter without 
the necessity of a court hearing or ruling, and the judge’s involve-
ment is reduced to signing an agreed order memorializing the par-
ties’ resolution. Access to prompt hearings produces prompt resolu-
tions.412 Equally, keeping problem cases on “a short leash” mini-
mized the amount of conflict and delay in the case according to the 
interviewed judges.413 Many reported that cases that were problem-
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atic were scheduled for case management events on a frequent ba-
sis.414 By providing access, the court can deliver clear guidance, pre-
vent additional controversies from accruing, and frequently reorgan-
ize the relationship between warring lawyers. Strong case manage-
ment resulted in less court involvement, not more, as opposed to the 
combatants seeking hearings on a continual ad hoc issue by issue 
basis with no end in sight.  
Judges were much more uncertain about how and why cases go 
off track. Only fifty-six percent (56%) agreed with this statement, 
still a majority, but twenty-three percent (23%) had no opinion and 
twenty percent (20%) disagreed for a total of forty-three percent 
(43%).415 This question was designed to begin to distinguish be-
tween proactive judicial case management, in which cases consist-
ently have prospective upcoming deadlines, and reactive case man-
agement, which reacts to periods of inactivity or requests for action 
with judicial intervention to restore momentum. Given the strong 
belief that attention correlates to deadlines,416 the ambiguity of these 
responses suggests the overall uncertainty about how to assure con-
stant progress toward resolution.  
The broad tendency to reactive case manage among the inter-
viewed judges reinforced the observation of ambivalence. Inter-
viewed judges again emphasized the contrast between criminal 
cases, which had consistent deadlines as a result of system architec-
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ture, and civil cases, in which deadlines were inconsistently set ab-
sent individual case management.417 The high number of no opinion 
responses again seems to demonstrate confusion about responsibil-
ity. The prior responses affirm that lawyers pay attention to cases 
with deadlines,418 that parties and lawyers cannot be trusted to pro-
gress cases alone,419 yet there is apparent reluctance to acknowledge 
the role of court events in moving cases along. There is no ambiguity 
in the view of the interviewed judges. They all believe that dates and 
deadlines, fairly and consistently enforced, are essential.420  
Three quarters of responding judges disagreed with this state-
ment, clearly seeing a role for the court in getting cases to trial.421 
Only sixteen percent (16%) agreed, while eight percent (8%) ex-
pressed no opinion.422 However, consistent with trends reflected 
above, judges with less experience agreed more often. Twenty-three 
percent (23%) of new judges agreed, twenty percent (20%) of judges 
with between three to six years of experience agreed, and twenty-
four percent (24%) of judges with six to nine years of experience 
agreed. In contrast, judges with twelve or more years of experience 
agreed at only eleven percent (11%).  
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In addition, the trial date remains the star by which virtually 
every case is navigated. The survey results on this statement rein-
force the continuing obsession with a trial date as being the driver 
of case progress, notwithstanding the overall lack of trials.423 Large 
law firms bill by the hour for substantial discovery based-processes, 
and plaintiffs have shifted to litigation consortia and committees. 
Yet, as observed by Professor Tidmarsh, four fifths of cases entering 
the litigation process resolve without trial424:  
[O]ur procedural system is structured around the be-
lief that a case will be resolved at a culminating, all-
issues jury trial. A fair question is to ask whether the 
entire procedural system should be designed around 
that most rare occurrence, the vanishing jury trial. If 
form follows function, a procedural system designed 
to develop the types of information useful to settle-
ment or summary disposition, and to structure the lit-
igation process in stages most conducive to settle-
ment or summary disposition, is more logical.425  
Every judge interviewed described the essential role trial dates play 
in managing cases, while at the same time acknowledging how few 
cases actually go to trial.426  
3. PHILOSOPHICAL OPPOSITION 
One of the unique challenges to courts as an enterprise is the 
nature of the organizational relationship between judges. In terms of 
institutional design, most local courts have a chief judge, and state 
judicial branches are run by the Chief Justice.427 There are generally 
Administrative Judges that run specific divisions within a circuit—
such as Civil, Felony, and Juvenile.428 However, these leaders do 
not have the authority generally to select or fire judges and they do 
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not have the authority to offer any kind of pay incentive or penalty—
the type of hiring, firing, incentives and threats that run the private 
sector.429 Judge Posner, discussing what judges maximize, points 
out that judicial salaries can neither be lowered nor raised based on 
performance.430 Posner identifies other elements that can affect ju-
dicial behavior: popularity, prestige, public interest, and reputa-
tion.431 However, there are no direct consequences for stellar or poor 
performance.432 The individual judge’s boss is the taxpayer and the 
voter.433 The taxpayer pays salaries.434 The voter, in states such as 
Florida which have elections, determines whether a judge keeps his 
or her job if opposition is filed.435  
As a result, the interviewed judges expressed that individual 
judges frequently assert their independence as elected constitutional 
judicial officers when asked or instructed by their Chief Justices, 
their Chief Judges in their circuit, or their Administrative Judge to 
follow certain procedures.436 Furthermore, interviewed judges indi-
cated that judges may reject case management as inconsistent with 
their judicial philosophy based on a view that the job belongs either 
to the lawyers or administration. One judge interviewed estimated 
that forty to fifty percent (40% to 50%) of judges assigned to civil 
dockets think case management is an administrative function as op-
posed to the judge’s job,437 although the survey respondents roundly 
rejected this view.438 While inconsistent with the previous survey 
results, the estimate is consistent with the minimal utilization of civil 
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case management across not only the state, but also other jurisdic-
tions.439  
Most of the interviewed judges felt that the philosophy argument 
was a relic of a bygone era, and that judges understand that case 
management is part of the job but simply don’t see the incentive or 
means to engage. Many interviewed judges characterized this ap-
proach in essentially the following way: why should I care if they 
don’t care? It’s their case.440 One said that “many judges have the 
attitude [of] just let me do my calendar for that day, get on with it, 
and go home.”441 However, the large majority of interviewed judges 
rejected that attitude, with one judge stating that judicial philosophy 
is just an “excuse.”442 Another judge stated the following: “I do not 
agree with the ‘just the umpire’ view. I am the umpire when it comes 
to decision making and rulings, but I am the manager when it comes 
to moving the case.”443  
While fourty-seven (47%) of judges disagree with this state-
ment, which suggests the view that case management is not optional 
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as a matter of judicial independence; 444 there is a sizable no opinion 
response. A solid thirty-three percent (33%) minority agrees that the 
decision to case manage is an issue of judicial independence. Com-
bined with eighteen percent (18%) who expressed no opinion, these 
responses evidence a fifty-one to forty-eight (51-48) split.445 This 
split is difficult to reconcile with the prior strong responses to the 
overall questions about case management as part of the judge’s 
job.446 It is equally difficult to reconcile with mandates contained in 
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and Florida Rules of Judicial 
Administration.447 Interestingly, new judges agreed with this broad 
statement of independence at a rate twenty points higher than any 
other data subset.  
The challenge of this survey response may reflect not only some 
of the definitional and scope issues about case management previ-
ously referenced,448 but also how courts define judicial independ-
ence. As one interviewed judge stated, “judicial independence is 
how you decide the issues, not how you move cases.”449 Overall, 
interviewed judges pointed out that being part of a court system sug-
gested that how cases move through that system should not signifi-
cantly deviate from standards and norms simply because of the phi-
losophy of which judge is assigned a case by blind-filing. Some 
spoke more harshly: “Judicial independence is an excuse that justi-
fies nothing but laziness. Part of our job and part of our oath is that 
we will work to maximize efficieny [and] maximize service to the 
folks who pay our salaries, the citizens of our counties.”450  
The negative response may be magnified by the degree to which 
case management currently depends on the individual processes of 
individual judges, as opposed to broad frameworks of structure and 
support within civil courts among the circuits. Virtually every trial 
court administrator across the circuits responded that there was a 
lack of a systemic case management framework, and case manage-
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ment was up to the individual judge. Without staff support, technol-
ogy support, and a systemic framework, it is understandable that 
judges would see this as a discretionary choice.451  
During the interview process, several judges pointed out the sys-
temic contrast with criminal felony assignments. Although judges 
seldom think of the process in this manner, criminal court is very 
case management oriented from arrest forward: constitutional guar-
antees of first appearance, bond, statutory arraignment timeframes, 
speedy trial.452 All of these features give a preexisting structure to 
criminal cases in which they always have an upcoming future date 
and specific events occur on deadlines.453 It is extremely rare for any 
judge to question the criminal court structure in their circuit, in par-
ticular due to the complexities of the timelines as well as the need to 
coordinate with other stakeholders: state attorneys, public defenders 
or criminal counsel, jail/corrections to bring the defendant to court, 
and law enforcement agencies to coordinate and provide testi-
mony/evidence etc.454 As the interviewed judges pointed out, judges 
who see civil case management as a discretionary function of judi-
cial independence do not even think about that independence in the 
criminal context.455 This suggests that a supportive framework that 
assists the case management execution is critical to systemic im-
provement. If courts are going to ask judges to handle all civil case 
management on their own, then it is likely judges will view those 
choices as individual, discretionary, and optional—in other words, 
based on judicial independence.  
Furthermore, many of the interviewed judges emphasized the 
need for strong leadership and support to incentivize civil case man-
agement adoption. One of the points they repeatedly raised was that, 
while the time standards have been embedded in the Florida Rules 
of Judicial Administration for decades,456 there is no accountability 
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for the time standards and there is no mandate for compliance.457 
However, the loosely-coupled character of court organization—in 
other words, no direct boss—makes it difficult to mandate change. 
As one judge stated, “you cannot force anyone if they view their job 
selfishly, themselves first, prioritizing convenience and minimizing 
work.458 Judge Posner’s article on what judges maximize also in-
cludes an interesting discussion about the influence that leisure-
seeking has on judicial behavior, which he defines as an “aversion 
to any sort of ‘hassle,’ as well as to sheer hard work.”459 Similarly, 
leisure-seeking behavior was the subject of critical comment by in-
terviewed judges with regard to judges who disregard their case 
management responsibilities.460  
No judges strongly agreed with this statement, and only a few 
agreed.461 Of those that agreed, nine percent (9%) of judges with 
zero to three years’ experience made up the largest presence. Still, 
eighty-seven percent (87%) of those new judges disagreed. Disa-
greement was strong across all data subsets, which is consistent with 
earlier questions and establishes awareness of case management and 
that it is, in fact, part of the judicial task.462 While interviewed judges 
felt that many used this excuse to justify avoiding responsibility for 
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case managing,463 the survey respondents rejected such an asser-
tion.464  
The fact that eighty-nine percent (89%) of judges agreed with 
this statement465 establishes a clear consensus on the least contro-
versial case management approach: reactive case management to get 
the case moving in the face of inactivity. This sort of case manage-
ment can occur through a lack of prosecution notice, a case manage-
ment conference being set by the court after inactivity of a specific 
duration, or requiring other action to be taken.466 This issue has im-
plications not only for contested matters, but also for uncontested 
matters that may frequently lose the attention of the prosecuting firm 
and languish.467 This is the basic level of case management, which 
the vast majority of judges who do undertake case management un-
derstand the best and are most comfortable with exercising. How-
ever, the results do show there is still a core group of six percent 
(6%) or so of judges that clings to the traditional deferential ap-
proach,468 where the case belongs to the lawyers to progress or fail 
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to progress as they see fit.469 As one judicial branch leader acknowl-
edged that there is genuine disagreement about what role the judge 
should play and how far the judge should go:  
Everybody in Florida understands time standards and 
is aware of case management, that the judge has to 
be involved in the management of the case, and that 
judges don’t just call balls and strikes. For justice to 
be relevant, just, and fair, that means timeli-
ness . . . . A docket is a pipeline. You have to keep 
current or everything gets saturated and just stops.470 
 Another judge pointed out that this is a public trust and confidence 
issue: people need timely results to trust the judiciary.471  
The results of the statements discussed in this Section demon-
strate a wealth of good intentions on the part of the bench: most 
judges understand what their obligations are in terms of providing 
access and timely resolutions. However, the results also demonstrate 
the ambiguity that exists regarding how those goals are accom-
plished and the environment in which the court’s business is con-
ducted.  
4. CROSS-INCENTIVES: ELECTIONS AND RELATIONSHIPS  
WITH THE BAR 
When asked about the factors, interviewed judges spoke 
strongly about the current court system and the factors of cross-in-
centives, institutional inertia, and lack of support. The subject of 
cross-incentives is a challenging inquiry. The prior interviews and 
results evidence that judges do not trust parties to timely move cases 
to resolution.472 At the same time, judges in Florida come to the 
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bench by appointment or election, and must thereafter stand for elec-
tion every six years.473 A judge will be re-elected without opposition 
if no candidate files to run against him or her.474 Unopposition can 
be a result of judicial reputation or perceived community support 
liable to generate significant campaign contributions.475  
The survey results do reflect a willingness of many judges to 
acknowledge these concerns. However, the high level of no-opinion 
responses to the inquiries about cross-incentives appear to implicate 
a reluctance to acknowledge basic concerns that are repeatedly 
voiced when judges talk “off the record” about case management 
pros and cons. To be frank, the survey statements were intentionally 
framed as an attempt to assess what judges thought attorneys be-
lieved, which leaves open the opportunity for judges to abdicate, 
professing that they are not in position to assess attorney opinon. 
However, this discomfort was not evident in other parts of the sur-
vey, as the level of no opinion responses regarding these factors 
were significantly higher than those in response to other questions 
about what lawyers and parties do or think. These concerns poten-
tially implicate self-interest, which may be why judges are reluctant 
to acknowledge them. The high level of “no opinion” responses to 
these statements suggests that the responding judges profess com-
plete indifference to personal and professional consequences in con-
templating case management. However, as noted by Judge Posner, 
“[p]olitics, personal friendships, ideology, and pure serendipity play 
too large a role in the appointment of . . . judges to warrant treating 
the judiciary as a collection of sainted genius-heroes miraculously 
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immune to the tug of self-interest.”476 While integrity, honesty, can-
dor, intellect, fidelity, and honor shape the vast majority of judicial 
conduct, we should not be so naïve or self-congratulatory as to deny 
the shadows of fear, laziness, greed, ego, ambition, and power in the 
judiciary.  
These statements asked about potential influences or bias that 
some judges may want to pretend do not exist, but are evident in 
public and bar perceptions about why judges fail to case manage.477 
Interviewed judges acknowledged the concerning reality of cross-
incentives and acknowledged that they make a deliberate choice to 
ignore pressures from the bar, their colleagues, and local court cul-
ture. They acknowledged the reality of push back from lawyers, 
which was also evident in the survey responses. One judge, a strong 
case manager, openly acknowledged that she is able to wield a firm 
case management approach because the majority of lawyers who lit-
igate before her come from a neighboring urban area outside her 
circuit—so they cannot vote against her or run against her.478  
In 2015, professional court manager Alexander Aikman wrote 
an unusually forthright article about the lack of utilization of case 
management.479 Aikman was blunt about this factor:  
Some judges believe that if they seek to shorten the 
time to disposition and do not grant the ‘standard’ 
continuance time—or whatever time the attorneys 
request—they risk being contested at the next elec-
tion . . . . The risks of a contest and losing are too 
great to save a few days here and there.480  
In addition, judges are constantly asked to enforce rules against 
the attorneys whom they must rely upon for public support in the 
event of an election. These same lawyers are the lawyers who many 
judges generally believe exploit the legal process based upon the 
survey questions discussed above. Further, lawyers have financial 
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incentives in how they handle cases.481 As previous scholars have 
noted, “[t]he discovery-based processes of modern litigation have 
been conducive to the growth of large law firms and hourly billing. 
American litigators prefer to leave no stone unturned, provided, of 
course, they can charge by the stone.”482 
Some interviewed judges felt that the identified cross-incen-
tives—concern about attorney attitudes, perceptions of being a 
threat to fees, bar polls, election opposition or elevation—were a 
motivating consideration for only a minority of judges. One esti-
mated that minority to be around ten to fifteen percent (10% to 
15%).483 Across the board, judges said that there are lawyers who 
don’t like case management, and that judges can experience push 
back. Further, interviewed judges attributed the resistance to rejec-
tion of any kind of change, while others felt more self-interest was 
involved. As one judge state, “they want to run on their time clock 
and billable hours. Billable hours play a significant role in why cases 
drag on and on, and are a significant concern to me.”484 One judge 
said point blank, “you case manage, you are going to be unpopular. 
Lawyers would rather be in charge. Participatory/directive judges 
are all accused of ‘micromanaging.’”485 Interestingly, this judge 
hailed from the only circuit in Florida that reports institutionalized 
case management—the Twentieth Circuit—in which one might ex-
pect that universal adoption should have prevented differences in 
judicial case management deployment.  
The interviewed judges all agreed that these cross-incentives 
should never be a consideration, but also felt that judges who did not 
acknowledge that they were aware of these concerns were not being 
forthright. The point, the interviewees said, is to realize the concern 
but then deliberately set it aside in the decisions about how to run 
the docket. They generally felt that the advantages of court case 
management would become apparent to naysayer attorneys once 
they experienced the benefits. The consistently high level of no 
opinion responses to statements about this factor underscores the 
                                                                                                         
 481  Aikman, supra note 280, at 10; Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, supra 
note 73, at 734; Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, supra note 1, at 524. 
 482  Langbein, supra note 12, at 550 (quoting Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Per-
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 483  Telephone Interview 20, supra note 294. 
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problem of ambivalence: judges know there are issues of cost, delay, 
and process manipulation and they know that they cannot rely on the 
parties and litigants to solve those issues; yet, they step back from 
acknowledging their mandated role in solutions. They don’t trust the 
lawyers to move the cases, but may be reluctant to examine what 
may influence attorney interaction on case management.  
This statement was designed to test the judges’ sensitivity to the 
court’s reputation for delay. If there is general consensus that liti-
gants do not reliably progress cases,486 who is getting blamed? The 
results show that a large majority of judges believe that the court is 
blamed. Seventy-eight percent (78%) of judges agreed with this 
statement, with only five percent (5%) disagreeing and sixteen per-
cent (16%) professing no opinion.487  
Interviewed judges agreed that there is a “disconnect” between 
lawyers and clients. According to the interviewed judges, there is 
delay and resistance to case management on the part of lawyers that 
their clients do not know about and would not agree with if it meant 
their cases would move faster. As one judge described it, the prob-
lem with the view that the “cases belong to the litigants and if they 
don’t care, I don’t care,” is that the litigants may actually care but 
that is not being conveyed to or recognized by the judge.488 Others 
point out that many lawyers don’t understand that the court has an 
obligation to move cases, have never heard of or read the Florida 
Rules of Judicial Administration, and are almost certainly unaware 
                                                                                                         
 486  See, e.g., supra Figure 8. 
 487  Figure 22. 
 488  Telephone Interview 7, supra note 440. 
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of the time standards.489 In the meantime, one judge expressed the 
sentiment that the bar throws courts under the bus, telling clients it’s 
the court when delay is due to lawyers’ laziness or lack of attention 
to the case, or too much work, or due to billing motivations. Inter-
viewed judges seemed to agree with Proffessor Gensler that “[a] 
sure first step in using culture change to control costs in discovery 
would be simply to get lawyers to abide by their existing rules-based 
and ethical duties.”490  
As a public trust and confidence measure, experience has shown 
that judges have no idea of and no control over the explanations of-
fered by lawyers to clients as to the reasons for delays or what ex-
pectations have been created. However, if a case management order 
is issued at an early stage of the case, the court has set out a clear 
path, created clear expectations, and made a promise to litigants 
about what it plans to do with the case, as opposed to the open no-
end-in-sight ad hoc procedures without some form of court case 
management.  
Nearly three quarters, or seventy-two percent (72%), of respond-
ing judges agreed with this statement.491 Only fourteen percent 
(14%) disagreed.492 Another fourteen (14%) did not opine, which 
again evidences judicial ambivalence about acknowledging or con-
fronting process exploitation. The data subset group of small circuits 
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showed the least amount of agreement, with sixty percent (60%) of 
smaller circuits agreeing, while the balance of circuits and experi-
ence levels ertr in general consensus.  
The impact of this perception was strongly ratified by inter-
viewed judges, with one judge stating that “civil cases just languish 
because lawyers are billing by the hour . . . the legislature believes 
that the bar and the judges are in a conspiracy.”493 Several judges 
commented on some attorneys who delay for strategic advantage, 
and specifically referenced that such conduct violates of a line in the 
Florida Bar’s Oath of Admission, which all those admitted to the 
Florida Bar must pledge: “I will never . . . delay anyone’s cause for 
lucre or malice.”494 As one commentator noted, “[r]eforming proce-
dural systems is not an easy task. Expectations about litigation be-
come settled, and the status quo becomes reinforced by the hundred 
thousand lawyers who do quite well under the present system.”495 
Many interviewed judges agreed with other commentators, as well 
as members of the bar, that the conduct of litigation frequently imi-
tates that of “spoiled children”, with courts being required to provide 
“adult supervision.”496  
But what to do about it? Having recognized the risk of exploita-
tion by the attorneys, the next questions were designed to test 
judge’s views of case management as a response to prevent such 
manipulation. These responses were particularly interesting in that 
all had a very high “no opinion” responses—implying that judges 
either prefer not to speculate on attorneys’ views or refuse to 
                                                                                                         
 493  Telephone Interview 21, supra note 282. 
 494  In Re: Oath of Admission to the Florida Bar, SC11-1702 (Sept. 12, 2011) 
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acknowledge these views. In the following statements, roughly one-
third of responding judges confronted these issues head-on.  
This statement was designed to start drawing out the cross-in-
centives that are routine anecdotal impediments to case manage-
ment. The equivocal responses of no opinion were high, at thirty-six 
percent (36%).497 The agreement level, at thirty-nine percent (39%), 
evidences judicial awareness that attorneys can experience court 
case management as threatening their unilateral control over case 
pace.498 The twenty-three percent (23%) disagreement level sug-
gests that a minority of judges take the view that attorneys are not 
threatened by case management.499 Agreement was most strongly 
expressed in large (38%) and very large (47%) circuits and experi-
enced judges of eighteen plus years (45%).  
Interviewed judges repeatedly stressed that attorney case man-
agement resistance reflected attorney desire to keep control of case 
progress despite clear rule mandates for court responsibility. 
“Judges are afraid of being accused of being too proactive and of 
drawing opposition at election time. Judges are afraid that if they 
dig into cases they will be perceived as haughty,” said one judge.500 
Part of this concern may stem from a lack of consistency among case 
management approaches among judges, as discussed above.501 The 
same judge continued, “Judges who case manage are appreciated. If 
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case management is done properly, it is not an issue.”502 Attorney 
experience with state court case management is limited, based on 
the interviews and the trial court administrator information. Predict-
ability and consistency could allay these concerns, particularly as 
part of a structured, systemic approach. The high no opinion rate 
indicates a reluctance to address these issues.  
Another factor that complicates civil court case management 
identified throughout the interviews is the obsessive need for a trial 
date. Most judges pointed out that many cases are noticed for trial 
with no relationship to case readiness, but simply to get a trial date, 
and then expect a continuance if (frequently when) the case is not 
ready. Many expressed chagrin at the difficulty of attempting to per-
suade lawyers that there are effective means of organizing deadlines 
in a case without issuing a largely fictitious trial date. Attorneys are 
comfortable with the court case managing via trial order, because 
then they can trigger the process by noticing the case for trial even 
if they plan to seek continuances. They may perceive more transpar-
ent proactive case management from inception as a threat, according 
to the interviews overall, because of the advanced planning required 
as opposed to working backwards from a traditional trial order-cre-
ated case management structure.  
This statement was designed to continue pursuing the cross-in-
centive “anecdata.” With thirty-five percent (35%) of judges agree-
ing, it is clear that a sizable minority of judges recognize attorney 
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apprehension and pecuniary interests as a case management consid-
eration.503 Only eleven percent (11%) disagreed with this statement, 
which speaks to a level of consciousness about this concern.504 
However, fifty percent (50%) professed no opinion on the topic.505 
For clients, the most expensive cost in a case is typically attorney 
fees. The strong no opinion response here demonstrates possible re-
luctance to acknowledge the inherent tension between lawyers, who 
earn their living by attorneys fees, and clients, who want to mini-
mize those fees as much as possible while achieveing their sought-
after result. This question was designed to test whether judges be-
lieve that attorneys see case management as a threat to their living. 
If case management is promoted to reduce cost, then that cost would 
include unnecessary attorney fees.  
Many judges may also be unaware of growing pressure on tra-
ditional fee structures. Alternative fee arrangements are growing as 
clients responded to the cost issue in civil courts.506 Legal process 
outsourcing, whether domestic or offshore, as well as technological 
innovation in document review has been a reliable source of billable 
hours and is changing business structures within the legal prac-
tice.507 A 2011 report by the Association of Corporate Counsel de-
fined savings as a “reduction in historical spending patterns with 
same or better outcomes.”508 To achieve that goal would draw busi-
ness for firms, although potentially limiting fees in any single case. 
                                                                                                         
 503  Figure 25. 
 504  Id.  
 505  Id. 
 506  A 2010 study cited by RAND found that ninety-five percent (95%) of the 
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The failure of law firms to recognize utility and business opportuni-
ties in the predictability and consistency of civil case management 
and instead focus on short-term perceived risks demonstrates the 
same cultural failings that courts face.509  
While fifty-seven percent (57%) of judges believe that there is a 
reputational benefit to case management, thirty-six percent (36%) 
have no opinion.510 This suggests that while a wide swath of the 
bench is currently unconvinced, they are still convincible. Judges in 
very large circuits strongly agreed at a rate fifteen points higher than 
other circuit types. To some extent, this may be impacted by the 
power of reputation in large circuits, as the size of the circuit bench 
reduces the individual attorney’s knowledge and repeat experiences 
with an individual judge.  
Interviewed judges all believed that case management enhances 
a judge’s reputation. There was solid consensus that case manage-
ment paid dividends in terms of reputation. Judges generally felt that 
as long as case management was conducted in a collaborative, non-
dictatorial fashion, lawyers accept and welcome it. On judge stated 
that lawyers and litigants “just want to know about what’s going to 
happen.”511 Another stated that “judges who are predictable, con-
sistent, strong case managers are more successful and popular. 
Judges who are reactive and situational are less so because lawyers 
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don’t know what they will do.”512 Another acknowledged that while 
judges “all think about bar polls,” it is important to do “stuff for the 
right reasons and . . . the respectful way,” which includes “recogniz-
ing [that some] cases . . . need more managing.”513  
One of the most significant reputational consequences of case 
management is the ability to solve the problem of access. Inter-
viewed judges all emphasized that using case management to set and 
enforce deadlines, monitor compliance, and prioritize workload re-
sulted in more open hearing time and easier access as matters re-
solved. The biggest complaint from parties and lawyers reflected in 
the trial court administrator responses and by interviews was access: 
waiting too long for hearing time. In other words, long delays result 
in bad reputations. Across the board, interviewed judges agreed that 
case management provided swift and predictable access to hearing 
time at critical points. Across the country, state court judges who 
proactively case manage a civil docket are convinced it reaps signif-
icant reputational benefits.514 
Eighteen percent (18%) of judges associate case management 
with political risk.515 Combined with the thirty-eight percent (38%) 
who profess no opinion, it amounts to a total of fifty-six percent 
(56%) of the responding judges.516 The strongest level of agreement 
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came from brand new judges with zero to three years experience, 
who agreed twelve points higher than any other subset. In contrast, 
the strongest disagreement level came from judges with three to six 
years experience, who disagreed at a rate nineteen points higher than 
other subsets.  
There may be some bias in these answers, in terms of a threat 
that judges are reluctant to acknowledge. As one judge said, “it’s not 
expressly a concern, but impliedly and inherently it’s a concern, at-
torney by attorney. It is an elected position. You don’t want to piss 
people off. It is a thought in the back of people’s minds.”517 Another 
judge compared it to the combination of water and electricity—
judges and lawyers seek the path of least resistance: “When you are 
faced with an agreed motion to continue, it’s not pleasant to say 
no.”518 The judge went on to say that lawyers may react differently 
than their clients; clients want their cases resolved and may accept 
rejection of an agreed continuance and insistence on a firm trial date 
more enthusiastically than their lawyers who agreed to the continu-
ance.519 Another judge felt that cross-incentives play a role close to 
election times: “Judges don’t want to needlessly make enemies. Un-
less there are significant problems in a case, you try not to offend 
anyone.”520  
Again, there is a high amount of no opinion responses, which 
indicates that, although the concerns are real and omnipresent ac-
cording to the judges interviewed, there is a reluctance to 
acknowledge these concerns. If courts are to effectively use case 
management, how can court leaders effectively address these cross-
incentives if many judges cling to the pretext that they do not ex-
ist?521 One solution would be to deploy a structured case manage-
ment system across the civil docket, so that no single judge would 
                                                                                                         
 517  Telephone Interview 21, supra note 282. 
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bear the burden of any initial resistance, and so that the conse-
quences would be borne by the court as a whole as opposed to any 
single judge. Creating a systemic approach may also permit attor-
neys and users to have a voice in its design, which may ameliorate 
these potential unacknowledged barriers. 
While some interviewed judges did not believe that case manag-
ing caused political consequences, they still believed that many of 
their colleagues do believe there is risk. This is particularly because 
institutional inertia has prohibited those judges from seeing the rep-
utational dividends that case management produces. 
5. INSTITUTIONAL INERTIA AND LOCAL COURT CULTURE 
Judges are all members of their local circuit courts. Each has its 
own practices and procedures, many of which have been in place 
many years. These practices are frequently referred to as a “local 
court culture.”522 Within circuits, there can be multiple geographic 
courthouses which may also have their own organizational prac-
tices.523  
Court operations and institutional design choices made at a par-
ticular time can be influenced by geography, budget, strength of per-
sonality, competing priorities, and frequently suffer from a “set it 
and forget it” mentality.524 As a result, system architecture can be-
come archaic without anyone’s noticing. This includes many em-
bedded procedures, the logic of which either evaporated years ago 
or has been long forgotten, but is institutionalized habit. Local court 
culture is undergoing a significant challenge to adapt its processes 
to new technologies, but frequently replicates existing obsolete pa-
per process due to the effort to continue existing operations while 
adapting.525 Local court culture poses significant challenges to court 
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case management due to the embedded barriers in antediluvian pro-
cesses that are not examined in an organized way, because “this is 
how we do things.” Local court culture is frequently spread through 
ad hoc verbal advice about how to perform court jobs among clerks, 
bailiffs, judicial assistants, and even judges.526  
However, in an age of swift technological change in which tech-
nology is increasingly integrated in every aspect of life, outmoded 
court processes from the last century will no longer be acceptable, 
particularly if all courts do is digitize them without improving them 
by taking advantage of new processes available through technolog-
ical innovation.527 We live in a day in which the vast majority of 
people carry a computer in the palm of their hand, which is instantly 
linked to every other computer in everyone else’s palm as well as to 
most every source of information in the world. The Department of 
Motor Vehicles, the bureaucratic butt of a thousand jokes, better uti-
lizes technology than the court system. One example would be 
online scheduling and push notifications: if one can schedule and 
get an automatic reminder from the DMV about an upcoming ap-
pointment, why can’t they get a reminder about a court date? Flor-
ida’s Department of Motor Vehicle has had online scheduling for 
driver’s license appointments for years, yet few courts in Florida of-
fer online scheduling of court dates, instead relying on a cumber-
some human system of date coordination.528 Courts across the coun-
try are working hard to deploy new technologies that are essential to 
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meet public expectations.529 If courts expect to hold public trust for 
deciding disputes, they are going to have to do better than the DMV.  
While a total of sixty-two percent (62%) of judges agreed or 
strongly agreed with this statement, there is no empirical evidence 
of a widespread systemic case management culture in Florida.530 In 
addition, when the interviewed judges were asked to rate their de-
gree of civil case management activity on a scale of one to ten, ten 
being active case management, the judges generally rated them-
selves between seven and nine but rated their colleagues between 
two and three. Those that rated their colleagues more highly de-
scribed case management in reactive terms as opposed to proactive 
terms.  
The surveys from the TCAs confirm that no circuit has a widely 
used proactive case management system across its civil division. 
Trial court administrators reported that the degree of case manage-
ment and what was entailed was up to the individual judges, and that 
hearings were largely set by attorneys on their timetable or at attor-
ney request.531  
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One indicator of a culture of case management is routine data 
distribution, so that delays can be identified. There is no state-wide 
systemic approach to data sharing that is evident from the responses 
from either TCAs or the interviewed judges.532 The caseload data 
that is distributed varied from circuit to circuit and sometimes from 
county to county. According to the interviewed judges, data reports 
regarding time standards or other case management information 
such as age of pending caseload, time to disposition, or clearance 
rates are seldom provided to judges. In fact, several of the inter-
viewed judges reported that no data reports are routinely issued to 
them.533 As most of the interviews indicated, information is fre-
quently available upon request, but only upon a judicial officer’s in-
itiative. Most judges interviewed actively used available data, most 
frequently being the extensive use of a list of pending cases which 
enabled them to use dates of last activity to spot inactive cases, or 
lack of prosecution calendars. This data set and the corresponding 
actions all suggest the use of modest and reactive case management 
as opposed to proactive case management, which would prevent un-
due delay from inception. There are no reports distributed in any 
circuit that identify case types and controversy characteristics that 
would provide a means to triage cases and anticipate their needs in 
advance.534 
The interviewed judges provided a wealth of insights about the 
role of institutional culture. One judge provided that “local court 
culture” starts the day new judges walks in the door and are “told 
this is how things are done, this is the way we do things. After day 
one, there is not a lot of thought that goes into whether that’s the 
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most effective way to do things.”535 Another judge agreed, observ-
ing that “rookie judges” talk to old judges, new judicial assistants 
talk to old judicial assistants, which results in the old ways continu-
ing to pass from generation to generation, “with a perception that 
other people run the system.”536 Noted across the interviews was the 
fact that even simply changing the day for a motion calendar can 
generate confusion and work, so many judges believe it is easier to 
just go along with the existing practices and traditions. Another 
judge described it as a “large bureaucracy, [where] . . . any kind of 
change is almost insurmountable.”537 Another judge noted that, 
since he or she began practice, “not much has changed other than 
the digital file,” and observed that “courts are definitely behind the 
private practice curve on technology.”538 One judge described the 
result this delay causes as “the institution is not as responsive to peo-
ple as we should be.” 539 This is supported by the previous research 
and data as the CJI Report specifically identified the need to take 
full advantage of technology for case management and litigant-court 
interaction, particularly with the self-represented.540 
Many judges are reluctant to advocate for changes to a long-
standing system. As Judge Posner points out, “there is even a cult of 
ordinariness in judging. Exceptionally able judges arouse suspicion 
of having an ‘agenda,’ that is, of wanting to be something more than 
just corks bobbing on waves of litigation or umpires calling balls 
and strikes.”541 Several judges interviewed referenced difficulties in 
advocating case management or change. “[It is] very difficult as an 
individual judge in an individual division to change a culture that 
predominates throughout an area,” one judge ruefully observed.542 
Overall, judges reported that there may be implied disapproval of 
judges who do something different, ‘ruining the curve’ sort of thing. 
Many of the judges felt the idea that “that’s the way we’ve always 
done it” was not a good answer to any question.  
                                                                                                         
 535  Telephone Interview 3, supra note 294.  
 536  Telephone Interview 11, supra note 282. 
 537  Telephone Interview 5, supra note 367. 
 538  Telephone Interview 2, supra note 282. 
 539  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Judge 6 (transcript on file with the 
University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Telephone Interview 6]. 
 540  See CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 31, 37.  
 541  Posner, supra note 429, at 4. 
 542  Telephone Interview 17, supra note 282. 
1178 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1071 
An overall theme among interviewed judges established that 
case managing judges were the exception, not the rule; and that 
judges who do case manage enjoy an exceptional reputation. Inter-
viewed judges who case manage currently put in extra effort on their 
own to design their own processes and systems with their staff, with-
out systemic support. They see the dividends personally as worth the 
effort, and the time investment upfront saves more time later.543 
One judge shared a story of attending an outstanding national 
educational program on case management.544 Upon his return, he 
proposed a simple case triage system to his fellow judge, only to 
face total rejection. “If they had understood it, the benefits, they 
would have been gung ho,” he said.545 “A lot of people don’t want 
to hear about it. Just let me do my job and go home.”546 The judge 
felt that strong leadership support would be critical to widespread 
use of court case management.547  
Florida Time Standards are contained in Florida Rule of Judicial 
Administration 2.250, which establishes a “presumptively reasona-
ble time period for the completion of cases[.]”548 Civil jury cases 
should be completed within eighteen months from filing to disposi-
tion, while non-jury cases should be completed within twelve 
months from filing to disposition.549 Thirty-nine percent (39%) of 
                                                                                                         
 543  See, e.g., Telephone Interview 3, supra note 294. 
 544  Id. 
 545  Id.  
 546  Id.  
 547  Id. 
 548  FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.250(a). 
 549  Id. at 2.250(a)(1)(B). The time standards recognize that complex cases in-
cur reasonable delays, which are undefined in the Rule of Judicial Administration. 
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judges think the Florida Time Standards are a good guide, and thirty-
four percent (34%) have no opinion.550 Twenty-five percent (25%) 
disagree.551 Because percentages of disagreement and no opinion re-
sponses total seventy-four percent (74%), it appears that roughly 
three-fourths of the bench are not using the time standards as a rel-
evant performance measure. Certain data subsets expressed strong 
agreement with the Florida Time Standards: small circuits agreed at 
fifty percent (50%) and judges with three to six years of experience 
agreed at forty-eight percent (48%).  
Interviewed judges had strong views on the time standards. The 
standards are, in their view, ignored without repercussion among 
Florida judges, which is generally consistent with the survey re-
sponses. According to the interviewed judges, lawyers are unaware 
of the standards despite their codification in the rules. One judge 
explained that the first time he raised the time standards in a 
crowded courtroom, the room fell absolutely silent.552 Another 
judge exclaimed: “Who follows up on the time standards? Nobody! 
It’s representative of the problem!”553 Many judges throughout the 
interviews pointed out that if the time standards are to serve as a 
baseline measure of performance, then that information needs to be 
shared with and emphasized to the judges. Overall, the TCAs did 
                                                                                                         
Id. at 2.250(a). However, the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provide that except 
when good cause is shown, cases meeting the definition of “complex litigation” 
shall be set for trial no later than 24 months from an initial case management 
conference. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.201(b)(3). 
 550  Figure 29. 
 551  Id.  
 552  Telephone Interview 12, supra note 294. 
 553  Telephone Interview 3, supra note 294. 
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not identify this information as routinely distributed, and the inter-
viewed judges confirmed by generally indicating that they were also 
not provided with time standard compliance reports. 
The results to this statement show that the judges of Florida are 
ambivalent about their use of the time standards.554 As reflected 
above, the compliance information is not generally distributed or 
even available to many judges. More than a third of the respondent 
judges have no opinion as to the use of Time Standards, which sug-
gests these judges are not using the standards. Combined with the 
level of disagreement at thirty-six percent (36%), this suggests a dis-
regard for the standards as a meaningful measure. Agreement with 
the time standards was strongest with judges three to six years on 
the bench, with fifty-two percent (52%) of those judges in agree-
ment, and small circuits at fifty percent (50%) agreement. Most 
other subsets ranged between eighteen and thirty-four percent (18% 
to 34%) agreement. However, if only a third of the judges agree that 
judges use the time standards, and the balance has no opinion or 
does not use them as a meaningful measure, then there is little in-
centive to manage cases to completion by those deadlines or to rely 
upon those deadlines as setting public or litigant expectations. 
                                                                                                         
 554  Figure 30. 
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The fifty-fifty split in responses to this statement reflects the am-
bivalence toward the use of available data to manage caseloads.555 
This also reflects the challenge of evaluating management on a 
docket-wide level versus a view of case management at the single 
case level. Because the competition for judicial resources occurs at 
a docket-wide level, the failure to use reports that provide a broader 
picture suggests an ad hoc approach to allocating time and attention, 
the critical judicial resources for every case. The typical judicial per-
formance measures are age to disposition, age of pending caseload, 
and clearance rate.556 According to interviewed judges and the trial 
court administrator responses, this information is not commonly dis-
tributed to Florida’s civil judges.  
Court manager Aikman discussed these institutional challenges 
with candor:  
Some judges still do not believe that the time to dis-
position is a concern. They see and deal with one 
case at a time. Their focus is substantive justice in 
each case, not on the days or months required to 
                                                                                                         
 555  Figure 31. 
 556  Trial Court Performance Measures, COURTOOLS, http://www.cour-
tools.org/Trial-Court-Performance-Measures.aspx (last visited Jan. 10, 2019).  
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achieve that. The negative macro impact of delay oc-
curring as a result of delay in a lot of individual cases 
is not apparent to them.557  
As one judge stated,  
Judges who are reactive view their reputation on a 
case by case basis—the wisdom of a ruling in an in-
dividual case, reactive, in the moment. Judges who 
view their reputation as their caseload or docket are 
thinking about how moving this case fits in with 
other cases and making sure each gets access, while 
at the same time trying to deliver identical high qual-
ity hearings—the bigger picture of access to jus-
tice.558  
Aikman also noted, “[s]ome judges believe that shortening the time 
to disposition means they are really being asked to work harder and 
longer hours and they are not interested in either, as they already are 
working long enough and hard enough.”559  
This statement, which I added based on the national data gener-
ated by the NCSC in its Landscape of Civil Litigation and Examin-
ing the Work studies, brought to light the judges’ lack of essential 
                                                                                                         
 557  Aikman¸ supra note 280, at 10. 
 558  Telephone Interview 2, supra note 282. 
 559  Aikman, supra note 280, at 10. 
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data regarding their own caseloads.560 There is no statewide data 
available in Florida on the pending civil caseload, which was not 
anticipated when this survey was drafted.561 The data is kept by the 
individual court clerks at a local county level. While the number of 
cases filed by action type is available state-wide, as well as disposi-
tions, pending case information is not provided, which diminished 
the value of the question. Therefore, the accuracy of this statement 
is not verifiable based on available data and the statement was ad-
mittedly not well-framed, although it still provides interesting in-
sights.  
Based on the Florida Office of the State Court Administrator 
(“OSCA”) data regarding filings and dispositions, contract cases 
seem to be the second highest case category.562 Foreclosures still top 
out the filings.563 Between 2015 and 2016, there were 40,028 con-
tract actions filed in circuit court, and 64,777 foreclosures.564 Pro-
fessional malpractice and products liability case filings totaled 2,949 
statewide, which is similar to national patterns of complexity.565 
Auto negligence totaled 25,199 filings, and other negligence cases 
totaled 12,033 filings.566 Dispositions reflected similar patterns.567  
With regard to the survey responses overall, forty-four percent 
(44%) of judges had no opinion,568 which suggests that nearly half 
of judges do not know what case types predominate their dockets. 
The type of cases pending has case management implications, espe-
cially given the opportunity for prompt resolution presented by most 
contract cases, as the parties are aware of the underlying facts due 
to their preexisting relationship. Although contracts cases fall in sec-
ond place behind foreclosures in amount of cases filed, it is interest-
ing that only eight percent (8%) of judges thought contract cases 
were dominant, as contract matters still form a significant bulk of 
                                                                                                         
 560  See supra notes 179–84 and accompanying text. See LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL 
LITIGATION, supra note 26; EXAMINING THE WORK, supra note 3. 
 561  See supra notes 212–18 and accompanying text. FLA. OFFICE OF THE STATE 
COURTS ADMN’R, supra note 162. 
 562  FLA. OFFICE OF THE STATE COURTS ADMN’R, supra note 162, at 4-2 to 4-5. 
 563  Id. 
 564  Id. 
 565  Id. 
 566  Id. 
 567  Id. at 4-12 to 4-15. 
 568  Figure 32. 
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the caseload and exceed every other case type except for foreclo-
sures.569 Improved observation of these filing patterns could lead to 
smart management decisions and judicial economies. If cases are to 
be triaged and managed from outset, providing this information is 
essential.  
Notably, most of the interviewed judges do not believe that 
judges overall have a good understanding of their caseload.570 
Again, many felt this was because judges were operating at an event-
by-event, case-by- case level as opposed to a docket-wide level. In-
terviewees felt that the breadth of the civil docket made understand-
ing the caseload a critical case management component. “Process 
and procedure,” as one judge pointed out, “can vary greatly [be-
tween a] product liability case [and a] mortgage foreclosure 
[case].”571 
Eighty-eight percent (88%) of judges agreed with this statement, 
with five percent (5%) disagreeing and eight percent (8%) having 
no opinion.572 This again ratifies earlier responses regarding judicial 
perception of value of case management.573 It suggests further po-
tential recognition of the benefits of proactive case management ver-
sus reactive case management. This statement also provides insight 
                                                                                                         
 569  FLA. OFFICE OF THE STATE COURTS ADMN’R, supra note 162, at 4-2 to 4-
5. 
 570  See, e.g., Telephone Interview 11, supra note 282; Telephone Interview 8, 
supra note 442; Telephone Interview 18, supra note 299; Telephone Interview 14, 
supra note 282; Telephone Interview 12, supra note 294; Telephone Interview 10, 
supra note 282; Telephone Interview 5, supra note 367. 
 571  Telephone Interview 14, supra note 282. 
 572  Figure 33. 
 573  See supra Figures 10, 11 & 12. 
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regarding the question of the scope of case management. If the court 
only gets involved for enforcement purposes upon the request of the 
parties, then the exploitive value of noncompliance is already being 
experienced in the case. The only way case management can prevent 
exploitation is to assure prompt access at critical times and proactive 
prevention of delay and gamesmanship.  
It is challenging to reconcile the broad support for case manage-
ment expressed here with the reluctance to consider the cross-incen-
tives reflected earlier. If judges believe parties and lawyers exploit 
the process, there must be some benefit to doing so, which the high 
“no opinion” response on cross-incentives seems to avoid.  
Responding judges agreed at eighty-seven percent (87%), disa-
greed at only six percent (6%), and expressed no opinion at seven 
percent (7%).574 Forty-seven percent (47%) of large circuits shows 
a disproportionate level of strong agreement, 17 points higher than 
any other circuit set. Question 13 in the survey, discussed earlier, 
had a twenty-three percent (23%) no opinion response,575 evidenc-
ing a lack of knowledge about when and where cases lose momen-
tum. The strong agreement here evidences consensus on the court’s 
obligation to intervene where cases become inactive and to get them 
moving again, which is a hallmark of reactive case management. 
Proactive case management would envision a structure from outset 
with embedded deadlines that would prevent the case from falling 
into inactivity. This statement also speaks to scope: judges want to 
ensure and monitor the appropriate pace of litigation. The question 
is how?  
                                                                                                         
 574  Figure 34. 
 575  See supra Figure 17. 
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While eighty-six percent (86%) agreed with this statement, 
eleven percent (11%) had no opinion, and three percent (3%) disa-
greed,576 notwithstanding the admonition of Florida’s Rule of Civil 
Procedure 1.010 as to “just, speedy, and inexpensive” resolution.577 
It is worth noting that one-hundred percent (100%) of small circuit 
judges agreed with the statement and the most significant disagree-
ment came from newer judges, who disagreed at eleven percent 
(11%). This question again provides some insight on scope, there is 
not strong objection to using case management to achieve these 
goals, but there is a lack of shared vision or information as to how 
that is to be accomplished.  
                                                                                                         
 576  Figure 35. 
 577  FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.010. 
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This statement produced relatively higher “no opinion” re-
sponses from the judges.578 Agreement/strong agreement was con-
sistent across the subsets, with minimal disagreement. The seventy-
seven percent (77%) who agree must envision proactive case man-
agement at the beginning of the case because case management can 
only produce a targeted discovery if it precedes the discovery effort. 
The “no opinion” rate could be reflective of the limited discussion 
of targeted discovery or proportionality in Florida state courts, as no 
rule change or broad debate has occurred on discovery limits or dis-
closures, unlike such discussions that have occurred in connection 
with the federal rules and in states such as Utah and New Hamp-
shire.579 As described by one commentator in connection with the 
federal process,  
[b]ecause discovery must be tailored to fit the partic-
ulars of each case, it is one phase of litigation where 
the debate about active judges crystalizes: do the par-
ties make the alterations themselves, or does the 
judge fashion the process? . . . Although the Rules 
authorize the judge to “right-size” discovery in the 
initial case management order, much of the scaling is 
typically delegated to the parties in the first instance, 
with the judge engaging only upon request. In our 
adversarial system, however, cooperation among the 
parties on how to configure discovery, without ongo-
ing monitoring and assistance of the judge, is simply 
not realistic in many cases.580  
                                                                                                         
 578  Figure 36.  
 579  E.g., Baicker-McKee, supra note 109, at 358; Utah: Impact of the Revi-
sions to Rule 26 on Discovery Practice in the Utah District Courts, NATIONAL 
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, at iii-iv (Apr. 2015), https://www.ncsc.org/~/me-
dia/Files/PDF/Topics/Civil%20Procedure/Utah%20Rule%2026%20Evalua-
tion%20Final%20Report(2015).ashx; NEW HAMPSHIRE: PAD PILOT RULES, su-
pra note 47, at 3.  
 580  Baicker-McKee, supra note 109, at 355–56.  
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Advocates for court case management see an essential role for 
case management in addressing discovery cost and delay with a dis-
covery plan from inception.581 Generally, the interviewed judges felt 
early judicial intervention and prompt access made a significant dif-
ference in reducing discovery delays, costs and hostilities.  
Judicial views about direct involvement in settlement seems to 
depend on local practice and court culture in specific areas. Based 
on the responses, Florida judges do not have a strong inclination to 
get involved in settlement.582 The responses were consistent across 
circuit types.  
                                                                                                         
 581  JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 21, at 19 (compiling an 
exhaustive list of studies and articles on judicial involvement with discovery 
abuse).  
 582  Figure 37. 
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Judges strongly believe that they appropriately share infor-
mation about case management with each other.583 Only twenty-four 
percent (24%) disagreed.584 This is in distinct contrast with the in-
terviewed judges, as most interviewed judges felt that the case man-
agement levels across their benches was at a two to three on a scale 
from one to ten, ten being highest. Across the interviews, they ex-
pressed that judges who case manage enthusiastically share infor-
mation, but judges who are disinclined to case manage are much less 
likely to share information or seek information. Smaller circuits dis-
agreed at a ninety percent (90%) rate, perhaps because the size of 
the bench lends itself to informal information sharing. 
There was strong agreement across all subsets that the ideal vi-
sion for case management is as a group effort involving all stake-
holders.585 However, some of the judges interviewed commented on 
the lack of preparation on the part of attorneys when case manage-
ment opportunities are presented.586 Judge Rosenthal and Professor 
Gensler have the same issue:  
Our point is this: for active case management to serve 
as a platform for interaction, the lawyers and the par-
ties must buy in to the scheme as much as judges. 
The types of live case-management interactions we 
                                                                                                         
 583  Figure 38.  
 584  Id. 
 585  Figure 39. 
 586  See, e.g., Telephone Interview 18, supra note 299; Telephone Interview 
17, supra note 282; Telephone Interview 21, supra note 282. 
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advocate are not one-way events during which the 
judge does all the work while the lawyers simply ob-
serve. Rather, the value of these live interactions is 
that they are the best—and often the only—oppor-
tunity for the trial judge and the lawyers to have an 
informed dialogue that penetrates the surface gloss 
and exposes the core issues, whether those issues re-
late to priorities in discovery or the merits of a pro-
posed summary-judgment motion. For these interac-
tions to thrive, the attending lawyers must be pre-
pared. This is so obvious that it hardly seems worth 
saying. Yet judges from different parts of the country 
continue to tell us that they schedule live Rule 16 
conferences with the intention of developing a tai-
lored case-management plan, only to have the law-
yers say they didn’t know what their pretrial needs 
were because they hadn’t really thought about the 
subject. Judges tell us that they present opportunities 
for oral argument, only to have lawyers announce 
that they are resting on their briefs. That is a waste of 
everyone’s time and a wasted chance for lawyers to 
interacting with the judge. 
. . . Judges will do it only if it proves to be worth their 
time. The surest way to kill an emerging culture of 
interactive case management is for it to be a waste of 
time, and the surest way for it to be a waste of time 
is if the lawyers have nothing to contribute when 
called upon to do so. . . . It is again an obvious point: 
lawyers who want the judge to spend more time be-
ing accessible must show the judge that it will be 
time well spent.587  
The concerns originally articulated by traditionalists, that judges 
could not effectively case manage because they lacked sufficient in-
formation about the case, can only be solved with engaged litigants 
                                                                                                         
 587  Gensler & Rosenthal, The Reappearing Judge, supra note 22, at 873–74.  
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fully utilizing the opportunity case management presents.588 Addi-
tionally, courts must consider and weigh genuine concerns about 
necessary time frames, competing business demands, and assure 
sufficient access at critical junctions in the case. “Lawyers clamor 
for judges to take a more active role in case management, but if the 
lawyers do not make the effort to know their own case needs, how 
can they expect the judges to enter thoughtful, case-specific case-
management orders?”589 Courts can and should tailor case manage-
ment to the needs of the case, but critical information can only be 
secured from the parties and their lawyers. Where lawyers appear 
without adequate information about the case, without decision-mak-
ing authority, without calendars, or without a vision as to how the 
case will be litigated, it is difficult for the court to tailor case man-
agement. Creating a performance standard for attorney preparation 
is easier to achieve when the system demands uniform participation 
and preparation as opposed to recalibrating for varying demands 
from judge to judge.  
The need to secure appropriate information to make sure that a 
case is proceeding in an organized, timely fashion typically requires 
court attention and monitoring.590 While this should not require ju-
dicial resources, it could be undertaken by trained staff.591 Inter-
viewed judges repeatedly extolled the role that smart judicial assis-
tants play in case management.592 Judges uniformly reported that 
they would be unable to carve out the time to case manage if they 
did not have the active involvement of their staff providing them 
with the necessary monitoring and information to case manage, and 
reported significant time and stress benefits once the effort was un-
dertaken and operationally ingrained.593  
6. LACK OF TIME, STAFF, AND TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT 
Interviewed judges enthusiastically endorsed the time spent in 
case management as saving significant time across their dockets, 
                                                                                                         
 588  Easterbrook, supra note 319, at 639.  
 589  Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, supra note 73, 735–36.  
 590  See CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 16–20. 
 591  See id. at 29; cf. OPPAGA REPORT, supra note 203, at 18–23. 
 592  See, e.g., Telephone Interview 12, supra note 294. 
 593  Id. 
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even as they acknowledged that many judges who do not case man-
age do not believe that they have the time or support to case man-
age.594 One interviewed judge stated that “there is no question that 
case management saves me work” and that, while it is more effort 
upfront, the initial tasks are not labor intensive and they produce 
great results as cases get to trial and are resolved sooner.595 This 
view was supported by the survey results. One judge described the 
bench as having the “general perception that I have plenty of cases, 
so I will be reactive,” but went on to say that “[it’s] our fault we 
don’t do a better job teaching [them] how to do case management 
and the benefits derived from case management” both in terms of 
time and reputation.596 Another judge said, “[The] more [you] push 
cases, the more time you have. The more continuances you grant, 
the less time you have to deal with everything.”597 Another judge 
believed that case management creates more time, not less, and that, 
when parties have deadlines and are coming face to face with the 
judge, things get done and there are fewer “discovery squabbles.”598 
The same judge also stated that, as a result of case management, “my 
calendar has opened up. I don’t have to roll over trials—either settle 
it or we try it.”599 Another judge was more blunt: “It’s in my per-
sonal home and life benefit to manage cases.”600 All interviewed 
judges agreed that a case managed docket is a less stressful docket.  
These comments reflect Parkinson’s Law: “work expands so as 
to fill the time available for its completion.”601 Judges for whom 
case management is a priority make the time and utilize their staff 
to ensure it occurs, while judges who profess to lack time to case 
manage overlook the time case management could save them. As 
Chief Justice Roberts pointed out in his 2016 report, “[a] lumberjack 
                                                                                                         
 594  See Telephone Interview 9, supra note 288; Telephone Interview 8, supra 
note 442; Telephone Interview 2, supra note 282; Telephone Interview 1, supra 
note 282; Telephone Interview 20, supra note 294.  
 595  Telephone Interview 20, supra note 294.  
 596  Telephone Interview 8, supra note 442.  
 597  Telephone Interview 11, supra note 282.  
 598  Telephone Interview 9, supra note 288. 
 599  Telephone Interview 9, supra note 288.  
 600  Telephone Interview 3, supra note 294.  
 601  C. NORTHCOTE PARKINSON, PARKINSON’S LAW [AND OTHER STUDIES IN 
ADMINISTRATION] 3 (1957); Elliot, supra note 11, at 12.  
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saves time when he takes the time to sharpen his ax.”602 The inter-
viewed judges perceive their colleagues as chopping away with dull 
axes. Other judges were even less sympathetic to their colleagues: 
“If you want to get a job done, give it to the busiest person. If they 
wanted to [case manage], they would.”603  
At the same time, each of the interviewed judges described a 
case management process that was highly human resource intensive. 
They and their judicial assistants review the reports, identify the 
cases, create the means of intervention, schedule the case manage-
ment conferences, and prioritize the workload. Case management as 
currently deployed in Florida is highly dependent on judges and 
court staff.604 While without question, this approach produces re-
sults that benefit cases, there are legitimate questions about how 
scalable such an approach would be across the entire court system. 
One interviewed judge pointed out that case managers are far 
cheaper than judges, and hiring case managers would give judges 
much more time to judge.605 An important component of a case man-
agement initiative is to ensure that each person is used at the top 
level of their skills to provide the most benefit to the judicial sys-
tem.606 For example, push notifications confirming upcoming hear-
ings can replace hours on the phone by staff confirming upcoming 
hearings or answering whether a case “made calendar.” Courts must 
better utilize existing staff to assist in court case management. 
                                                                                                         
 602  2016 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 46, at 7.  
 603  Telephone Interview 19, supra note 288.  
 604  See generally OPPAGA REPORT, supra note 203. 
 605  Telephone Interview 10, supra note 282. 
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1194 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1071 
A significant omission in the discussion on case management is 
the role of technology. Technology, if properly deployed, could pro-
vide cost-effective systemic support for case management in a pre-
dictable and consistent process that would afford smarter utilization 
of human resources.607  
This response suggests that judges have confidence that case 
management can reduce overall caseloads, and also provides an ed-
ucational opportunity with regard to the twenty-six percent (26%) 
of judges who responded “no opinion.”608 Judges in very large cir-
cuits agreed at a rate twenty points higher than other circuit types. 
An interviewed judge pointed out that “a backlog of cases makes the 
system sclerotic, and backs up the entire system until cases only 
come to the fore with an issue or an emergency, so cases only move 
with crisis.”609 He went on to discuss how case management permits 
prioritization of the total caseload on what needs to be done and 
when it should be done, keeping the caseload moving instead of ca-
reening from problem to problem.610 “Every case has a beginning 
point—a human event or crisis that starts the legal process and ulti-
mately closes. In between, it should move in effective stages.”611 
This is the description of proactive case management. This judge, 
like other judges, pointed out that the criminal justice system already 
has many of these structures in place.612  
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 609  Telephone Interview 11, supra note 282. 
 610  Id. 
 611  Id. 
 612  Id. 
2019] WHY DON’T JUDGES CASE MANAGE? 1195 
Many of the interviewees pointed out that the more cases that 
accrue, the more cases are competing for hearing time, the longer it 
takes to get a hearing, and the more delay and cost occurs as a result. 
The lack of access causes more backlog to accrue. 613 One judge 
described the naysayers: “Some judges don’t worry about it. Cases 
come in and cases go out. They just don’t really worry about num-
bers.”614 The judge felt that the naysayers failed to understand the 
benefit of getting the caseload down.”615 As another judge observed, 
“if you just sit back and wait until someone asks to schedule their 
case, it’s still assigned to you” and not going anywhere until you 
deal with it.616 Yet another said, “you can always sit back and let 
your caseload swell.”617 Another stated, “you have to have the fore-
sight and the faith and the skills to decide that life is easier because 
you are not rushing from crisis to crisis. You know exactly what’s 
coming. You are prepared for what’s coming next, and hearings are 
more effective.”618  
All interviewed judges recognized that access is essential to 
moving a docket and expressed dismay over the lack of access that 
occurs when judges don’t case manage and prioritize to guarantee 
timely hearings. One judge noted the following:  
The major complaint is never about rulings, it’s 
about access. I hear more about access than brilliance 
in a hearing. A part of the brilliance is case manage-
ment. People use judicial unavailability as an asset to 
gain leverage and stall a case. With some judges, it’s 
like searching for the Rosetta Stone to get on the cal-
endar.619  
The same judge pointed out that the fact that he is available for hear-
ings reduces the demand for hearing time, because matters resolve 
themselves:  
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The imminent threat of seeing me beats actually see-
ing me,” because that deadline prompts resolution by 
agreed orders between parties. “The reality is you 
can be efficient and great, but if the lawyers have to 
wait two months or more for a hearing, it won’t mat-
ter as much. Lawyers put a premium on timely access 
beyond just a great hearing and thoughtful wise rul-
ing.620  
At the same time, the Federal Judicial Center notes that, 
A small amount of a judge’s time devoted to case 
management early in a case can save vast amounts of 
time later on. Saving time also means saving costs, 
both for the court and for the litigants. Judges who 
think they are too busy to manage cases are really too 
busy not to. Indeed, the busiest judges with the heav-
iest dockets are often the ones most in need of sound 
case-management practices.621  
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W. SCHWARZER & ALAN HIRSCH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE ELEMENTS OF CASE 
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Sixty-eight percent (68%) of judges agree that courts need better 
training, with modest disagreement at fourteen percent (14%).622 In-
terestingly, the judges who expressed the least disagreement regard-
ing greater need for more training were the most experienced (eight-
een or more years of experience) with a disagreement rate of seven 
percent (7%), while other subsets based on level of experience 
ranged from nineteen percent to thirteen percent (19% to 13%) dis-
agreement.  
At the same time, the interviewed judges strongly emphasized 
the need for training both in terms of defining a common scope to 
the case management task, wise use of staff, and importantly from a 
training standpoint, use of technology.623 One judge with twenty-
seven years of experience reported that he would welcome as much 
training as he could get on case management—and would take it 
whenever and wherever offered, and jump at the chance.624 Most 
line judges have not even begun to imagine the ways in which tech-
nology could improve their case handling, and yet cannot put down 
their cell phones. For case management to work, every level of the 
court system will need to engage and share information, which 
means that education about information sharing and common con-
sistent and predictable systems must be created and deployed with 
                                                                                                         
 622  Figure 41. 
 623  See, e.g., Telephone Interview 2, supra note 282. 
 624  Telephone Interview 8, supra note 442. 
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solid training on technology that is user friendly on the judicial in-
terface as well as the public interface.  
Strong consensus on this statement existed across all circuit 
types and experience levels.625 Court resources—including judges, 
court technology and all line staff—have to be utilized to produce 
forward case momentum. As several judges observed, it is not that 
judges do not want to case manage, but that they perceive they do 
not have the time.626 Many judges feel that they need resources to 
help case manage, and because they don’t have those resources, they 
won’t case manage.627 Interviewed judges all reported that at the be-
ginning, case managing requires extra time and effort, but that the 
savings in time and effort later in the case more than compensated 
for the initial investment.628  
Several interviewed judges acknowledged a significant role in 
case management for their secretaries, referred to in Florida as a ju-
dicial assistant or “J.A.”629 One judge explained that there are many 
judges who would love to case manage, but their JA cannot do it 
because of the other demands on their time, and there are no other 
resources.630 At the same time, some scholars have noted that basic 
technology could relieve staff of burdensome tasks of scheduling, 
confirming, information sharing, and in many instances, assisting 
self-represented litigants.631  
One judge specifically pointed out the benefits of dealing with 
pro se litigant cases as an area where trained staff and technology 
could be of unique assistance.632 The CJI Report also pointed out the 
structural benefits to the self-represented. All judges felt that many 
of the compliance, follow-up, and rule conformity issues inherent in 
case management could be appropriately delegated to trained staff 
                                                                                                         
 625  Figure 42.  
 626  Telephone Interview 9, supra note 288; Telephone Interview 17, supra 
note 282; Telephone Interview 18, supra note 299; Telephone Interview 20, supra 
note 294; Telephone Interview 21, supra note 282. 
 627  See, e.g., Telephone Interview 17, supra note 282. 
 628  Telephone Interview 20, supra note 294. 
 629  Telephone Interview 7, supra note 440; Telephone Interview 12, supra 
note 294; Telephone Interview 14, supra note 282; Telephone Interview 17, supra 
note 282. 
 630  Telephone Interview 17, supra note 282. 
 631  Cabral et al., supra note 190, at 247. 
 632  Telephone Interview 12, supra note 294; CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 29. 
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under judicial supervision. A smart judicial assistant was key to all 
the interviewed judges.633 Those judges who had the opportunity to 
work with trained case management staff felt that the additional help 
turbo-charged their effectiveness exponentially and rendered signif-
icant justice value at relatively minor cost.634  
If case management is to be successfully deployed as a systemic 
tool against cost and delay, judges need help. It is simply not enough 
to give judges another job to do, particularly if poorly defined as to 
the scope of the task, without support. Resentment and resistance 
would inevitably result. In contrast, creating a supportive court case 
management system with the staff and technology to help would sig-
nificantly reduce resistance and barriers to case management, with 
demonstrable benefits across the branch.635 A systemic response 
would also increase predictability, consistency, and provide stand-
ards upon which performance could be judged “apples to apples.” It 
would potentially increase public trust and confidence by having a 
plan laid out that created systemic and individual case expectations 
for civil justice. It would reduce waste both in fees spent trying to 
comply with varying individual judicial procedures as well as staff 
time educating parties and lawyers about individual judicial proce-
dures and correcting noncompliance, particularly parties without 
lawyers. By organizing access, it would potentially reduce unneces-












                                                                                                         
 633  See, e.g., Telephone Interview 19, supra note 288. 
 634  Id. 
 635  See CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 29. 
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This statement probably suffered due to the lack of sufficient 
definition regarding how to better utilize court staff, which may ac-
count for the twenty percent (20%) “no opinion” response.636 How-
ever, seventy percent (70%) of judges did agree,637 which speaks to 
the willingness to explore more intelligent methods of providing ef-
fective civil justice within existing resources.  
Given state budgets, judges recognize overall that additional re-
sources may be difficult and the place to start is to work smarter. As 
one interviewed judge said,  
we could accomplish so much more for the people 
we serve if there were additional case management 
capacity [referencing both technology and staff]. Es-
pecially given the cost of a case manager versus the 
cost of a judge. Technology needs to play a role in 
monitoring, preparing and presenting information. 
Utilize judges for what judges are needed for.638 
In addition, several judges pointed out that providing staff support 
for case management would create an opt-out system for case man-
agement in which cases and judges would receive the benefit of the 
structure automatically, much like criminal court. It would make 
civil case management the rule instead of the exception, while re-
taining to the judge the right to decide each case’s individual issues 
as needed. The non-judge jobs that judges do not think they should 
                                                                                                         
 636  Figure 43.  
 637  Id. 
 638  Telephone Interview 10, supra note 282. 
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do or have time to do could be done by trained staff. Then judges 
have more time for judging.639  
Even Professor Resnik contemplated the need for necessary sup-
port staff in decrying managerial judging: “Perhaps scarce judicial 
resources should be conserved and employed only when judges’ 
special skill—adjudication—is required.”640 A judge is the most ex-
pensive and most highly trained asset in the court system. The tasks 
performed should be assigned according to the level of training and 
experience required to deal with them, which means that many case 
management tasks could be assigned to administrative staff, clerks, 
and case managers. This conclusion was also reflected in recom-
mendation eight to the Conference of Chief Justices CJI Report.641 
Many in the court system joke that the court technology slogan 
is “yesterday’s technology tomorrow.”642 The strongest agreement 
was from small circuits and very large circuits, at ninety percent 
(90%) agreement levels each. New judges with zero to three years 
experience agreed at a seventy percent (70%) rate, lower than any 
                                                                                                         
 639  Telephone Interview 2, supra note 282; Telephone Interview 13, supra 
note 267; Telephone Interview 16, supra note 299; Telephone Interview 20, supra 
note 294.  
 640  Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73, at 435.  
 641  CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 29 (“For right-size case management to be-
come the norm, not the exception, courts must provide judges and court staff with 
training that specifically supports and empowers right-sized case management.”). 
 642  Chawn Ganguly, Dutch Blockchain Company Aims to Update Criminal 
Justice, CORESECTOR COMMUNIQUE (Dec. 22, 2017), http://corecommu-
nique.com/dutch-blockchain-company-aims-update-criminal-justice/. 
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other data subset, but also had a significantly higher rate of “no opin-
ion” at twenty six percent (26%), twice as much as any other subset. 
There was little disagreement. One interviewed judge noted,  
it’s a cultural thing to establish a baseline of perfor-
mance and who is closing what. There really is no 
way to measure how we are doing—bar polls are 
popularity contests, lawyers blow smoke—so you 
have to use statistics. You cannot teach a love of 
numbers or statistics, but paying attention pays a rep-
utational dividend.643  
Technology will build necessary transparency and accountability 
into the system, according to the interviews.644  
Given the slow pace of digitizing state court files, some twenty-
five years after PACER revolutionized the federal docket, that com-
ment is fair.645 As noted earlier, courts struggle with technology due 
to budget limitations and diffuse responsibility. Florida is particu-
larly dysfunctional in that each county provides its court with its 
technology, resulting in many different systems. Some multi-county 
circuits are dealing with different computer systems in each constit-
uent county. Florida courts have approached this by providing state-
wide functional standards, but despite best efforts, they lag far be-
hind what is available in the private sector. Florida has only recently 
digitized its court files beginning in 2009, and many circuits are still 
transitioning some aspect of their operations. Civil dockets are gen-
erally digitized. This technology facilitates reporting on essential 
case management data points—if the data is captured, distributed, 
and understood. The case management methods currently in use in 
Florida among judges who case manage are significantly dependent 
on human review and action, as opposed to benefitting from tech-
nology advances that could assist in deadline calculation, order 
preparation, and compliance and status monitoring. These tasks are 
currently being performed by case-managing judges and their judi-
cial assistants, according to interviews.  
 
                                                                                                         
 643  Telephone Interview 2, supra note 282. 
 644  Id. 
 645  See supra notes 123–26 and accompanying text. 
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The creation of a case management infrastructure seems to draw 
strong consensus, which is interesting considered in tandem with the 
ambivalence in regards to statements about judicial independence 
and case management.646 This response seems to suggest that if an 
infrastructure of support is built, judges are less likely to see case 
management as a question of philosophy, since it would not be en-
tirely dependent on the judge, but rather would become embedded 
in the circuit’s process. Small circuits are fully on board at one hun-
dred percent (100%) agreement/strong agreement. There is strong 
consensus by most data subsets, in the eighty to ninety-six percent 
(80 to 96%) range, with two outliers: judges with zero to three years 
experience only agreed at seventy percent (70%), and judges with 
twelve to eighteen years of experience agreed at seventy-three per-
cent (73%). New judges also expressed a disproportionate disagree-
ment, at thirteen percent (13%), more than double any other subset.  
New technology provides a unique window of opportunity, par-
ticularly as new judges are added from the private sector who react 
with disbelief to the state of court technology.647 The RAND study 
described specific examples for binary case management actions in 
1996, much of which could be monitored and addressed by technol-
ogy today: monitoring for service and answer deadines and taking 
action where deadlines are missed; monitoring for signs of early ter-
mination of the case and capturing that resolution; and initiating a 
case management schedule when an active case is identified with 
                                                                                                         
 646  Figure 45. 
 647  See, e.g., Telephone Interview 7, supra note 440. 
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scheduled cutoff time for discovery and a firm, appropriate, trial 
date. 
For cases that do not yet have issue joined, have a 
clerk monitor them to be sure deadlines for service 
and answer are met, and begin judicial action to dis-
pose of case if those deadlines are missed. Wait 
a . . . month, to see if the case terminates and then 
begin judicial case management. Include setting of a 
firm trial date as part of the early management pack-
age, and adhere to that date as much as possible. In-
clude setting of a reasonably short discovery cutoff 
time tailored to the case as part of the early manage-
ment package.648  
Following the prior statement, support dropped once the system 
was described as mandatory.649 While small circuits remained al-
most completely on board at ninety percent (90%) agreement, from 
medium circuits dropped to fifty-two percent (52%), large circuit 
support stood at fifty-seven percent (57%), and very large circuit 
support was at seventy-six percent (76%). A similar drop in enthu-
siasm was evidenced across the experience subsets. “No opinion” 
responses doubled, as did disagreement. This response evidences the 
                                                                                                         
 648  KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 79, at 28. 
 649  Compare Figure 46, with Figure 45. 
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strong sense of independence that judges possess, and the overall 
dislike of mandates.  
That said, most of the judges that were interviewed felt that if a 
system were made available, the benefits would become clear in 
short order to attorneys and the judges, and a combination of peer 
pressure and self-interest would result in adoption.650 Interviewed 
judges felt that external structure would assist deployment of civil 
case management, as referenced earlier in the repeated comparisons 
to criminal court.651 Molot suggests formalizing case management 
and standardizing across judges for uniformity: “One could imagine 
a regime designed to vary from case to case but not from judge to 
judge.”652 Civil case management faces the unique problems of a 
lack of uniformity and a variety of enforcement levels as it currently 
exists. “Using technology and case management systems would 
bring in judges who wouldn’t do it on their own, and they would be 
able to see the impact and the benefit on their docket. If they knew 
that case management was part of the system, and they had to do it, 
they would do it,” said one judge who served in an administrative 
capacity.653  
Judges also emphasized accountability and consequences. “If we 
measure things, it changes behavior.”654 They also emphasized the 
need for the systemic support: “If we want it to happen, it cannot be 
another unfunded mandate from the Supreme Court. Judges need 
resources to case manage. Currently, we don’t have the data man-
agement tools and don’t have the case management tools.”655  
One judge described the lack of systemic civil case management 
with a classic television analogy: the episode of “I Love Lucy” at 
the chocolate factory, where the heroine desperately attempts to 
keep up with an accelerating assembly line of chocolates by shoving 
chocolates in her pocket, in her mouth, and dropping them on the 
floor as candy goes everywhere—instead of choosing to simply un-
plug the machine, resetting and reorganizing the speed and the task, 
and making sure the line proceeded at a consistent and effective 
                                                                                                         
 650  See, e.g., Telephone Interview 4, supra note 166. 
 651  See, e.g., Telephone Interview 7, supra note 440. 
 652  Molot, supra note 108, at 89–90. 
 653  Telephone Interview 20, supra note 294. 
 654  Telephone Interview 18, supra note 299. 
 655  Id. 
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speed. 656 “It’s easy to manage,” said the judge, “if you have a good 
system.”657  
At the same time, interviewed judges emphasized their interest 
in tailoring case management to meet case needs, as every case does 
not need the same level of case management.658 Case management 
systems needs to be flexible and compliant with the rules and pro-
cedural fairness standards. They also felt that it was important to 
create buy-in among judges to demonstrate that case management 
on the front end produces less work and effort and better results on 
the back end,659 winnowing down cases that need judicial time, and 
not spending time on cases that don’t need judicial resources.660 One 
strong judicial supporter stated that,  
The only true resolution for case management is a 
uniform system imposed on all, with tailoring per-
mitted, required to be followed. If you leave it in the 
judge’s hands, you will get all different directions. 
Justice should not depend so significantly on which 
judge you fall in front of. We need uniform standards 
and uniform requirements with the necessary support 
to make it happen. Judicial case management is 
changing and becoming a part of court culture, espe-
cially with legislative emphasis on accountability 
and performance measures.661  
Implicit in all the discussions were overriding basic justice val-
ues. The emphasis on working more efficiently cannot compromise 
the positive values of public justice. In other words, creating systems 
in addition to measures assures that innovation comes packaged 
with the necessary precautions to preserve the justice mission, as 
opposed to simply creating a new generation of judges obsessed 
with numbers.  
                                                                                                         
 656  Telephone Interview 12, supra note 294. 
 657  Id. 
 658  Telephone Interview 4, supra note 166; Telephone Interview 17, supra 
note 282; Telephone Interview 19, supra note 288. 
 659  Telephone Interview 10, supra note 282. 
 660  Telephone Interview 4, supra note 166; Telephone Interview 17, supra 
note 282; Telephone Interview 19, supra note 288. 
 661  Telephone Interview 4, supra note 166. 
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As one judge simply concluded: “If you put together a civil case 
management system and place it in the judge’s lap, most judges 
would say, ‘Sure, I’ll do it.’ Just make it easy for them to do it.”662  
Three quarters of judges responding felt that creating an expec-
tation of case management would encourage case management, in 
other words, changing the culture and overcoming institutional in-
ertia.663 There was minimal disagreement, except for judges with 
nine to twelve years of experience who disagreed at ten percent 
(10%) but also had a “strong agreement/agreement” rate of eighty-
three percent (83%). Small circuits again expressed enthusiasm at 
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Eighty-five percent (85%) of judges agreed with this statement, 
with ten percent (10%) “no opinion”—a relatively larger amount 
than in other statements.664 Ninety–five percent (95%)of judges in 
small circuits agreed/strongly agreed while judges from very large 
circuits seemed the most skeptical with only seventy-eight percent 
(78%) agreeing/strongly agreeing.  
As one judge pointed out, civil is the last division to adopt active 
case management—criminal has had it for decades and the family 
division has had it for more than twenty years.665 An interviewed 
judge felt that case management would not be widely adopted until 
there is strong leadership from the state supreme court on down.666 
“Even if judges have to be dragged kicking and screaming,”667 there 
has to be accountability and enforcement if judges want to sit in a 
civil assignment. “One of the weakest aspects of our branch is very 
little accountability for judges—it’s totally opposite of the ordinary 
corporate or military environment.668 The best way to get rank and 
file judges engaged is through peer pressure and setting expecta-
tions—that is what good judges do.669  
As judges rotate through assignments, they come to expect and 
accept case management as a responsibility, but the challenge of ad-
equately defining and executing the task remains. As one former 
Chief Judge recommended,  
                                                                                                         
 664  Figure 48. 
 665  Telephone Interview 14, supra note 282. 
 666  Telephone Interview 3, supra note 294. 
 667  Id. 
 668  Telephone Interview 11, supra note 282. 
 669  Id. 
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Most judges are motivated to do a good job, and al-
most every judge agrees that we gotta get it right—
no matter if it’s a multi-million dollar lawsuit or a 
landlord-tenant case. Timeliness is a very important 
part of getting it right, because you need the right an-
swer at the right time. There needs to be a ‘vivid con-
versation’ with fellow chief judges. Judges have to 
embrace the concept that case management is part of 
the job. So you take their best intentions and sur-
round it with resources and commit everyone to the 
process, allowing judges to be creative and innova-
tive, and come up with a process that works for the 
majority—and let peer pressure deal with the minor-
ity. Harness the distinct legal culture to your ad-
vantage.670  
Another judge noted that case management has become more criti-
cal with public pressure to improve the process: “We have an obli-
gation to learn as we go and to find better ways to work.”671  
CONCLUSION 
This research attempts to understand why, in the face of years of 
advocacy and demand, judges in state civil courts do not case man-
age. The survey was designed to identify attitudes and the role of 
various factors on that decision. In evaluating the impact of these 
factors, there were measurable differences in the level of influence. 
The factors focusing on individual judge perspectives were less in-
fluential: lack of awareness, judicial philosophy, view of the task as 
administrative versus judicial function, and cross-incentives. Other 
factors focused on the broader systemic issues. The research overall 
evidenced that the systemic factors were more important than the 
individual factors.  
With regard to individual factors, the traditionally-touted con-
cerns about lack of awareness of case management, philosophical 
opposition, or “not my job,” were only modestly evident in the sur-
veys and rejected by the majority of respondents, and sharply re-
jected by interviewed judges. There was little evidence of cloistered 
                                                                                                         
 670  Telephone Interview 14, supra note 282. 
 671  Telephone Interview 1, supra note 282. 
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ivory-tower intellectual rejection of the job. Equally, most judges do 
not view case management as the responsibility of non-judge court 
administrators. 
Assessing the role of cross-incentives as a factor is more chal-
lenging. Taken at face value, thirty-six percent to fifty percent (36% 
to 50%) of surveyed judges had no opinion about the cross-incen-
tives in considering case management.672 Therein lie the challenges 
in examining the cross-incentive factor. Many judges don’t want to 
even acknowledge the existence of self-interest that might be impli-
cated. Additionally, it is difficult to gauge whether these concerns 
are actually valid in light of the strong assertions by interviewed 
judges that lawyers and clients who experience fair, predictable, and 
reliable case management like it, as well as the plethora of surveys 
in which attorneys request active judicial engagement. While survey 
responses here suggest that judges ignore cross-incentives, com-
ments by the interviewed judges suggest “wishful thinking.” The in-
ternal inconsistencies revealed by the survey would suggest that ad-
ditional research on cross-incentives would be very beneficial. 
However, one of the challenges inherent in trying to measure attor-
ney and litigant resistance is the diverse and individual nature of ju-
dicial approaches to case management. One judge may impose un-
reasonable and arbitrary deadlines as a function of case manage-
ment, and another may build a collaborative case management plan 
with the parties that gets them the essential information to resolve 
the case as early as possible, or to take it to trial within a reasonable 
period. Comparison, as well as public acceptance, is challenging 
with variation.  
The results reveal that the most influential factors affecting ju-
dicial case management engagement are institutional: lack of defi-
nition of the case management task,673 institutional inertia,674 and 
lack of time and support.675 These are factors that are closely related 
and can be significantly affected by resource allocation and process 
choices that are within the control of court leaders. The survey es-
tablished that judges clearly recognize that case management is an 
                                                                                                         
 672  See supra Figures 22–27. 
 673  See supra Section IV.C.2.  
 674  See supra Section IV.C.5. 
 675  See supra Section IV.C.6. 
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essential component of the judicial task.676 Judges see the need but 
do not engage in case management. This research suggests that 
judges are open to the task of civil case management, and see its 
potential value, but do not have a starting point. 
Court leaders would be wise to tackle the task of defining case 
management first. The variety of approaches was evident in the in-
terviews as well as in the survey results. Disarray was reflected in 
the conflicting responses. Defining the task is essential. If judicial 
case management is to be an effective tool within this lifetime, then 
state justice leaders should consider simplifying this long-standing 
debate into a process designed to give trial judges clear guidance 
about the case management task: what it is, how to do it, and the 
expected benefits. The research summarized here demonstrates that 
the lack of a clear definition of case management has reduced the 
effectiveness of efforts at deployment.677 A judge said, “Case man-
agement is so generally misunderstood by the rank and file judges 
and is used only sporadically or improperly by judges who don’t 
understand and then question the benefit.”678 The need for clarity in 
the case management task and the need for accountability was a 
strong theme in the interviews.  
It is also important to understand that adoption can be a process. 
Very few judges expressed any opposition to reactive case manage-
ment, which would be among the easiest and least controversial sys-
tems to deploy to prevent case inactivity and access issues.679 Court 
leaders may be wise to begin systemic deployment with a supportive 
framework for reactive case management as a bridge from old ap-
proaches to new approaches, which would produce tangible and rel-
atively immediate results.  
The importance of defining the task was encapsulated in a recent 
article:  
Someone once said the difference between a vision 
and a hallucination is simply how many people see 
it. Thus, court leaders need to provide a comprehen-
sive vision for their court that a significant number 
                                                                                                         
 676  See supra Figure 8. 
 677  See supra Figure 46. 
 678  Telephone Interview 8, supra note 442. 
 679  See supra Figures 33 & 34. 
1212 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1071 
of judges and other court staff will embrace and buy 
into. Setting and communicating a leadership vision 
statement is a critically important and deeply strate-
gic activity that many court leaders fail to do ade-
quately. . . . [and] judges and court staff must see 
how the . . . [vision] direct[s] the daily work they 
carry out.680  
At the same time, “organizing and mobilizing judges and court 
staff members around court improvement is a process requiring at-
tention, patience, and compromise . . . the idea that the few can con-
sistently command the abiding support of the many is a dubious ex-
pectation.” 681 These comments capture the effect of the institutional 
inertia challenge.682 State courts face challenges due to institutional 
inertia from the sheer number of judges, court staff and lawyers to 
be convinced, the wide variation in local court cultures, technology 
shortfalls, and funding, accountability, and transparency issues. 
These are all significant barriers that must be addressed to diminish 
restraints preventing case management. But building underlying 
system architecture based upon a framework of court case manage-
ment would significantly reduce the drag of resistance, and would 
provide the evidence needed to map the path forward.  
The judges who are the strongest proselytizers for court case 
management believe that it will not occur unless court leaders re-
quire court case management, cheerlead for court case management, 
and measure compliance with accountability consequences.683 In or-
der to support civil case management, judges need to understand that 
leaders are not asking them to do more work, they are being asked 
to work differently—to work “smarter” not “harder.”684 Courts need 
to make conscious design choices in creating a system to provide 
                                                                                                         
 680  Ostrom et al., supra note 25, at 80; see also VICTOR E. FLANGO & THOMAS 
M. CLARKE, REIMAGINING COURTS: A DESIGN FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
163–65 (2015).  
 681  Id.  
 682  See supra Section IV.C.5. 
 683  See, e.g., Telephone Interview 18, supra note 299. 
 684  See generally INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., 
WORKING SMARTER NOT HARDER: HOW EXCELLENT JUDGES MANAGE CASES 
(2014), http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/working_ 
smarter_not_harder.pdf.  
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direct incentives for appropriate behavior. RAND outlined the path 
to court case management in 1996: “Studies of change in the courts 
and in other organizations provide some guidelines for improving 
implementation. They include: clearly articulating what the change 
is to accomplish and generating a perceived need for it; a govern-
ance structure and process that coordinates individuals’ activities 
and assigns accountability for results; and meaningful performance 
measures to help both implementers and overseers gauge pro-
gress.”685 One judge stated the following:  
The only true solution for case management is a uni-
form system imposed on all, required to be followed 
by all. If you leave it in the judge’s hands, you will 
get all different directions and variations. Justice 
should not depend so significantly on which judge 
you fall in front of. We need uniform standards and 
uniform requirements with the necessary support to 
make it happen. Judicial case management is chang-
ing and becoming a part of court culture, especially 
with legislative emphasis on accountability and per-
formance measures.686  
Another significant factor that court leaders can control is the 
level of support in terms of staff and technology.687 Judges need to 
do judicial work and those tasks which do not require judicial deci-
sion-making need to be moved to appropriately trained support staff 
and technology. Much of case management involves assessing com-
pliance and status information. As pointed out in the interviews, 
many of these questions do not have to be resolved by a judge. An 
appropriately trained and supervised staff person, much in the way 
law firms have relied on smart legal secretaries and paralegals over 
the past sixty years, can handle these tasks. Using staff and technol-
ogy support effectively was a significant component of the CJI rec-
ommendations eight, ten, and thirteen,688 and given state budgets, is 
                                                                                                         
 685  KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 79, at 30. 
 686  Telephone Interview 4, supra note 166. 
 687  See supra Figures 43 & 44. 
 688  CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 29 (“Recommendation 8: . . . Courts should 
partner with bar leaders to create programs that educate lawyers about the require-
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likely to be essential for successful use of proactive case manage-
ment in state civil courts. With regard to the original debate of the 
traditionalists and the case management advocates, pushing the ad-
ministrative end of case management to staff resources is likely to 
leave judges with more time to engage in traditional adjudicatory 
functions, in addition to obvious cost-effectiveness.689 One judge 
who had rotated out of a specialty assignment with proactive, struc-
tured case management sighed, “[w]hen you are used to a case man-
ager, and then no longer have that support, you feel naked.”690  
Encouraging civil court case management requires consensus 
building across the entire court system. The interviewed judges 
demonstrate leadership by example in which the tangible benefits of 
case management can be identified, counted, and captured. There 
are judges like them across the country, but court leadership will 
have to reach out to identify them and ask them to help preach the 
benefits to their colleagues and courts. Leaders will have to over-
come a general resistance to change on the part of the bar and the 
bench: the fear of the unknown; threats to competence of judges, 
court staff, and attorneys by requiring new tasks and responsibilities; 
altered relationships between the court, counsel, and the clients; and 
the risk of a sense of loss of control over relationships that judges 
traditionally craft on an individual basis. Leaders would be wise to 
keep all judicial audiences in mind: the self-represented, the jurors, 
the injured, the insurance companies, the business community, the 
lawyers, as well as the judges with whom they directly correspond. 
Judges are motivated by others’ assessments of their performance. 
Protecting constitutional rights provides a public good reason why 
criminal cases must be handled as soon as possible. Leaders must 
articulate the public good reason that will be advanced by judicial 
civil case management. As one judge said, “Judges think there is 
good reason why criminal cases need to be resolved ASAP—a pub-
lic good reason.” He went on to note that if courts seek to ensure 
                                                                                                         
ments of newly instituted case management practices.”); id. at 31 (“Recommen-
dation 10: Courts must take full advantage of technology to implement right-sized 
case management and achieve useful litigant-court interaction.”); id. at 37 (“Rec-
ommendation 13: Courts must take all necessary steps to increase convenience to 
litigants by simplifying the court-litigant interface and creating on-demand court 
assistance services.”).  
 689  Id. at 4. 
 690  Telephone Interview 20, supra note 294.  
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widespread support for case management efforts, “there has to be a 
public good reason articulated for civil case management, inherent 
evident benefit that can be articulated and emphasized for the civil 
docket.”691 Those reasons come down to access, cost and delay, and 
the continued relevance of the civil courts as a matter of public trust 
and confidence. People cannot be forced to change. They can be led 
to accept that change will occur and to adjust to its consequences.  
The good news from this research is that removing barriers is 
key, as the most significant impediments to judicial case manage-
ment are factors that are within the control of institutional leaders. 
Transparency—an inevitable result of technological improvements, 
and legislatures and a public that want to understand the branch—
could result in more interest in case management as judicial perfor-
mance is measured. In order to build case management into the sys-
tem and eliminate institutional inertia as an impediment to judicial 
case management, judicial case management must become an insti-
tutional keystone. Leaders need to build case management into the 
civil court system, as much as it is an institutional bedrock in crim-
inal divisions across the country.  
Court leaders are in the position to create frameworks which de-
fine the task of judicial case management; provide the necessary 
training, education, and information about judicial case manage-
ment; as well as the organizational support for implementation in 
terms of technology and staffing. Courts can design and build sys-
tems, through choice architecture, that support case management 
and make a clean, monitored process with a tangible end date as the 
default process, with flexibility and tailoring as appropriate for the 
case. The broad use of reactive case management suggests that cre-
ating a means of attacking cases that have not progressed and pre-
venting cases from stalling out, may be the easiest place to start and 
a good way to quickly demonstrate the value of a case management 
system.  
Additional research needs to be done, with empirical measure-
ment.692 The results of civil case management can be measured 
                                                                                                         
 691  Telephone Interview 16, supra note 299.  
 692  It can be done. Miami, my home jurisdiction, served as a site for a national 
pilot project to test civil case management team approaches in 2017. Notwith-
standing significant operational challenges including Hurricane Irma, the Miami 
project reflects an early reduction of pending caseloads of sixteen to twenty-two 
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when definitions and metrics are adequately established. Courts 
should measure these projects to assure they are meeting the delay 
reduction goals. Research about attorney and litigant experiences in 
cases with and without case management would determine which 
practices are most beneficial. Evaluation of which events or time 
points in a case generate a need for court access would enable courts 
to block preset hearing times over the life of a case with confidence. 
There should also be a closer look at pro se, minimally contested 
and uncontested matters, in terms of case management impacts. An-
other area of research should examine whether the effect of cross-
incentives differ based on judicial selection methodology; for exam-
ple, where judges are appointed or retained once in office without 
risk of direct opposition. An examination of what drives those 
judges who see case management as an essential element of judicial 
excellence might help normalize case management in other judges’ 
choices. Finally, the role of choice architecture in creating case man-
agement systems that judges would opt-out of instead of opt-in to 
may prove of benefit to court leaders who wish to integrate court 
case management into the business process of civil courts.  
Better results cannot be measured simply by speed of process or 
even reduction in cost, even though these are the easiest data points. 
This change must be consistent with core values: it must deliver bet-
ter justice. Cost and delay cannot be improved at the expense of fair 
and just results. How parties experience court in terms of procedural 
fairness cannot be sacrificed for swiftness or efficiency. At the same 
time, current processes that handle cases in crowd settings, with only 
moments for each case and litigants, deserve rethinking. The over-
whelming response from the interviewed judges established that 
they viewed case management as essential to delivering better jus-
tice, because they could spend more time judging and less time jug-
gling, with the luxury of paying appropriate attention to each mat-
ter’s needs. As one interviewed judge stated, “[c]ase management is 
the ultimate delivery system for fairness and efficiency.”693  
                                                                                                         
percent (16%–22%) at twelve months compared with a non-case management 
control group. For an example of more recent empirical research, see LYDIA HAM-
BLIN & PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., CIVIL JUSTICE 
INITIATIVE: EVALUATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE INITIATIVE PILOT PROJECT 
(CJIPP) (2019). 
 693  Telephone Interview 6, supra note 539. 
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In the end, courts are being asked to engage in fundamental be-
havioral change in the way judges handle civil cases. This research 
indicates that rather than face burdens of persuasion, the challenge 
for court leaders is to eliminate the barriers that prevent judges from 
case managing. Given the limited carrots and sticks available to 
court leaders, creating a solid scope and definition of case manage-
ment, providing judicial training, and reengineering staff positions, 
are much easier and cost-effective prospects than the inevitably un-
successful task of trying to force judges to conform. These barriers 
in the way of civil case management are significantly under the con-
trol of Chief Justices and Chief Judges, and can be the subject of 
objective measurement likely to encourage legislative budget sup-
port. One judicial interview reflected on limited court resources: 
“Currently we allow parties to demand and allocate judicial re-
sources instead of the court. If we are to work smarter in this era of 
tight budgets, we have to take control of our resources and make 
sure we are using them wisely, and the most expensive and essential 
resource in the judicial branch is the judge.”694  
When an individual can choose from hundreds of thousands of 
products on a website, buy their selection with a click, and then track 
its delivery from seller to doorstep in 48 hours, and the only infor-
mation a litigant can access is a court docket listing pleadings and 
events, the disconnect between courts and their customers is evident. 
Any idea that the court system can continue with its current opacity 
bodes poorly for the continued relevance of courts, and if transpar-
ency provides a window into how cases move through the court sys-
tem, interest in better case management will likely result from 
judges seeking to deliver great justice—or protect their reputations. 
Doing nothing risks obsolescence. 
The critical motivation for civil judicial case management is 
public trust and confidence in the ability of our state courts to fairly, 
timely, and cost-effectively resolve our disputes.695 Judges repeat-
edly expressed concern that the traditional creaky and flawed sys-
tems currently in place will not meet twenty-first century demands. 
Many acknowledged the need to be more transparent and accounta-
ble. All interviewed judges made reference in one way or another to 
the public’s expectation of timely, cost-effective, fair justice that 
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every judge should honor, and they all believe civil case manage-
ment is an important tool to meet that expectation. Some judges, 
particularly those who had served in judicial branch leadership po-
sitions, also pointed out broader public concerns. As one judge 
pointed out,  
time is valuable to the justice system. It’s not just 
working harder, it’s working smarter with our re-
sources. Some judges see themselves as efficient just 
by giving access and hearing cases, equating hard 
work with what is needed; but there are ways of 
working that are so much more effective. Case man-
agement helps by setting reasonable goals and defin-
ing expectations. . . . Some judges think, ‘I can’t 
handle anything else,’ but this gets you more time, 
less stress for everyone—it’s good for the parties, it’s 
good for the lawyers, it’s good for the judges, and it’s 
good for the system. Case management is a tool that 
makes life better in so many ways. Business people 
know how they can plan for the future. It enhances 
public trust and confidence in every way.696  
If the problems in our justice system evidenced in these survey 
results are this clear to judges, how can we guarantee justice to liti-
gants who must navigate these flawed processes in seeking solutions 
to their problems in court? Courts and court leaders have to confront 
the disconnect that is evident throughout the survey responses: 
judges don’t think the system works and they don’t think the parties 
can manage it, but judges aren’t taking action on it. A challenging 
element of the change process is providing motivation.697 In terms 
of effecting change, the judicial branch has few resources and little 
means to incentivize changes in judicial behavior. Many judges, 
once the scope of the case management task is defined, may be mo-
tivated by the same mission that animated the interviewed judges: a 
simple dedication to excellence and to the people we serve. Other, 
more self-interested motivations, should also be explored: better use 
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 697  See generally John P. Kotter, Leading Change: Why Transformation Ef-
forts Fail, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 1995, at 59, 60. 
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of and less frustration for staff, particularly when dealing with pro 
se litigants; less waste of judicial time; and less stress as reflected in 
the interviews. 
Most citizen experience with the judicial branch comes through 
the doorway of their community state courthouse. This is where 
America’s reputation for justice is built or destroyed, where justice 
is delivered face-to-face. If lawyers and litigants do not see the state 
courts as being able to deliver timely, cost-effective, and fair justice, 
then state courts will continue to lose customers and disputes as con-
troversies shift to other private-sector options, or are simply aban-
doned. A diminishing role for courts, particularly the state courts 
which handle the vast majority of the peoples’ problems, has signif-
icant consequences for democracy. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in 
Federalist No. 17,  
There is one transcendant advantage belonging to the 
province of the State governments . . . [By which] I 
mean the ordinary administration of criminal and 
civil justice. This, of all others, is the most powerful, 
most universal, and most attractive source of popular 
obedience and attachment. It is that which, being the 
immediate and visible guardian of life and property, 
having its benefits and its terrors in constant activity 
before the public eye, regulating all those personal 
interests and familiar concerns to which the sensibil-
ity of individuals is more immediately awake, con-
tributes, more than any other circumstance, to im-
pressing upon the minds of the people, affection, es-
teem, and reverence towards the government.698 
Another judge described the challenge of case management in 
personal terms. He is the only active case managing judge in his 
area. His colleagues ask him: what’s the point? He replies with a 
uniquely Floridian response: “You walk on the beach and see star-
fish left by the departing tide all over the beach, dying on the sand. 
You pick them up one by one and throw them back into the water. 
People say you can’t save them all. But you know, it made a real 
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difference to that starfish I threw back.”699 That’s the difference he 
sees case management making case by case to the litigants, and with 
enough cases, to the entire justice system.700 
“Great reform movements require the fuel of a pressing social 
need, the oxygen of optimism, and the spark of a great idea.”701 
America needs effective state courts. This research shows that 
judges understand the need, but not the solution. The type of case 
management that has a real chance to make a material difference in 
civil litigation is not dependent on the philosophy, resolve, or work-
load of any individual judge, but is built into the court system. Sys-
temic, structured court case management can use the rules, guaran-
tee access and prompt high quality and accurate rulings, avoid waste 
and delay, and limit unnecessary process-imposed costs. If court 
leaders wish to improve use of case management as a tool to im-
prove the reputation of state civil courts as a place to solve problems, 
to attract a diverse caseload representing all sectors of our society 
and economy, and to allow the law to fully reflect the diversity of 
American life, then they must understand how to get judges en-
gaged. This Article hopes to fill a gap in the literature regarding what 
we know about judicial attitudes towards civil court case manage-
ment today, how it can help, and further identify what potential next 
steps should be taken to make civil case management part of the 
mechanics of civil case processing. Experts for years have advo-
cated for case management as essential to public trust in state civil 
courts to resolve their disputes effectively. This Article hopes to add 
clarity to that effort.  
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